Rational Inference of Beliefs and Desires From Emotional Expressions

We investigated people's ability to infer others’ mental states from their emotional reactions, manipulating whether agents wanted, expected, and caused an outcome. Participants recovered agents’ desires throughout. When the agent observed, but did not cause the outcome, participants’ ability to recover the agent's beliefs depended on the evidence they got (i.e., her reaction only to the actual outcome or to both the expected and actual outcomes; Experiments 1 and 2). When the agent caused the event, participants’ judgments also depended on the probability of the action (Experiments 3 and 4); when actions were improbable given the mental states, people failed to recover the agent's beliefs even when they saw her react to both the anticipated and actual outcomes. A Bayesian model captured human performance throughout (rs ≥ .95), consistent with the proposal that people rationally integrate information about others’ actions and emotional reactions to infer their unobservable mental states.     

Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures

People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? To address this question, we tested the good true self theory against two potential boundary conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual differences in misanthropy—the tendency to view humans negatively—predict beliefs about the good true self in an American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in a good true self, even among individuals who have an explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true self‐attributions across cultural groups, by comparing samples from an independent country (USA) and a diverse set of interdependent countries (Russia, Singapore, and Colombia). Results indicated that the direction and magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy, suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the true self as morally good.     

Sensitivity to the Sampling Process Emerges From the Principle of Efficiency

Humans can seamlessly infer other people's preferences, based on what they do. Broadly, two types of accounts have been proposed to explain different aspects of this ability. The first account focuses on spatial information: Agents' efficient navigation in space reveals what they like. The second account focuses on statistical information: Uncommon choices reveal stronger preferences. Together, these two lines of research suggest that we have two distinct capacities for inferring preferences. Here we propose that this is not the case, and that spatial‐based and statistical‐based preference inferences can be explained by the assumption that agents are efficient alone. We show that people's sensitivity to spatial and statistical information when they infer preferences is best predicted by a computational model of the principle of efficiency, and that this model outperforms dual‐system models, even when the latter are fit to participant judgments. Our results suggest that, as adults, a unified understanding of agency under the principle of efficiency underlies our ability to infer preferences.     

Examining the Effectiveness of Integrated Behavioral and Primary Health Care Treatment

Using a quasi‐experimental, pre–post test design of 196 persons diagnosed with serious mental illness, the authors compared the effectiveness of an integrated behavioral and primary health care (IBPH) treatment approach vs. a treatment‐as‐usual approach over a 12‐month period. A profile analysis of 5 mean difference scores, each representing a separate component of client holistic functioning, indicated that individuals receiving IBPH experienced a 24‐times greater improvement in overall functioning. Recommendations for treatment and client care are provided.     

Criminal Behavior and Self-Control: Using the Dual Component Theory of Inhibition Regulation to Advance Self-Control and Crime Research

Predicting crime remains a central issue for social science research. Perspectives that consider the role of self-control have added greatly to our ability to explain and predict criminal behavior. However, this approach has been narrowly focused on the role of individual differences in trait self-control, limiting the potential of this approach to integrate a range of findings in the literature. To realize the full potential of the self-control construct to explain criminal behavior, we use the Dual Component Theory of Inhibition Regulation (DCTIR). We discuss how the model can account for a number of findings, including patterns of recidivism, age differences, and the role of socioeconomic factors in crime. The DCTIR provides a framework for integrating these findings, generating new predictions, and ultimately better predicting criminal behavior.     

Promoting Mental Health in Disadvantaged Preschoolers: A Cluster Randomized Controlled Trial of Teacher Training Effects

