Simulation of Preference Information in an Interactive Reference Point‐Based Method for the Bi‐Objective Inventory Routing Problem

In the research area of multiple criteria decision making, very few publications exist that explicitly design the simulation of a decision maker (DM) in an interactive approach. For this reason, we outline some methods widely used in the literature to identify common assumptions of simulating the DM's responses and the required input preference information. Our paper aims at covering the identified gap by introducing experimental concepts. Such concepts are used for theoretical analyses of a combined search‐and‐decision‐making procedure. Simulating the DM is a fruitful idea because the algorithm can be tested without integrating a human decision maker. Finally, we conduct experiments based on the proposed settings for a multiobjective inventory routing problem, which is a relevant and challenging logistic problem. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Probability and Evolution. Why the Probability Argument of Creationists is Wrong

Summary  Evolution is a time process. It proceeds in steps of definite length. The probability of each step is relatively high, so self organization of complex systems will be possible in finite time. Prerequisite for such a process is a selection rule, which certainly exists in evolution. Therefore, it would be wrong to calculate the probability of the formation of a complex system solely on the basis of the number of its components and as a momentary event.     

Adaptation in the constancy of visual direction measured by a one-trial method

Adaptation to field displacement during head movements in the direction with the head rotation and in the direction against it was produced under otherwise identical conditions and compared; the field displacement rate was also varied. A rapid training procedure was used, and a novel one-trial test was employed that could measure the adaptation well enough to compare the effects of various training conditions. The one-trial test measured the magnitude of one of the manifestations of adaptation, the apparent displacement of a stationary target during head movements. This apparent horizontal target displacement was transformed into an oblique one by having the head movements that brought forth the apparent target displacement simultaneously cause an objective vertical target displacement. The slant of the resultant apparent motion path varied with the magnitude of the apparent horizontal target displacement. It was measured by having S reproduce its slant angle. It was found that adaptation to field displacement in the direction with the head rotation was consistently greater than adaptation to the opposite displacement conditions. An explanation for this result is offered.     

Disentangling dimensions in the dimensional change card-sorting task

The dimensional change card-sorting task (DCCS task) is frequently used to assess young children's executive abilities. However, the source of children's difficulty with this task is still under debate. In the standard DCCS task, children have to sort, for example, test cards with a red cherry or a blue banana into two boxes marked with target cards showing a blue cherry and a red banana. Typically, 3-year-olds have severe problems switching from sorting by one dimension (e.g. color) to sorting by the other dimension (e.g. shape). Three experiments with 3- to 4-year-olds showed that separating the two dimensions as properties of a single object, and having them characterize two different objects (e.g. by displaying an outline of a cherry next to a red filled circle on the card) improves performance considerably. Results are discussed in relation to a number of alternative explanations for 3-year-olds' difficulty with the DCCS task.     

An automated version of the operation span task

We present an easy-to-administer and automated version of a popular working memory (WM) capacity task (operation span; Ospan) that is mouse driven, scores itself, and requires little intervention on the part of the experimenter. It is shown that this version of Ospan correlates well with other measures of WM capacity and has both good internal consistency (alpha=.78) and test-retest reliability (.83). In addition, the automated version of Ospan (Aospan) was shown to load on the same factor as two other WM measures. This WM capacity factor correlated with a factor composed of fluid abilities measures. The utility of the Aospan was further demonstrated by analyzing response times (RTs) that indicated that RT measures obtained in the task accounted for additional variance in predicting fluid abilities. Our results suggest that Aospan is a reliable and valid indicator of WM capacity that can be applied to a wide array of research domains.     

Decision-making impairments in patients with Parkinson's disease

A high percentage of Parkinson's disease (PD) patients show cognitive impairments in addition to the cardinal motor symptoms. These deficits primarily concern executive functions most probably linked to dysfunctions in prefrontal regions due to decreased dopaminergic transmission in fronto-striatal loops. To investigate possible associations between decision-making and executive functions in PD, we examined 20 non-demented PD patients and 20 healthy control subjects with a neuropsychological test battery and the Game of Dice Task. In this computerised decision-making task, the rules for gains and losses and the winning probabilities are obvious and stable. Thus, strategic components besides feedback processing might influence decision-making in this task. We found that PD patients were impaired in the Game of Dice task performance and that the frequency of disadvantageous choices correlated with both executive functions and feedback processing. We suggest that decision-making deficits of PD patients in explicit gambling situations might be associated with dysfunctions in two different fronto-striatal loops: the limbic-orbitofrontal-striatal loop, involved in feedback processing, and the dorsolateral prefrontal-striatal loop, involved in executive functions.     

