Conservatism and “copy-if-better” in chimpanzees (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pan troglodytes</Emphasis>)

Social learning is predicted to evolve in socially living animals provided the learning process is not random but biased by certain socio-ecological factors. One bias of particular interest for the emergence of (cumulative) culture is the tendency to forgo personal behaviour in favour of relatively better variants observed in others, also known as the “copy-if-better” strategy. We investigated whether chimpanzees employ copy-if-better in a simple token-exchange paradigm controlling for individual and random social learning. After being trained on one token-type, subjects were confronted with a conspecific demonstrator who either received the same food reward as the subject (control condition) or a higher value food reward than the subject (test condition) for exchanging another token-type. In general, the chimpanzees persisted in exchanging the token-type they were trained on individually, indicating a form of conservatism consistent with previous studies. However, the chimpanzees were more inclined to copy the demonstrator in the test compared to the control condition, indicating a tendency to employ a copy-if-better strategy. We discuss the validity of our results by considering alternative explanations and relate our findings to the emergence of cumulative culture.     

Chimpanzee problem-solving: contrasting the use of causal and arbitrary cues

Humans are able to benefit from a causally structured problem-solving context rather than arbitrarily structured situations. In order to better understand nonhuman causal cognition, it is therefore important to isolate crucial factors that might differentiate between events that follow a purely spatial and temporal contingency and those that hold a “true” causal relationship. In the first of two experiments, chimpanzee subjects were required to detect a bottle containing juice from five opaque bottles of equal shape and size. In the causal condition, the juice bottle looked identical to the other four bottles, only it was much heavier than the others. In the arbitrary condition, the weight of all five bottles was identical, but the juice bottle was color-marked differently. Since bottle opening was made difficult (and therefore costly), the question was whether subject’s manipulative behavior would be random or somehow influenced by the nature of the provided information. Our results show that subjects detected and opened the juice bottle significantly faster when weight was the discriminating feature (causal condition) compared to situations in which the discrimination was necessarily based on a color-cue (arbitrary condition). Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility of a general learning bias toward tactile rather than visual information in chimpanzees. When tested in a simple exchange paradigm that prevented any use of causal information, no predominance of a tactile cue (weight) over a visual cue (color) could be found. Furthermore—and in contrast to the causal condition in Experiment 1—no learning occurred during the course of Experiment 2, neither in the weight nor in the color condition. We therefore conclude that chimpanzees can more easily determine the content of an object based on its causal properties compared to situations in which the only available information is a pure arbitrary regularity. This supports the view that chimpanzees’ causal cognition does not rely on mere perceptual information but also on structural abstraction about their physical environment.     

Relative quantity judgments in South American sea lions (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Otaria flavescens</Emphasis>)

There is accumulating evidence that a variety of species possess quantitative abilities although their cognitive substrate is still unclear. This study is the first to investigate whether sea lions (Otaria flavescens), in the absence of training, are able to assess and select the larger of two sets of quantities. In Experiment 1, the two sets of quantities were presented simultaneously as whole sets, that is, the subjects could compare them directly. In Experiment 2, the two sets of quantities were presented item-by-item, and the totality of items was never visually available at the time of choice. For each type of presentation, we analysed the effect of the ratio between quantities, the difference between quantities and the total number of items presented. The results showed that (1) sea lions can make relative quantity judgments successfully and (2) there is a predominant influence of the ratio between quantities on the subjects’ performance. The latter supports the idea that an analogue representational mechanism is responsible for sea lions’ relative quantities judgments. These findings are consistent with previous reports of relative quantities judgments in other species such as monkeys and apes and suggest that sea lions might share a similar mechanism to compare and represent quantities.     

First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement

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36‐month‐olds conceal visual and auditory information from others

By three years of age, children are skilled at assessing under which circumstances others can see things. However, nothing is known about whether they can use this knowledge to guide their own deceptive behaviour. Here we investigated 3‐year‐olds’ ability to strategically inhibit or conceal forbidden actions that a nearby adult experimenter could see or hear. In the first experiment, children were more likely to disobey the adult when she did not have visual access to their activities than they were when she was looking at them. In the second experiment, in which the adult could never see the child, children refrained from making noise when engaging in a prohibited action that the adult might hear. These results suggest that by three years of age children use their knowledge of others’ perceptual states to decide whether it is safe to commit a transgression and, moreover, actively conceal perceptual cues that could reveal to others their ongoing transgression.     

