Salient stimuli capture attention and action

Reaction times in a visual search task increase when an irrelevant but salient stimulus is presented. Recently, the hypothesis that the increase in reaction times was due to attentional capture by the salient distractor has been disputed. We devised a task in which a search display was shown after observers had initiated a reaching movement toward a touch screen. In a display of vertical bars, observers had to touch the oblique target while ignoring a salient color singleton. Because the hand was moving when the display appeared, reach trajectories revealed the current selection for action. We observed that salient but irrelevant stimuli changed the reach trajectory at the same time as the target was selected, about 270 ms after movement onset. The change in direction was corrected after another 160 ms. In a second experiment, we compared manual selection of color and orientation targets and observed that selection occurred earlier for color than for orientation targets. Salient stimuli support faster selection than do less salient stimuli. Under the assumption that attentional selection for action and perception are based on a common mechanism, our results suggest that attention is indeed captured by salient stimuli.     

Counterfactual reasoning: From childhood to adulthood

The objective of this study was to describe the developmental progression of counterfactual reasoning from childhood to adulthood. In contrast to the traditional view, it was recently reported by Rafetseder and colleagues that even a majority of 6-year-old children do not engage in counterfactual reasoning when asked counterfactual questions (Child Development, 2010, Vol. 81, pp. 376–389). By continuing to use the same method, the main result of the current Study 1 was that performance of the 9- to 11-year-olds was comparable to that of the 6-year-olds, whereas the 12- to 14-year-olds approximated adult performance. Study 2, using an intuitively simpler task based on Harris and colleagues (Cognition, 1996, Vol. 61, pp. 233–259), resulted in a similar conclusion, specifically that the ability to apply counterfactual reasoning is not fully developed in all children before 12 years of age. We conclude that children who failed our tasks seem to lack an understanding of what needs to be changed (events that are causally dependent on the counterfactual assumption) and what needs to be left unchanged and so needs to be kept as it actually happened. Alternative explanations, particularly executive functioning, are discussed in detail.     

Konzept der Mentalisierung

Mentalization is the fundamental human capacity to relate to each other as minded beings. We mentalize when we are aware of mental states in others or ourselves as persons with feelings, wishes and beliefs. That is what makes the behavior of other people meaningful to us. Fonagy and colleagues based their mentalization concept on the attachment theory and on hypotheses about the development of the self. Mentalization-based treatment relies on this concept and has been manualized and evaluated for the treatment of borderline personality disorders. Psychotherapy research supports this to some extent. The authors claim that all psychotherapeutic treatment will benefit from the understanding of mentalization and its practical applications (Allen et al. 2008). Although the concept of mentalization is not new, the integration of different theories with empirically informed knowledge into a coherent concept is new.     

Is reasoning from counterfactual antecedents evidence for counterfactual reasoning?

In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010 Perner, J. and Rafetseder, E. 2010. “Counterfactual and other forms of conditional reasoning: Children lost in the nearest possible world”. In Understanding counterfactuals/Understanding causation, Edited by: Hoerl, C., McCormack, T. and Beck, S. R. New York: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar]). Basic conditional reasoning takes background assumptions represented as conditionals about how the world works. If an antecedent of one of these conditionals is provided by the task, then a likely conclusion can be inferred based only on background assumptions. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning is that the selection of these additional assumptions is constrained by actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast, in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions, unconstrained by actual events. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers from counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention of reading a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, “If there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?” should counterfactually be answered “in the park”. But by ignoring the doctor's intentions, and just reasoning from premises about the default location of a hospital doctor who has not been called out to an emergency, one might answer: “in the hospital”. Only by 6 years of age did children mostly give correct answers.     

