Keeping track of time: evidence for episodic-like memory in great apes

Episodic memory, as defined by Tulving, can be described in terms of behavioural elements (what, where and when information) but it is also accompained by an awareness of one’s past (chronesthesia) and a subjective conscious experience (autonoetic awareness). Recent experiments have shown that corvids and rodents recall the where, what and when of an event. This capability has been called episodic-like memory because it only fulfils the behavioural criteria for episodic memory. We tested seven chimpanzees, three orangutans and two bonobos of various ages by adapting two paradigms, originally developed by Clayton and colleagues to test scrub jays. In Experiment 1, subjects were fed preferred but perishable food (frozen juice) and less preferred but non-perishable food (grape). After the food items were hidden, subjects could choose one of them either after 5 min or 1 h. The frozen juice was still available after 5 min but melted after 1 h and became unobtainable. Apes chose the frozen juice significantly more after 5 min and the grape after 1 h. In Experiment 2, subjects faced two baiting events happening at different times, yet they formed an integrated memory for the location and time of the baiting event for particular food items. We also included a memory task that required no temporal encoding. Our results showed that apes remember in an integrated fashion what, where and when (i.e., how long ago) an event happened; that is, apes distinguished between different events in which the same food items were hidden in different places at different times. The temporal control of their choices was not dependent on the familiarity of the platforms where the food was hidden. Chimpanzees’ and bonobos’ performance in the temporal encoding task was age-dependent, following an inverted U-shaped distribution. The age had no effect on the performance of the subjects in the task that required no temporal encoding.     

On the Closure Properties of the Class of Full G-models of a Deductive System

In this paper we consider the structure of the class FGModS of full generalized models of a deductive system S from a universal-algebraic point of view, and the structure of the set of all the full generalized models of S on a fixed algebra A from the lattice-theoretical point of view; this set is represented by the lattice FACS_s A of all algebraic closed-set systems C on A such that (A, C) ε FGModS. We relate some properties of these structures with tipically logical properties of the sentential logic S. The main algebraic properties we consider are the closure of FGModS under substructures and under reduced products, and the property that for any A the lattice FACS_s A is a complete sublattice of the lattice of all algebraic closed-set systems over A. The logical properties are the existence of a fully adequate Gentzen system for S, the Local Deduction Theorem and the Deduction Theorem for S. Some of the results are established for arbitrary deductive systems, while some are found to hold only for deductive systems in more restricted classes like the protoalgebraic or the weakly algebraizable ones. The paper ends with a section on examples and counterexamples. Dedicated to the memory of Willem Johannes Blok     

Assessment of Functional Impairment in Spanish Children

Le pressent travaux vérifie l’applicabilité et la validité du CAFAS, un instrument pour évaluer l’incapacité fonctionnel dans une population espagnole. L’échantillon est formé par 441 malades ambulatoires psychiatriques d’entre 8 et 17 années et leurs parents, et aussi par un échantillon de 74 malades ambulatoires pédiatriques. On a applique différents instruments pour évaluer l’incapacité fonctionnel, la psychopathologie, et autres variables psychologiques. La fiabilité intra observateur varie entre modérée et bonne. L’accord entre les ponctuations obtenues avec l’information des parents et des infants varie entre faible et modérée. Les corrélations avec autres mesures d’incapacité et du fonctionnement sont significatives mais modérée. Les ponctuations CAFAS différencient significativement les enfants avec et sans psychopathologie. Les résultats obtenus avalisent l’utilisation du CAFAS pour les études en psychopathologie, en incapacité fonctionnel et pour planifier interventions et services de santé mental. The present work tests the applicability and validity of the CAFAS, an instrument for assessing functional impairment, in the Spanish population. The sample included 441 psychiatric outpatients from 8 to 17 years old and their parents, and a pediatric group of 74 outpatients. Different instruments for assessing functional impairment, psychopathology, and other related variables were used. Interrater reliability ranged from moderate to very good. Weak‐to‐moderate agreement between CAFAS scores based on information from parents and children was obtained. Correlations with other measures of impairment and functioning were moderate. CAFAS scores differentiated significantly between children with and without psychopathology. These results permit the use of the instrument for studies on psychopathology and functional impairment, and for planning intervention and mental health services.     

