Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision

By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). However, much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children's expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties’ belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children's inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.     

Priming students for whole-class interaction: using interdependence to support behavioral engagement

Student interaction at a whole-class level is tied to learning outcomes, but encouraging students to engage with their peers at a whole-class level is difficult. While little research has sought to promote student engagement with one another at this level, one factor that has been shown to increase student interaction in pairs and small groups is student–student interdependency. Yet, to date, no studies have attempted to examine the impact of prior interdependency at this smaller scale on students’ interactions as a whole-class. The current study tested this relationship in an undergraduate class learning science content (n?=?19) through structuring interdependency (task and resource) during science learning. Students completed six science learning sessions each of which included a science learning activity followed by a whole-class concept mapping task. Students were audio and video recorded during the whole-class task, and then individual student behavior was coded in 10 s intervals during the first 10 min of each session. Generalized regression results showed that adding small group interdependency during learning predicted significantly more student science discussion (R²?=?.05) and supportive interactions (R²?=?.16), while predicting decreased expressions of science misunderstanding (R²?=?.07) during the whole-class task. Additionally, the combination of task and resource interdependency predicted a further decrease in student expressions of misunderstanding (R²?=?.07), but also increased student social distraction in comparison to task interdependency alone (R²?=?.28). Together these findings suggest that prior interdependency can be leveraged to increase student behavioral engagement at the whole-class level.     

Generalizations,Cultural Essentialism,and Metaphorical Gulfs

An ongoing debate in comparative research is about whether we should see cultural diversities as manifestations of essential differences or as superficial variations on a universal blueprint. Edward Slingerland has pointed to cognitive science and the use of embodied metaphors to emphasize the universality of concept formation and cognition across cultures. He suggests that this should quiet the “cultural essentialists” who take fundamental differences in Eastern and Western thinking as their starting points. Michael Puett has also leveled a critique of cultural essentialism in support of a presuppositionless approach, and Slingerland’s conclusions seem to offer him support. However, I will argue that even if all modern humans are broadly similar in metaphor use and cognitive processes, research in the humanities must continue to account for the differences implied by the particular metaphors employed and emphasized in diverse traditions. I contend that responsible hermeneutic practice does this through provisional, yet indispensable, generalizations.     

Is the Positive Bias an ADHD Phenomenon? Reexamining the Positive Bias and its Correlates in a Heterogeneous Sample of Children

The goals of this study were to (a) evaluate the presence of the positive bias (PB) in elementary-school-aged children with and without ADHD when PB is defined at the individual level through latent profile analysis and (b) examine the extent to which several correlates (i.e., social functioning, aggression, depression, and anxiety) are associated with the PB. Participants were 233 youth (30% female; 8 to 10 years of age), 51% of whom met criteria for ADHD. During an individual evaluation, children and parents completed a battery of questionnaires to assess child competence, depression, anxiety, and aggression. Children also participated in a novel group session with same-sex unfamiliar peers (half of the group was comprised of children with ADHD) to engage in group problem-solving tasks and free play activities. After the group session, peers and staff completed ratings of each child’s behavior (e.g., likeability, rule following). The best fitting LPA model for parent and self-ratings of competence revealed four profiles: High Competence/Self-Aware; Variable Competence/Self-Aware; Low Competence/Self-Aware; and Low Competence/PB, in which the PB was present across domains. Only 10% of youth showed a PB and youth with ADHD were no more likely to display the PB than their non-ADHD peers with similar levels of low competence. Lastly, the Low Competence/Self-Aware profile demonstrated higher levels of anxiety and depression than the Low Competence/PB profile; the profiles did not differ on aggression or peer or staff ratings of social/behavioral functioning. Implications for understanding the PB in children with and without ADHD are discussed.     

Transitioning from rich to lean reinforcement as a form of error correction

Discrete trial instruction (DTI) is a ubiquitous tool used by practitioners in early intervention programs. A common approach to correcting errors during DTI involves providing a single prompt of the target response when a mistake is made (i.e., single-response repetition). Modifications to the single-response repetition approach have been developed to improve acquisition; however, these modifications are often aversive techniques (e.g., increased effort, response cost) and may not be preferred by the children or considered socially acceptable by caregivers. We conducted this study to evaluate the use of a transition from rich to lean reinforcement as a form of error correction. We compared the rich–lean condition to the single-response repetition approach during DTI for 4 boys diagnosed with autism. The rich–lean condition was (a) more efficient in improving accuracy in 6 out of 9 tasks, (b) more preferred by all participants, and (c) socially validated by caregivers.