Command and consequence

Philosophical Studies - An argument is usually said to be valid iff it is truth-preserving—iff it cannot be that all its premises are true and its conclusion false. But imperatives (it is...     

THE SECULARIZATION OF CHANCE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF THE PROBABILITY REVOLUTION ON CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN DIVINE PROVIDENCE

This article gives a brief history of chance in the Christian tradition, from casting lots in the Hebrew Bible to the discovery of laws of chance in the modern period. I first discuss the deep‐seated skepticism towards chance in Christian thought, as shown in the work of Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin. The article then describes the revolution in our understanding of chance—when contemporary concepts such as probability and risk emerged—that occurred a century after Calvin. The modern ability to quantify chance has transformed ideas about the universe and human nature, separating Christians today from their predecessors, but has received little attention by Christian historians and theologians.     

Surprise! Infants consider possible bases of generalization for a single input example

Infants have been shown to generalize from a small number of input examples. However, existing studies allow two possible means of generalization. One is via a process of noting similarities shared by several examples. Alternatively, generalization may reflect an implicit desire to explain the input. The latter view suggests that generalization might occur when even a single input example is surprising, given the learner's current model of the domain. To test the possibility that infants are able to generalize based on a single example, we familiarized 9‐month‐olds with a single three‐syllable input example that contained either one surprising feature (syllable repetition, Experiment 1) or two features (repetition and a rare syllable, Experiment 2). In both experiments, infants generalized only to new strings that maintained all of the surprising features from familiarization. This research suggests that surprise can promote very rapid generalization.     

Misplaced Priorities: Gutmann’s Democratic Theory,Children’s Autonomy,and Sex Education Policy

This paper offers a critique of the “democratic state of education” proposed by Amy Gutmann in her influential book Democratic Education. In the democratic state of education, educational authority is shared among the state, parents and educational professionals; and educational objectives are geared toward equipping future citizens to participate in what Gutmann calls “conscious social reproduction”—the collective shaping of the future of society through democratic deliberation. Although I agree with some of Gutmann’s broad recommendations for civic education, I have misgivings about the centrality that she gives to conscious social reproduction in her theory of education. I argue that in focusing so intently on the facilitation of conscious social reproduction, Gutmann’s theory makes insufficient room for the basic interests of individual children, and in particular, their prospective interest in autonomy. Gutmann’s considered position on sex education policy—specifically, her willingness to allow local communities to deny their children access to sex education—exemplifies the shortcomings of her theory. Ultimately, her democratic state of education fails to acknowledge the fundamental moral importance of individual flourishing, and the contribution that education can and should make to it.     

Are consonant intervals music to their ears? Spontaneous acoustic preferences in a nonhuman primate

Humans find some sounds more pleasing than others; such preferences may underlie our enjoyment of music. To gain insight into the evolutionary origins of these preferences, we explored whether they are present in other animals. We designed a novel method to measure the spontaneous sound preferences of cotton-top tamarins, a species that has been extensively tested for other perceptual abilities. Animals were placed in a V-shaped maze, and their position within the maze controlled their auditory environment. One sound was played when they were in one branch of the maze, and a different sound for the opposite branch; no food was delivered during testing. We used the proportion of time spent in each branch as a measure of preference. The first two experiments were designed as tests of our method. In Experiment 1, we used loud and soft white noise as stimuli; all animals spent most of their time on the side with soft noise. In Experiment 2, tamarins spent more time on the side playing species-specific feeding chirps than on the side playing species-specific distress calls. Together, these two experiments suggest that the method is effective, providing a spontaneous measure of preference. In Experiment 3, however, subjects showed no preference for consonant over dissonant intervals. Finally, tamarins showed no preference in Experiment 4 for a screeching sound (comparable to fingernails on a blackboard) over amplitude-matched white noise. In contrast, humans showed clear preferences for the consonant intervals of Experiment 3 and the white noise of Experiment 4 using the same stimuli and a similar method. We conclude that tamarins' preferences differ qualitatively from those of humans. The preferences that support our capacity for music may, therefore, be unique among the primates, and could be music-specific adaptations.     

Coordination,Triangulation, and Language Use

In this paper, I explore two contrasting conceptions of the social character of language. The first takes language to be grounded in social convention. The second, famously developed by Donald Davidson, takes language to be grounded in a social relation called triangulation. I aim both to clarify and to evaluate these two conceptions of language. First, I propose that Davidson’s triangulation-based story can be understood as the result of relaxing core features of conventionalism pertaining to both common-interest and diachronic stability—specifically, Davidson does not require uses of language to be self-perpetuating, in the way required by conventionalism, in order to be bona fide components of linguistic systems. Second, I argue that Davidson’s objections to conventionalism from language innovation and language variation fail, and that certain kinds of negative data in language use require an appeal to diachronic social relations. However, I also argue that recent work on communication in the absence of common interests and common knowledge highlights the need for broader non-conventional social relations like triangulation. In short, I suggest that the choice between coordination and triangulation is not either/or: that we need to appeal to both if we are adequately to explain the nature of language and its use.     

Values and Science: An Argument for Why They Cannot Be Separated

A distinction between facts and values is often assumed when people in the modern West talk about science. The biologist Stephen Gould, for example, famously argued that religion covers questions of meaning and moral value, but science deals with empirical facts. This paper challenges the traditional fact/value distinction by questioning the presuppositions about science upon which it depends. It begins by describing the origins of the fact/value distinction in the Scientific Revolution and then gives three reasons for the inseparability of facts and values in scientific inquiry, drawing upon themes from the “practice turn” in recent scholarship on the sciences.