Inductive reasoning about causally transmitted properties

Different intuitive theories constrain and guide inferences in different contexts. Formalizing simple intuitive theories as probabilistic processes operating over structured representations, we present a new computational model of category-based induction about causally transmitted properties. A first experiment demonstrates undergraduates’ context-sensitive use of taxonomic and food web knowledge to guide reasoning about causal transmission and shows good qualitative agreement between model predictions and human inferences. A second experiment demonstrates strong quantitative and qualitative fits to inferences about a more complex artificial food web. A third experiment investigates human reasoning about complex novel food webs where species have known taxonomic relations. Results demonstrate a double-dissociation between the predictions of our causal model and a related taxonomic model [Kemp, C., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2003). Learning domain structures. In Proceedings of the 25th annual conference of the cognitive science society]: the causal model predicts human inferences about diseases but not genes, while the taxonomic model predicts human inferences about genes but not diseases. We contrast our framework with previous models of category-based induction and previous formal instantiations of intuitive theories, and outline challenges in developing a complete model of context-sensitive reasoning.     

1/f noise and effort on implicit measures of bias

Phenomena that vary over time can often be represented as a complex waveform. Fourier analysis decomposes this complex wave into a set of sinusoidal component waves. In some phenomena, the amplitude of these waves varies in inverse relation to frequency. This pattern has been called 1/f noise and, unlike white noise, it reflects nonrandom variation. Latencies in simple computer tasks typically reveal 1/f noise, but the magnitude of the noise decreases as tasks become more challenging. The current work hypothesizes a correspondence between 1/f noise and effort, leading to the prediction that increasing effort will reduce 1/f noise. In 2 studies, the author examined the relationship between an individual's attempts to avoid bias (measured in Study 1, manipulated in Study 2) and 1/f noise in implicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice. In each study, participants who made an effort to modulate the use of racial information showed less 1/f noise than did participants who made less effort. The potential value of this analytic approach to social psychology is discussed.     

Beyond Strategy,Towards the Kingdom of God: The Post‐Critical Reconstructionist Mission of the Emerging Church

Abstract : The Emerging Church is a diverse global phenomenon which envisions a radical reforming of the theology and praxis of the broader Christian church in light of the philosophical and cultural shift from modernism to post‐modernism. Differing from the evangelical New Paradigm seeker‐sensitive Church's generational focus, and the organizational unity and routines of Mainline Protestant denominations the Emerging Church conversation endeavors to create committed, authentic, day‐to‐day communities that embrace ecumenical and ancient Christian theology and practices in order to live out the reality of the in‐breaking kingdom of God. Though precise systemic theological unity within the Emerging movement is recognized as an elusive goal that is generally not even sought, the movement as a whole finds much in common with post‐conservative and post‐liberal theology, and shares a joint mission with those who have been called to the task of post‐critical reconstruction.     

Vague terms,indexicals, and vague indexicals

Jason Stanley has criticized a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox that treats vagueness as a kind of indexicality. His objection rests on a feature of indexicals that seems plausible: that their reference remains fixed in verb phrase ellipsis. But the force of Stanley’s criticism depends on the undefended assumption that vague terms, if they are a special sort of indexical, must function in the same way that more paradigmatic indexicals do. This paper argues that there can be more than one sort of indexicality, that one term might easily have both sorts, and that therefore, and despite Stanley’s worries, vagueness might easily be assimilated to one form.

Eliminating the memory blocking effect

Six experiments investigated the memory blocking effect (MBE) in which exposure to orthographically similar words (e.g., BALLOON) impairs one's ability to complete a similar fragment (e.g., BAL_ON_, solution is BALCONY). Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that blocking is not observed after a 72-hour delay; however, repetition priming was observed after the same delay. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that presenting unrelated semantic information during the fragment completion test eliminates blocking. Experiment 5 demonstrated that the MBE persists despite directed-forgetting instructions, and Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that activating both the solutions and blocking words for a particular fragment at study eliminates blocking. Collectively, the data demonstrate that reading orthographically similar primes automatically triggers retrieval of the blocking word and an executive control process works to manage this interference. A working framework that describes how an executive control mechanism could govern memory retrieval in the memory-blocking paradigm is presented to stimulate development of more advanced theoretical models that can explain blocking.     

The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy scale: an examination of the personality traits and disorders associated with the LSRP factors

There are several self-report measures of psychopathy, most of which use a two-factor structure. There is debate regarding the convergence of these factors, particularly with regard to Factor 1 (F1), which is related to the interpersonal and affective aspects of psychopathy; Factor 2 (F2) is related to the social deviance associated with psychopathy. This study examines the relations between the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy (LSRP) factors and personality traits and disorders (PDs) in an undergraduate sample (n = 271). LSRP Factor 1 is related to an antagonistic interpersonal style (i.e., low Agreeableness; high Narcissistic PD and ratings of prototypical psychopathy), whereas Factor 2 is more strongly related to negative emotionality (i.e., Neuroticism), disinhibition (i.e., low Conscientiousness) and a broad array of PD symptoms. The authors interpret these findings in the context of alternative measures of psychopathy and suggest that the LSRP is a reasonable, albeit imperfect, measure of psychopathy.     

Masked fearful faces modulate the orienting of covert spatial attention

Dot probe studies indicate that masked fearful faces modulate spatial attention. However, without a baseline to compare congruent and incongruent reaction times, it is unclear which aspect(s) of attention (orienting or disengagement) is affected. Additionally, backward masking studies commonly use a neutral face as the mask stimulus. This method results in greater perceptual inconsistencies for fearful as opposed to neutral faces. Therefore, it is currently unclear whether the effects of backward masked fearful faces are due to the fearful nature of the face or perceptual inconsistencies. Equally unclear, is whether this spatial attention effect is due to orienting or disengagement. Two modified dot probe experiments with neutral (closed mouth in Experiment 1) and smiling (open mouth in Experiment 2) masks were used to determine the role of perceptual inconsistencies in mediating the spatial attention effects elicited by masked fearful faces. The results indicate that masked fearful faces modulate the orienting of spatial attention, and it appears that this effect is due to the fearful nature of the face rather than perceptual inconsistencies between the initial faces and masks.     

Intuitions about declining marginal utility

In two studies, subjects judged the desirability of distributions of life expectancy or money. Their judgments showed declining marginal utility. That is, they were less sensitive to changes at the high end of each scale. Subjects also made utility ratings of the outcomes of individuals. And they made ratings of the distributions when these were described in terms of utility ratings rather than goods (years or dollars). The judgments of utility ratings showed equivalent declining marginal utility, even though they were based on utilities that themselves declined marginally. People extend their intuition about declining marginal utility to utility itself, as if utility had utility that declined marginally. In one experiment, a similar result was found with gambles: people are risk averse for utility as well as for money. We argue that this is an overextension of a reasonable heuristic and that this heuristic may account for one classic objection to utilitarian distributions. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion-induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.