The literature provides solid documentation of the negative consequences of poor psychosocial functioning and behavioral problems in early childhood. Children facing economic disadvantage are at higher risk for poor socio-emotional development and problem behaviors, which draws attention to the need for prevention targeted at this risk group. The aim of our study was to analyze the impact of an evidence-based teacher-training program, the Incredible Years Teacher Classroom Management (IY-TCM), on the behavior of economically disadvantaged Portuguese children. Participants were 1030 children aged 3–6 years, from 65 preschool classrooms selected for their high percentage of children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. The study followed an experimental randomized controlled between-group design, with pre- and post-intervention assessments. Teachers in the experimental group attended the IY-TCM program, implemented in six monthly workshops, and four sessions of individual in-class support. Children outcomes were evaluated with the Preschool and Kindergarten Behavior Scales—2nd Edition (Social Skills and Problem Behavior scales). After the intervention, preschoolers in the IY-TCM classrooms showed more improvements in their social skills and more decreases in problem behavior. Children with lower levels of social skills (high risk) at pre-intervention and those coming from families in economic need showed greater improvements in social skills, but these effects were not observed for problem behavior. Results support the growing evidence of the effectiveness of the IY-TCM as a stand-alone, non-adapted program in a Portuguese cultural context, which can play a protective role in children’s lives and thus bridge the gap between children coming from different economic backgrounds.     

Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats

My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information (often conceptually structured information) specialized for action guidance, which in turn suggests that [d] the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes.

     

Neighborhood Concentrated Disadvantage and Dating Violence among Urban Adolescents: The Mediating Role of Neighborhood Social Processes

The link between relationship violence and aspects of neighborhood concentrated disadvantage (e.g., percent of unemployed adults, percent of families below poverty level), has been established. However, the literature examining neighborhood social processes, including informal social control and social cohesion, in relation to adolescent dating violence has shown mixed results with a limited theoretical foundation and methodology. Using a social disorganization theoretical framework, this study examined the mediating role of these neighborhood social processes in the relation between concentrated disadvantage and adolescent dating violence within an urban context. Participants included 605 adult residents in 30 census tracts and 203 adolescents from neighborhoods on the West and South sides of Chicago. Neighborhood‐level concentrated disadvantage was measured via Census data, adult residents reported on neighborhood social processes, and youth reported on dating violence. Informal social control was negatively associated with dating violence, and social cohesion was positively associated with dating violence. A multilevel mediation model showed that concentrated disadvantage was related to higher levels of dating violence via lower levels of informal social control. These results extend social disorganization theory to dating violence within an urban context, while also highlighting the important role of neighborhood processes on relationship violence. Implications for research and intervention programming are discussed.     

Interpersonal regulation of relationship partners’ security: A causal chain analysis

Security in relationship partners’ positive regard promotes high-quality close relationships, and insecurity in partners’ regard undermines relationship quality. Hence, people may be motivated to dispel their close partners’ insecurity. The current research used an experimental-causal-chain design to test a novel model of the interpersonal regulation of relationship partners’ security. Manipulated perceptions of relationship partners’ insecurity increased the activation of security regulation goals (i.e., goals to improve partners’ security and dispel their insecurity) and selective attention to threat-relevant information (Study 1). In turn, manipulated security regulation goals increased the expression of positive regard for relationship partners, particularly in negatively evaluated and important domains (Study 2). In turn, manipulated expression of positive regard increased partners’ relationship security and satisfaction, particularly when partners had chronic doubts about the extent to which they were valued (Study 3). These studies provide compelling causal evidence for a relationship-protective response to detection of partner insecurity; people try to dispel the relationship threat posed by an insecure partner by adopting security regulation goals, which motivate expressions of positive regard that increase partner security.     

Can Only Human Lives Be Meaningful?

Duncan Purves and Nicolas Delon have argued that one’s life will be meaningful to the extent that one contributes to valuable states of affairs and this contribution is a result of one’s intentional actions. They then argue, contrary to some theorists’ intuitions, that non-human animals are capable of fulfilling these requirements, and that this finding might entail important things for the animal ethics movement. In this paper, I also argue that things besides human beings can have meaningful existences, but I disagree with Purves and Delon’s theory of meaning, and some of the practical implications they suggest arise from their conclusion. Specifically, I argue that Purves and Delon are wrong to suggest that intentional agency is necessary for one’s life to be meaningful; contributing to valuable states of affairs can be sufficient by itself. Purves and Delon’s objection to such a claim is that it would allow even inanimate objects’ existences to count as meaningful. However, while I accept this consequence, I argue that it only seems counterintuitive because of two false beliefs they appear to hold: that some X cannot have a meaningful existence without that meaning (a) making X better off or (b) giving X reasons for pride.