Knowledge level learning and the power law: A soar model of skill acquisition in scheduling

Zusammenfassung. Das hier vorgestellte Modell lernt graduell, Planungsaufgaben aus der Klasse der Maschinenbelegungsprobleme (job-shop-scheduling problems) zu lösen. Mit Hilfe des Chunking-Mechanismus von Soar wird episodisches Wissen über die Belegungsreihenfolge von Aufträgen auf Maschinen memoriert. Bei der Entwicklung des Modells wurden zahlreiche qualitative (z. B. Transfereffekte) und quantitative Befunde (z. B. Bearbeitungszeiten) aus einer früheren empirischen Untersuchung berücksichtigt. In einer Validierungsstudie wurden dieselben Aufgaben von 14 Probanden und dem Modell bearbeitet. Die Passung von Simulationsdaten und empirischen Ergebnissen fiel insgesamt gut aus. Allerdings löst das Modell die Aufgaben schneller und zeigt auch einen etwas besseren Lernverlauf als die Probanden. Das Modell liefert eine Erklärung für das Rauschen, das typischerweise bei Bearbeitungszeiten zu beobachten ist: es handelt sich um erworbenes Wissen, das mehr oder weniger gut und auch unterschiedlich häufig auf neue Situationen übertragen wird. Der Lernverlauf der Probanden entspricht nur für aggregierte Daten einer Potenzfunktion (power law). Der vorgestellte Mechanismus zeigt, wie ein symbolisches Modell der Informationsverarbeitung graduelle Verhaltensänderungen generiert und wie der offensichtliche Erwerb allgemeiner Prozeduren ohne explizites Lernen von deklarativen Regeln erfolgen kann. Es wird nahegelegt, daß es sich hier um die Modellierung einer Form impliziten Lernens handelt. Summary. The model presented here gradually learns how to perform a job-shop scheduling task. It uses Soar's chunking mechanism to acquire episodic memories about the order to schedule jobs. The model was based on many qualitative (e.g., transfer effects) and quantitative (e.g., solution time) regularities found in previously collected data. The model was tested with new data where scheduling tasks were given to the model and to 14 subjects. The model generally fit these data with the restrictions that the model performs the task (in simulated time) faster than the subjects, and its performance improves somewhat more quickly than the subjects' performance. The model provides an explanation of the noise typically found in problem solving times - it is the result of learning actual pieces of knowledge that transfer more or less to new situations but rarely by an average amount. Only when the data are averaged (i.e., over subjects) does the smooth power law appear. This mechanism demonstrates how symbolic models can exhibit a gradual change in behavior and how the apparent acquisition of general procedures can be performed without resorting to explicit declarative rule generation. We suggest that this may represent a type of implicit learning.     

Dissociable stages of problem solving (II): first evidence for process-contingent temporal order of activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

In a companion study, eye-movement analyses in the Tower of London task (TOL) revealed independent indicators of functionally separable cognitive processes during problem solving, with processes of building up an internal representation of the problem preceding actual planning processes. These results imply that processes of internalization and planning should also be distinguishable in time and space with respect to concomitant brain activation patterns. To investigate this possibility, here we conducted analyses of fMRI data for left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) during problem solving in the TOL task by accounting for the trial-by-trial variability of onsets and durations of the different cognitive processing stages. Comparisons between stimulus-locked and response-locked modeling approaches affirmed that activation in left dlPFC was elicited particularly during early processes of internalization, comprising the extraction of goal information and the generation of an internal problem representation, whereas activation in right dlPFC was predominantly attributable to later processes of mental transformations on this representation, that is planning proper. Thus, present data corroborate the proposal that often observed bilateral dlPFC activation patterns during complex cognitive tasks such as problem solving may reflect functionally and, to some extent, even temporally separable processes with opposing lateralizations.     

Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief: …”

I applaud Ruffman for cautioning us against interpreting early sensitivity to others’ beliefs as evidence for an innate theory of mind and for making room for learning. In turn, however, I caution against his claim that all infants need is to understand that people act depending on what they perceive. Instead, infants may keep experiential records (Perner & Roessler, 2010) for other people or records of what they have registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), which makes it less obvious that all required knowledge can be acquired by statistical learning. As a general criticism I remonstrate with current theory of mind research on its lack of concern that we understand people as acting for reasons which goes beyond detecting lawful regularities in behaviour.