Natural reference: A phylo‐ and ontogenetic perspective on the comprehension of iconic gestures and vocalizations

The recognition of iconic correspondence between signal and referent has been argued to bootstrap the acquisition and emergence of language. Here, we study the ontogeny, and to some extent the phylogeny, of the ability to spontaneously relate iconic signals, gestures, and/or vocalizations, to previous experience. Children at 18, 24, and 36 months of age (N = 216) and great apes (N = 13) interacted with two apparatuses, each comprising a distinct action and sound. Subsequently, an experimenter mimicked either the action, the sound, or both in combination to refer to one of the apparatuses. Experiments 1 and 2 found no spontaneous comprehension in great apes and in 18‐month‐old children. At 24 months of age, children were successful with a composite vocalization‐gesture signal but not with either vocalization or gesture alone. At 36 months, children succeeded both with a composite vocalization‐gesture signal and with gesture alone, but not with vocalization alone. In general, gestures were understood better compared to vocalizations. Experiment 4 showed that gestures were understood irrespective of how children learned about the corresponding action (through observation or self‐experience). This pattern of results demonstrates that iconic signals can be a powerful way to establish reference in the absence of language, but they are not trivial for children to comprehend and not all iconic signals are created equal.     

Content and form characteristics that predict discriminating power in personality items: an item response theory-based analysis

In two personality item pools that measure extraversion and neuroticism, the relations between three groups of itemmetric properties and the estimated discrimination indexes according to the two-parameter model are assessed. The itemmetric properties, which are conceptualized as dimensions, are: verbal complexity, ambiguity, and trait indicativity, and the hypotheses concerning their impact on the discriminating power are derived from a processing-stage model. The dimension of trait indicativity shows the clearest relations with the discriminating power in the expected direction. The implications of the results in the construction of personality measures are discussed.     

Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) point to inform a human about the location of a tool

Although pointing is not part of great apes’ natural gestural repertoire, they can learn to point to food, in order to request it. To assess the flexibility with which they can use this gesture, one can vary the potential referent of the point. In two previous studies, three orangutans (two of them human-reared) have shown the ability to point to the location of a tool which a human experimenter needed in order to give them food. Here, we tested six orangutans and five bonobos using a set-up in which our subjects had to guide a human experimenter to the hiding place of a fork which was needed in order to retrieve a piece of food for the subject out of a vertical tube. We further examined the potential role of a competitive/deceptive context by varying the identity of the person responsible for hiding the tool. In addition, we implemented three different control conditions in which an object was hidden but it was not necessary to indicate its location to get the food. We found that the majority of subjects spontaneously guided the experimenter to the hiding place of the fork by pointing to it when it was necessary and they did so significantly less in control conditions. We did not find an effect of the person hiding the fork. Our results show that mother-reared orangutans and bonobos are able to point to inform a human about the location of an object that the human needs to procure food for the subject and that they can take into account whether it is relevant or not to do so.

Comparing dogs and great apes in their ability to visually track object transpositions

Knowing that objects continue to exist after disappearing from sight and tracking invisible object displacements are two basic elements of spatial cognition. The current study compares dogs and apes in an invisible transposition task. Food was hidden under one of two cups in full view of the subject. After that both cups were displaced, systematically varying two main factors, whether cups were crossed during displacement and whether the cups were substituted by the other cup or instead cups were moved to new locations. While the apes were successful in all conditions, the dogs had a strong preference to approach the location where they last saw the reward, especially if this location remained filled. In addition, dogs seem to have especial difficulties to track the reward when both containers crossed their path during displacement. These results confirm the substantial difference that exists between great apes and dogs with regard to mental representation abilities required to track the invisible displacements of objects.     

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what can be seen from where

Visual perspective taking research has established that chimpanzees recognize what others can or cannot see in the presence of occluding barriers. Less is known about chimpanzees’ appreciation of what they themselves can or cannot see in similar situations. Additionally, it is unclear whether chimpanzees must rely on others’ gaze cues to solve such tasks or whether they have a more general appreciation of what can be seen from where. Hence, we investigated chimpanzees’ ability to anticipate what they would or would not be able to see from different visual perspectives. Food was hidden among arrays of open containers, with different containers providing visual access from unique viewing perspectives. Chimpanzees immediately adopted the correct perspective for each container type. Follow-up experiments showed that they were not simply moving to align themselves with visible openings. Our study thus suggests that chimpanzees have good visual perspective taking abilities with regard to themselves as well as others, and that both likely reflect a more general knowledge, at least implicit, of what can be seen from where.

Taking Degrees of Truth Seriously

This is a contribution to the discussion on the role of truth degrees in manyvalued logics from the perspective of abstract algebraic logic. It starts with some thoughts on the so-called Suszko’s Thesis (that every logic is two-valued) and on the conception of semantics that underlies it, which includes the truth-preserving notion of consequence. The alternative usage of truth values in order to define logics that preserve degrees of truth is presented and discussed. Some recent works studying these in the particular cases of Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logics and of logics associated with varieties of residuated lattices are also presented. Finally the extension of this paradigm to other, more general situations is discussed, highlighting the need for philosophical or applied motivations in the selection of the truth degrees, due both to the interpretation of the idea of truth degree and to some mathematical difficulties.