Judgement bias in pigs is independent of performance in a spatial holeboard task and conditional discrimination learning

Biases in judgement of ambiguous stimuli, as measured in a judgement bias task, have been proposed as a measure of the valence of affective states in animals. We recently suggested a list of criteria for behavioural tests of emotion, one of them stating that responses on the task used to assess emotionality should not be confounded by, among others, differences in learning capacity, i.e. must not simply reflect the cognitive capacity of an animal. We performed three independent studies in which pigs acquired a spatial holeboard task, a free choice maze which simultaneously assesses working memory and reference memory. Next, pigs learned a conditional discrimination between auditory stimuli predicting a large or small reward, a prerequisite for assessment of judgement bias. Once pigs had acquired the conditional discrimination task, optimistic responses to previously unheard ambiguous stimuli were measured in the judgement bias task as choices indicating expectation of the large reward. We found that optimism in the judgement bias task was independent of all three measures of learning and memory indicating that the performance is not dependent on the pig’s cognitive abilities. These results support the use of biases in judgement as proxy indicators of emotional valence in animals.     

Metaphor and minimalism

This paper argues first that, contrary to what one would expect, metaphorical interpretations of utterances pass two of Cappelan and Lepore’s Minimalist tests for semantic context-sensitivity. I then propose how, in light of that result, one might analyze metaphors on the model of indexicals and demonstratives, expressions that (even) Minimalists agree are semantically context-dependent. This analysis builds on David Kaplan’s semantics for demonstratives and refines an earlier proposal in (Stern, Metaphor in context, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000). In the course of this argument, I also discuss some new examples of linguistic phenomena that motivate a semantic structure underlying metaphorical interpretation, phenomena I argue that neither Minimalists nor Contextualists can explain.     

Nonlinear dynamics: theoretical perspectives and application to suicidology

Despite decades of research, the prediction of suicidal behavior remains limited. As a result, searching for more specific risk factors and testing their predictive power are central in suicidology. This strategy may be of limited value because it assumes linearity to the suicidal process that is most likely nonlinear by nature and which can be more adequately described and analyzed with nonlinear dynamics. The goal of moving nonlinear dynamics from theory to practice and to real-world phenomena can now be realized with Internet-based monitoring systems such as the Synergetic Navigation System.     

Framing decisions: Hypothetical and real

This paper addresses the general issue of whether the practice of investigating human decision making in hypothetical choice situations is at all warranted, or under what conditions. A particularly relevant factor that affects the match between real decisions and hypothetical decisions is the importance of a decision’s consequences. In the literature experimental gambles tend to confound the reality of the decision situation with the size of the payoffs: hypothetical decisions tend to offer large payoffs, and real decisions tend to offer only small payoffs. Using the well-known framing effect (a tendency of risk-aversion for gains and of risk-seeking for losses) we find that the framing effect depends on payoff size but hypothetical choices match real choices for small as well as large payoffs. These results appear paradoxical unless size of incentive is clearly distinguished from the reality status of decision (real versus hypothetical). Since the field lacks a general theory of when hypothetical decisions match real decisions, the discussion presents an outline for developing such a theory.     

Developmental aspects of consciousness: how much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware?

When do children become consciously aware of events in the world? Five possible strategies are considered for their usefulness in determining the age in question. Three of these strategies ask when children show signs of engaging in activities for which conscious awareness seems necessary in adults (verbal communication, executive control, explicit memory), and two of the strategies consider when children have the ability to have the minimal form of higher-order thought necessary for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, respectively. The tentative answer to the guiding question is that children become consciously aware between 12 and 15 months (+/-3 months).     

Listen up,eye movements play a role in verbal memory retrieval

People fixate on blank spaces if visual stimuli previously occupied these regions of space. This so-called “looking at nothing” (LAN) phenomenon is said to be a part of information retrieval from internal memory representations, but the exact nature of the relationship between LAN and memory retrieval is unclear. While evidence exists for an influence of LAN on memory retrieval for visuospatial stimuli, evidence for verbal information is mixed. Here, we tested the relationship between LAN behavior and memory retrieval in an episodic retrieval task where verbal information was presented auditorily during encoding. When participants were allowed to gaze freely during subsequent memory retrieval, LAN occurred, and it was stronger for correct than for incorrect responses. When eye movements were manipulated during memory retrieval, retrieval performance was higher when participants fixated on the area associated with to-be-retrieved information than when fixating on another area. Our results provide evidence for a functional relationship between LAN and memory retrieval that extends to verbal information.     

The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum

The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the 'mineness' of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, considered as different and less fundamental than the feeling of mineness. Two clinical vignettes of patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia will be presented: the first one, illustrating early illness stages, and the second case, of chronic schizophrenia, symptomatically marked by persistent hallucinations. Through their analysis, we will discuss the experiential dimensions of minimal self.