The Multi-Stimulus Box: An innovative learning device for the comparative study of object perception and recognition with various types of stimuli

In this article, we report the construction of a novel type of automated learning device for exploring a broad range of issues in animal visual cognition. The testing box (Multi-Stimulus Box, or MSB) we describe is an experimental chamber that enables the flexible presentation of various stimulus types while providing control over incidental cues to the greatest possible extent. Among the stimuli that can be presented are photographs, real objects, and even holograms. The MSB allows for comparative research across different stimulus qualities and species, and is thus a promising tool for advancing our understanding of the role of stimulus qualities for animals' perception, discrimination, and categorization of objects.     

Basic Conditional Reasoning: How Children Mimic Counterfactual Reasoning

Children approach counterfactual questions about stories with a reasoning strategy that falls short of adults’ Counterfactual Reasoning (CFR). It was dubbed “Basic Conditional Reasoning” (BCR) in Rafetseder et al. (Child Dev 81(1):376–389, 2010). In this paper we provide a characterisation of the differences between BCR and CFR using a distinction between permanent and nonpermanent features of stories and Lewis/Stalnaker counterfactual logic. The critical difference pertains to how consistency between a story and a conditional antecedent incompatible with a nonpermanent feature of the story is achieved. Basic conditional reasoners simply drop all nonpermanent features of the story. Counterfactual reasoners preserve as much of the story as possible while accommodating the antecedent.     

Directory of Members of the Society for Projective Techniques as of Feb. 1, 1966

Singer, Erwin, Key Concepts in Psychotherapy, New York, Random House, 1965, 384 Pp. $6.95. Reviewed by John Gladfelter     

Symptomattributionsstile bei Hypochondrie

Background

Somatic symptom attributions are of central importance in cognitive-behavioral models of the development, maintenance and treatment of hypochondriasis. However, the mode of symptom attribution has rarely been systematically investigated in these patients. Is a somatic mode of symptom attribution indeed specific for hypochondriasis and furthermore, how strongly is it associated with “doctor shopping”, a typical behavioral consequence of hypochondriasis?

Patients and methods

In this study 88 hypochondriacal, 52 depressive and 52 healthy persons were asked to complete the symptom interpretations questionnaire and several standardized symptom questionnaires. They also took part in two structured clinical interviews for the diagnosis of hypochondriasis and various other psychological disorders according to DSM-IV.

Results

Somatic symptom attributions were associated specifically with hypochondriasis, while normalizing attributions characterized persons with low health anxiety. When examined as predictors in multiple regression models, in particular somatic attributions and the total of somatoform complaints predicted the intensity of health anxiety (R ²?=?0.69) and “doctor shopping” (R ²?=?0.48).

Conclusion

In the cognitive-behavioral treatment of hypochondriasis, patients should be encouraged to test normalizing explanations as alternatives to habitual somatic attributions of somatic disturbances.     

Rationality in Action: A Symposium

Abstract

John Searle's forthcoming book ‘Rationality in Action’ presents a sophisticated and innovative account of the rationality of action. In the book Searle argues against what he calls the classical model of rationality. In the debate that follows Barry Smith challenges some implications of Searle's account. In particular, Smith suggests that Searle's distinction between observer-relative and observer–independent facts of the world is ill suited to accommodate moral concepts. Leo Zaibert takes on Searle's notion of the gap. The gap exists between the reasons that we have for acting and our actions. According to Searle, whenever there is no gap, our actions exhibit irrationality. Zaibert points out a certain obscurity in Searle's treatment of the gap, particularly in connection with Searle's notion of ‘recognitional rationality’. Finally, Josef Moural examines the interactions between Searle's theory of institutions and his theory of rationality, with emphasis on the connections between intentionality and Searle's notion of the ‘background’.     

Further Evidence for Nonspecificity of Theory of Mind in Preschoolers: Training and Transferability in the Understanding of False Beliefs and False Signs

In a training study, the authors addressed whether or not preschoolers' difficulty with false belief is due to a domain-specific problem with mental states. Following Slaughter's (1998 Slaughter , V. ( 1998 ). Children's understanding of pictorial and mental representations . Child Development , 69 , 321 – 332 .[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) design, 57 children who failed a false-belief (FB) pretest received two sessions of training on either an FB, false sign (FS), or control task. All children were then posttested on theory-of-mind, FS, and control tasks. Results showed the FB and FS tasks were not only empirically tested as equivalent but also potentially transferable (i.e., FB training enhanced FS posttest performance, and FS training contributed to the understanding of one's own false belief), suggesting that understanding of false beliefs is an ability of representational understanding that is not restricted to mental states.     

The Art of Sculpture: Jan Patočka’s Concept of Incarnate Being

Jan Pato?ka is known as a philosophical analyst of the phenomenological concept of the live-word (Lebenswelt), which contradicts the preoccupations expressed in Sir Herbert Read’s Art of Sculpture. This essay interprets Pato?ka’s “philosophy of sculpture” in the intellectual context of communist Czechoslovakia, arguing that he regarded sculpture as an incarnate being. His phenomenological interpretation defies all attempts to narrow such a being to the realm of mere haptic or visual sensibilities.     

Working memory capacity and the antisaccade task: individual differences in voluntary saccade control

Performance on antisaccade trials requires the inhibition of a prepotent response (i.e., don't look at the flashing cue) and the generation and execution of a correct saccade in the opposite direction. The authors attempted to further specify the role of working memory (WM) span differences in the antisaccade task. They tested high- and low-span individuals on variants of prosaccade and antisaccade trials in which an eye movement is the sole requirement. In 3 experiments, they demonstrated the importance of WM span differences in both suppression of a reflexive saccade and generation of a volitional eye movement. The results support the contention that individual differences in WM span are not exclusively due to differences in inhibition but also reflect differences in directing the focus of attention.     

Dissociating size representation for action and for conscious judgment: Grasping visual illusions without apparent obstacles

Visual illusions provide important evidence for the co-existence of unconscious and conscious representations. Objects surrounded by other figures (e.g., a disc surrounded by smaller or larger rings, Ebbinghaus/Titchener illusion) are consciously perceived as different in size, while the visuo-motor system supposedly uses an unconscious representation of the discs' true size for grip size scaling. Recent evidence suggests other factors than represented size, e.g., surrounding rings conceived as obstacles, affect grip size. Use of the diagonal illusion avoids visual obstacles in the path of the reaching hand. Results support the dual representation theory. Grip size scaling follows actual size independent of illusory effects, which clearly bias conscious perception in direct comparisons of lengths (Experiment 1) and in finger-thumb span indications of perceived length (Experiment 2).