Behavioral cues that great apes use to forage for hidden food

We conducted three studies to examine whether the four great ape species (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans) are able to use behavioral experimenter-given cues in an object-choice task. In the subsequent experimental conditions subjects were presented with two eggs, one of which contained food and the other did not. In Study 1 the experimenter examined both eggs by smelling or shaking them, but only made a failed attempt to open (via biting) the egg containing food. In a control condition, the experimenter examined and attempted to open both eggs, but in reverse order to control for stimulus enhancement. The apes significantly preferred the egg that was first examined and then bitten, but had no preference in a baseline condition in which there were no cues. In Study 2, we investigated whether the apes could extend this ability to cues not observed in apes so far (i.e., attempting to pull apart the egg), as well as whether they made this discrimination based on the function of the action the experimenter performed. Subjects significantly preferred eggs presented with this novel cue, but did not prefer eggs presented with a novel but functionally irrelevant action. In Study 3, apes did not interpret human actions as cues to food-location when they already knew that the eggs were empty. Thus, great apes were able to use a variety of experimenter-given cues associated with foraging actions to locate hidden food and thereby were partially sensitive to the general purpose underlying these actions.     

Chimpanzees do not take into account what others can hear in a competitive situation

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what others can and cannot see in a competitive situation. Does this reflect a general understanding the perceptions of others? In a study by Hare et al. (2000) pairs of chimpanzees competed over two pieces of food. Subordinate individuals preferred to approach food that was behind a barrier that the dominant could not see, suggesting that chimpanzees can take the visual perspective of others. We extended this paradigm to the auditory modality to investigate whether chimpanzees are sensitive to whether a competitor can hear food rewards being hidden. Results suggested that the chimpanzees did not take what the competitor had heard into account, despite being able to locate the hiding place themselves by the noise.     

Enculturated chimpanzees imitate rationally

Human infants imitate others' actions 'rationally': they copy a demonstrator's action when that action is freely chosen, but less when it is forced by some constraint (Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 2002). We investigated whether enculturated chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) also imitate rationally. Using Gergely and colleagues' (2002) basic procedure, a human demonstrator operated each of six apparatuses using an unusual body part (he pressed it with his forehead or foot, or sat on it). In the Hands Free condition he used this unusual means even though his hands were free, suggesting a free choice. In the Hands Occupied condition he used the unusual means only because his hands were occupied, suggesting a constrained or forced choice. Like human infants, chimpanzees imitated the modeled action more often in the Hands Free than in the Hands Occupied condition. Enculturated chimpanzees thus have some understanding of the rationality of others' intentional actions, and use this understanding when imitating others.     

Do great apes use emotional expressions to infer desires?

Although apes understand others’ goals and perceptions, little is known about their understanding of others’ emotional expressions. We conducted three studies following the general paradigm of Repacholi and colleagues (1997, 1998 ). In Study 1, a human reacted emotionally to the hidden contents of two boxes, after which the ape was allowed to choose one of the boxes. Apes distinguished between two of the expressed emotions (happiness and disgust) by choosing appropriately. In Studies 2 and 3, a human reacted either positively or negatively to the hidden contents of two containers; then the ape saw him eating something. When given a choice, apes correctly chose the container to which the human had reacted negatively, based on the inference that the human had just eaten the food to which he had reacted positively – and so the other container still had food left in it. These findings suggest that great apes understand both the directedness and the valence of some human emotional expressions, and can use this understanding to infer desires.     

Three dimensions of coping and a look at their evolutionary origin

Serious problems persist concerning the conceptualization and measurement of the coping construct. This study examines the properties and factor structure of the COPE questionnaire, one of the most widely used instruments to measure coping, in a sample of 471 patients. A series of exploratory factor procedures are applied at the item- and scale-level, and the resulting solutions are tested both by their congruence with previously published structures and by confirmatory techniques. Our finding of three robust, generalizable, and parsimonious second-order dimensions—Engagement, Disengagement, and Help-Seeking—challenges the original structure. The results are discussed from an evolutionary perspective, on the assumption that the recognition of coping as the activation of vestigial defenses may make a substantial contribution to clarifying its functions and organization.