Cognitive control deficits in adolescents born with very low birth weight (≤ 1500 g): Evidence from dichotic listening

The objective of the paper is to explore bottom‐up auditory and top‐down cognitive processing abilities as part of long‐term outcome assessment of preterm birth. Fifty‐five adolescents (age 13–15) born with very low birth weight (VLBW) were compared to 80 matched controls born to term, using three consonant‐vowel dichotic listening (DL) instruction conditions (non‐forced, forced‐right and forced‐left). DL scores were correlated with cortical gray matter thickness derived from T1‐weighted structural MRI volumes using FreeSurfer to examine group differences also in the neural correlates of higher cognitive processes. While showing normal bottom‐up processing, VLBW adolescents displayed impaired top‐down controlled conflict processing related to significant cortical thickness differences in left superior temporal gryus and anterior cingulate cortex. Preterm birth with VLBW induces fundamental changes in brain function and structure posing a risk for long‐term neurocognitive impairments. Deficits emerge in situations of increasing cognitive conflict and can be related to measures of executive functions as well as morphology.     

Judgement bias in pigs is independent of performance in a spatial holeboard task and conditional discrimination learning

Biases in judgement of ambiguous stimuli, as measured in a judgement bias task, have been proposed as a measure of the valence of affective states in animals. We recently suggested a list of criteria for behavioural tests of emotion, one of them stating that responses on the task used to assess emotionality should not be confounded by, among others, differences in learning capacity, i.e. must not simply reflect the cognitive capacity of an animal. We performed three independent studies in which pigs acquired a spatial holeboard task, a free choice maze which simultaneously assesses working memory and reference memory. Next, pigs learned a conditional discrimination between auditory stimuli predicting a large or small reward, a prerequisite for assessment of judgement bias. Once pigs had acquired the conditional discrimination task, optimistic responses to previously unheard ambiguous stimuli were measured in the judgement bias task as choices indicating expectation of the large reward. We found that optimism in the judgement bias task was independent of all three measures of learning and memory indicating that the performance is not dependent on the pig’s cognitive abilities. These results support the use of biases in judgement as proxy indicators of emotional valence in animals.     

Metaphor and minimalism

This paper argues first that, contrary to what one would expect, metaphorical interpretations of utterances pass two of Cappelan and Lepore’s Minimalist tests for semantic context-sensitivity. I then propose how, in light of that result, one might analyze metaphors on the model of indexicals and demonstratives, expressions that (even) Minimalists agree are semantically context-dependent. This analysis builds on David Kaplan’s semantics for demonstratives and refines an earlier proposal in (Stern, Metaphor in context, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000). In the course of this argument, I also discuss some new examples of linguistic phenomena that motivate a semantic structure underlying metaphorical interpretation, phenomena I argue that neither Minimalists nor Contextualists can explain.     

Nonlinear dynamics: theoretical perspectives and application to suicidology

Despite decades of research, the prediction of suicidal behavior remains limited. As a result, searching for more specific risk factors and testing their predictive power are central in suicidology. This strategy may be of limited value because it assumes linearity to the suicidal process that is most likely nonlinear by nature and which can be more adequately described and analyzed with nonlinear dynamics. The goal of moving nonlinear dynamics from theory to practice and to real-world phenomena can now be realized with Internet-based monitoring systems such as the Synergetic Navigation System.     

Framing decisions: Hypothetical and real

This paper addresses the general issue of whether the practice of investigating human decision making in hypothetical choice situations is at all warranted, or under what conditions. A particularly relevant factor that affects the match between real decisions and hypothetical decisions is the importance of a decision’s consequences. In the literature experimental gambles tend to confound the reality of the decision situation with the size of the payoffs: hypothetical decisions tend to offer large payoffs, and real decisions tend to offer only small payoffs. Using the well-known framing effect (a tendency of risk-aversion for gains and of risk-seeking for losses) we find that the framing effect depends on payoff size but hypothetical choices match real choices for small as well as large payoffs. These results appear paradoxical unless size of incentive is clearly distinguished from the reality status of decision (real versus hypothetical). Since the field lacks a general theory of when hypothetical decisions match real decisions, the discussion presents an outline for developing such a theory.