National attitudes towards mental health treatment: the importance of research evidence

Most conceptualizations of evidence-based practice view it as a “three legged stool” consisting of: the use of best available research evidence, clinical expertise, and client preferences. Although empirical evidence and clinical expertise have received greater empirical attention, relatively little research has systematically explored client preferences. The present study analyzed self-reported treatment preferences for various clinical and non-clinical presentations. Adult participants (n = 1262) residing in the United States were presented with diagnostic vignettes and rated their relative preferences among 5 treatment variables, including: use of an empirically supported treatment (EST), quality of the client–therapist relationship, therapist empathy, therapist experience, and client speaking for the majority of therapy sessions. Results indicated that participants endorsed significant preference for receiving an EST over other treatment variables for all clinical disorders, with effect sizes ranging from small to large depending on the diagnosis. There was slightly greater variability in treatment preferences for non-clinical issues, though participants generally reported greater preference for receiving an EST. Follow-up questions provided further evidence for EST preferences. The implications of these results are discussed.     

Humility attenuates negative attitudes and behaviors toward religious out-group members

Humility is marked by the regulation of selfish impulses for the sake of others, including holding a modest view of one’s beliefs (and their relative strengths and weaknesses). In three studies, we evaluated the extent to which humility attenuates negative attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behaviors toward religious out-group members. In Study 1 (N = 159), humility regarding religious beliefs was associated with positive attitudes toward religiously different individuals. In Study 2 (N = 149), relational and intellectual humility were associated with less aggressive behavioral intentions in a hypothetical situation in which their cherished beliefs were criticized. In Study 3 (N = 62), participants implicitly primed with humility administered significantly less hot sauce (a behavioral measure of aggression) to a religious out-group member who criticized their cherished views relative to participants in the neutral prime condition. We highlight the importance of humility in promoting positive attitudes and behaviors toward religious out-group members.     

The capabilities approach and Catholic social teaching: an engagement

This essay brings Martha Nussbaum's politically liberal version of the Capabilities Approach (CA) to human development into critical dialogue with the Catholic Social Tradition (CST). Like CST, Nussbaum's focus on embodiment, dependence and dignity entails a social use of property which privileges marginalized people, and both theories explain the underdevelopment of central human capabilities in social rather than exclusively material terms. Whereas CST is metaphysically and theologically ‘thick', however, CA is ‘thin’: its proponents positively eschew metaphysical commitments, believing a commitment to quasi-Rawlsian ‘overlapping consensus' is more consistent with political liberalism. This creates two tensions between CA and CST. The first is that CST understands the internal virtues of essentially social practices to be inseparable from their concrete instantiation in actual communities, while CA sometimes describes these virtues as political entitlements which can be supported independently of the comprehensive doctrines of particular communities. We argue, therefore, that CA's commitment to political liberalism tends to ‘crowd out’ particular conceptions of the good, such as those found in CST. Second, because CST recognizes a plurality of spiritual purposes of property that CA does not, including promotion of what Pope Benedict XVI calls the ‘logic of gift', from the perspective of CST, CA will tend to be motivationally deficient in ways that negatively impact human development.     

Achieving socially significant reductions in problem behavior following the interview‐informed synthesized contingency analysis: A summary of 25 outpatient applications

Jessel, Hanley, and Ghaemmaghami (2016) reported the results of 30 interview‐informed, synthesized contingency analyses (IISCAs) and found the IISCAs to be an effective tool for identifying the functions of problem behavior across a variety of topographies, participants, and settings. Jessel et al. did not, however, include data on the effectiveness of the corresponding treatments. In the current study, we collected and summarized 25 additional applications, from analysis to treatment, in which the IISCA was applied in an outpatient clinic. The IISCA identified various social functions of problem behavior, which informed personalized treatments of functional communication training with contingency‐based reinforcement thinning. A 90% or greater reduction in problem behavior was obtained for every participant by the end of the treatment evaluation. The assessment and treatment process was socially validated by caregivers who rated the procedures highly acceptable and helpful, and the improvement in their child's behavior highly satisfactory.     

A Comparison of the Nomological Networks Associated With Forced-Choice and Likert Formats of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory

The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) is one of the most popular measures of narcissism. However, its use of a forced-choice response set might negatively affect some of its psychometric properties. The purpose of this research was to compare a Likert version of the NPI, in which only the narcissistic response of each pair was given, to the original NPI, in 3 samples of participants (N = 1,109). To this end, we compared the nomological networks of the forced-choice and Likert formats of the NPI in relation to alternative measures of narcissism, narcissistic personality disorder, entitlement, self-esteem, general personality traits (reported by self and informants), interpersonal styles, and general pathological traits included in the DSM–5. The Likert format NPI—total and subscales—manifested similar construct validity to the original forced-choice format across all criteria with only minor differences that seem to be due mainly to the increased reliability and variability found in the Likert NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale. These results provide evidence that a version of the NPI that employs a Likert format can justifiably be used in place of the original.     

Assessing Dimensions of Pathological Narcissism: Psychometric Properties of the Short Form of the Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory in a Sample of Italian University Students

To evaluate the psychometric properties of the Italian translation of the Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory–Short Form (FFNI–SF), 1,063 Italian university students were administered the scale, along with the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI) and the Measure of Disordered Personality Functioning (MDPF). In general, the FFNI–SF scales showed good internal consistency (median α = .76; median interitem r = .44) and structural analyses suggested a 3-component model of FFNI–SF scales that was similar to that reported by Sherman et al. (2015). FFNI–SF second-order scales yielded meaningful convergent and discriminant correlations with PNI second-order grandiose and vulnerable dimensions. Finally, FFNI–SF second-order scales correlated in expected ways with 2 dimensions of personality dysfunction.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Framing how we think about disagreement

Disagreement is a hot topic right now in epistemology, where there is spirited debate between epistemologists who argue that we should be moved by the fact that we disagree and those who argue that we need not. Both sides to this debate often use what is commonly called “the method of cases,” designing hypothetical cases involving peer disagreement and using what we think about those cases as evidence that specific normative theories are true or false, and as reasons for believing as such. With so much weight being given in the epistemology of disagreement to what people think about cases of peer disagreement, our goal in this paper is to examine what kinds of things might shape how people think about these kinds of cases. We will show that two different kinds of framing effect shape how people think about cases of peer disagreement, and examine both what this means for how the method of cases is used in the epistemology of disagreement and what this might tell us about the role that motivated cognition is playing in debates about which normative positions about peer disagreement are right and wrong.