Decision making in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART): Anterior cingulate cortex signals loss aversion but not the infrequency of risky choices

The inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula (IFG/AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are key regions involved in risk appraisal during decision making, but accounts of how these regions contribute to decision making under risk remain contested. To help clarify the roles of these and other related regions, we used a modified version of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8, 75-84, 2002) to distinguish between decision-making and feedback-related processes when participants decided to pursue a gain as the probability of loss increased parametrically. Specifically, we set out to test whether the ACC and IFG/AI regions correspond to loss aversion at the time of decision making in a way that is not confounded with either reward-seeking or infrequency effects. When participants chose to discontinue inflating the balloon (win option), we observed greater ACC and mainly bilateral IFG/AI activity at the time of decision as the probability of explosion increased, consistent with increased loss aversion but inconsistent with an infrequency effect. In contrast, we found robust vmPFC activity when participants chose to continue inflating the balloon (risky option), consistent with reward seeking. However, in the cingulate and in mainly bilateral IFG regions, blood-oxygenation-level-dependent activation decreased when participants chose to inflate the balloon as the probability of explosion increased, findings that are consistent with a reduced loss aversion signal. Our results highlight the existence of distinct reward-seeking and loss-averse signals during decision making, as well as the importance of distinguishing between decision and feedback signals.     

Action, mindreading and embodied social cognition

One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent??s actional processes and states??her goals, needs, intentions, desires, and so on??likely play important roles in and for mindreading processes. If so, a full understanding of mindreading processes and their role in cognition more broadly will require an understanding of how actional mental processes interact with, influence, or take part in mindreading processes.     

Does power corrupt or enable? When and why power facilitates self-interested behavior

Does power corrupt a moral identity, or does it enable a moral identity to emerge? Drawing from the power literature, we propose that the psychological experience of power, although often associated with promoting self-interest, is associated with greater self-interest only in the presence of a weak moral identity. Furthermore, we propose that the psychological experience of power is associated with less self-interest in the presence of a strong moral identity. Across a field survey of working adults and in a lab experiment, individuals with a strong moral identity were less likely to act in self-interest, yet individuals with a weak moral identity were more likely to act in self-interest, when subjectively experiencing power. Finally, we predict and demonstrate an explanatory mechanism behind this effect: The psychological experience of power enhances moral awareness among those with a strong moral identity, yet decreases the moral awareness among those with a weak moral identity. In turn, individuals' moral awareness affects how they behave in relation to their self-interest.     

A five-factor measure of dependent personality traits

This study provides convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity data for a new measure of dependent personality traits from the perspective of the five-factor model (FFM). Dependent personality trait scales were constructed as maladaptive variants of FFM facets (e.g., Gullibility as a maladaptive variant of FFM trust). Based on responses from 383 undergraduates, the convergent validity of the Five-Factor Dependency Inventory (FFDI) scales was tested with respect to 2 measures of the FFM, 6 dependency trait scales, and 4 measures of dependent personality disorder. Discriminant validity was tested with respect to FFM facets from alternative domains. Incremental validity was tested with respect to the ability of the FFM dependent personality trait scales to account for variance in 2 established measures of dependency, after variance accounted for by respective FFM facet scales and other measures of DPD was first removed. The results of this study provided support for the validity of the FFDI assessment of dependency from the perspective of the FFM.     

Measures to assess maladaptive variants of the five-factor model

The five-factor model (FFM) is the predominant dimensional model of general personality structure. A considerable body of research supports the hypothesis that personality disorders can be conceptualized as extreme or maladaptive variants of the domains and facets of the FFM. However, existing measures of the FFM are confined largely to the normal variants. The purpose of this special section of the Journal of Personality Assessment is to provide the development and initial validation of self-report inventory scales to assess obsessive-compulsive, borderline, narcissistic, avoidant, and dependent personality traits from the perspective of the FFM, which complement the similarly constructed existing measures for psychopathic, histrionic, and schizotypal personality traits.     

EFFECTS OF A SIGNALED DELAY TO REINFORCEMENT IN THE PREVIOUS AND UPCOMING RATIOS ON BETWEEN-RATIO PAUSING IN FIXED-RATIO SCHEDULES

Domestic hens responded under multiple fixed‐ratio fixed‐ratio schedules with equal fixed ratios. One component provided immediate reinforcement and the other provided reinforcement after a delay, signaled by the offset of the key light. The components were presented quasirandomly so that all four possible transitions occurred in each session. The delay was varied over 0, 4, 8, 16, and 32 s with fixed‐ratio 5 schedules, and over 0, 8 and 32 s with fixed‐ratio 1, 15 and 40 schedules. Main effects of fixed‐ratio value and delay duration were detected on between‐ratio pauses. Pauses were longer when the multiple‐schedule stimulus correlated with a delayed‐reinforcer component was presented, with the longest pauses occurring at the transition from a component with an immediate reinforcer to one with a delayed reinforcer. Pause durations were shortest during immediate components. Overall, both the presence or absence of a delay in the upcoming component, and the presence or absence of a delay in the preceding component affected pause length, but the upcoming delay had the larger effect. Thus changes in delay had similar effects to past reports of the effects of changes in response force, response requirement, and reinforcer magnitude in multiple fixed‐ratio fixed‐ratio schedules.     

Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not supplant earlier intuitions

When students learn scientific theories that conflict with their earlier, naïve theories, what happens to the earlier theories? Are they overwritten or merely suppressed? We investigated this question by devising and implementing a novel speeded-reasoning task. Adults with many years of science education verified two types of statements as quickly as possible: statements whose truth value was the same across both naïve and scientific theories of a particular phenomenon (e.g., “The moon revolves around the Earth”) and statements involving the same conceptual relations but whose truth value differed across those theories (e.g., “The Earth revolves around the sun”). Participants verified the latter significantly more slowly and less accurately than the former across 10 domains of knowledge (astronomy, evolution, fractions, genetics, germs, matter, mechanics, physiology, thermodynamics, and waves), suggesting that naïve theories survive the acquisition of a mutually incompatible scientific theory, coexisting with that theory for many years to follow.     

Adaptive memory: enhanced location memory after survival processing

Two experiments investigated whether survival processing enhances memory for location. From an adaptive perspective, remembering that food has been located in a particular area, or that potential predators are likely to be found in a given territory, should increase the chances of subsequent survival. Participants were shown pictures of food or animals located at various positions on a computer screen. The task was to rate the ease of collecting the food or capturing the animals relative to a central fixation point. Surprise retention tests revealed that people remembered the locations of the items better when the collection or capturing task was described as relevant to survival. These data extend the generality of survival processing advantages to a new domain (location memory) by means of a task that does not involve rating the relevance of words to a scenario.