Further Evidence for Nonspecificity of Theory of Mind in Preschoolers: Training and Transferability in the Understanding of False Beliefs and False Signs

In a training study, the authors addressed whether or not preschoolers' difficulty with false belief is due to a domain-specific problem with mental states. Following Slaughter's (1998 Slaughter , V. ( 1998 ). Children's understanding of pictorial and mental representations . Child Development , 69 , 321 – 332 .[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) design, 57 children who failed a false-belief (FB) pretest received two sessions of training on either an FB, false sign (FS), or control task. All children were then posttested on theory-of-mind, FS, and control tasks. Results showed the FB and FS tasks were not only empirically tested as equivalent but also potentially transferable (i.e., FB training enhanced FS posttest performance, and FS training contributed to the understanding of one's own false belief), suggesting that understanding of false beliefs is an ability of representational understanding that is not restricted to mental states.     

Rationality in Action: A Symposium

Abstract

John Searle's forthcoming book ‘Rationality in Action’ presents a sophisticated and innovative account of the rationality of action. In the book Searle argues against what he calls the classical model of rationality. In the debate that follows Barry Smith challenges some implications of Searle's account. In particular, Smith suggests that Searle's distinction between observer-relative and observer–independent facts of the world is ill suited to accommodate moral concepts. Leo Zaibert takes on Searle's notion of the gap. The gap exists between the reasons that we have for acting and our actions. According to Searle, whenever there is no gap, our actions exhibit irrationality. Zaibert points out a certain obscurity in Searle's treatment of the gap, particularly in connection with Searle's notion of ‘recognitional rationality’. Finally, Josef Moural examines the interactions between Searle's theory of institutions and his theory of rationality, with emphasis on the connections between intentionality and Searle's notion of the ‘background’.     

The Art of Sculpture: Jan Patočka’s Concept of Incarnate Being

Jan Pato?ka is known as a philosophical analyst of the phenomenological concept of the live-word (Lebenswelt), which contradicts the preoccupations expressed in Sir Herbert Read’s Art of Sculpture. This essay interprets Pato?ka’s “philosophy of sculpture” in the intellectual context of communist Czechoslovakia, arguing that he regarded sculpture as an incarnate being. His phenomenological interpretation defies all attempts to narrow such a being to the realm of mere haptic or visual sensibilities.     

Directory of Members of the Society for Projective Techniques as of Feb. 1, 1966

Singer, Erwin, Key Concepts in Psychotherapy, New York, Random House, 1965, 384 Pp. $6.95. Reviewed by John Gladfelter     

Basic Conditional Reasoning: How Children Mimic Counterfactual Reasoning

Children approach counterfactual questions about stories with a reasoning strategy that falls short of adults’ Counterfactual Reasoning (CFR). It was dubbed “Basic Conditional Reasoning” (BCR) in Rafetseder et al. (Child Dev 81(1):376–389, 2010). In this paper we provide a characterisation of the differences between BCR and CFR using a distinction between permanent and nonpermanent features of stories and Lewis/Stalnaker counterfactual logic. The critical difference pertains to how consistency between a story and a conditional antecedent incompatible with a nonpermanent feature of the story is achieved. Basic conditional reasoners simply drop all nonpermanent features of the story. Counterfactual reasoners preserve as much of the story as possible while accommodating the antecedent.     

What can self-disorders in schizophrenia tell us about the nature of subjectivity? A psychopathological investigation

The purpose of this article is to show how schizophrenia, understood as a distortion of the most intimate structures of subjectivity, illustrates the nature of subjectivity as such, while at the same time how philosophical considerations may help to understand schizophrenia. More precisely, schizophrenic experiences of self-alienation seem to reflect a congealing or concretization of a form of differentiation or potential alterity implicit in the dynamic nature of subjectivity. In other words, we propose that the structure of subjectivity includes potential divisions and fissures that condition the experiences of radical self-alienation seen in schizophrenia. In order to elucidate how this alterity emerges within the self in schizophrenia and in order to consider its conditions of possibility we examine the disorders of the self as described in phenomenological psychopathology. We especially use the work of the Japanese psychiatrists Mari Nagai, her teacher Bin Kimura, and the French psychiatrist Henry Ey, supplemented with clinical material from our own research. Finally, we shed light on the development of the psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions, which are understood as the expressions of a radical alterization (i.e., becoming other) of the self.     

Symptomattributionsstile bei Hypochondrie

Background

Somatic symptom attributions are of central importance in cognitive-behavioral models of the development, maintenance and treatment of hypochondriasis. However, the mode of symptom attribution has rarely been systematically investigated in these patients. Is a somatic mode of symptom attribution indeed specific for hypochondriasis and furthermore, how strongly is it associated with “doctor shopping”, a typical behavioral consequence of hypochondriasis?

Patients and methods

In this study 88 hypochondriacal, 52 depressive and 52 healthy persons were asked to complete the symptom interpretations questionnaire and several standardized symptom questionnaires. They also took part in two structured clinical interviews for the diagnosis of hypochondriasis and various other psychological disorders according to DSM-IV.

Results

Somatic symptom attributions were associated specifically with hypochondriasis, while normalizing attributions characterized persons with low health anxiety. When examined as predictors in multiple regression models, in particular somatic attributions and the total of somatoform complaints predicted the intensity of health anxiety (R ²?=?0.69) and “doctor shopping” (R ²?=?0.48).

Conclusion

In the cognitive-behavioral treatment of hypochondriasis, patients should be encouraged to test normalizing explanations as alternatives to habitual somatic attributions of somatic disturbances.     

Is reasoning from counterfactual antecedents evidence for counterfactual reasoning?

In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). Basic conditional reasoning takes an antecedent, which like in counterfactual reasoning can be counter to fact, and combines it with a conditional (or set of conditionals reflecting knowledge of how the world works) to draw a likely conclusion. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning then is that these additional assumptions be modelled after the actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers than counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention to read a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, "if there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?" should counterfactually be answered "in the park". But ignoring the doctor's intentions and just reasoning on plausible grounds one might answer: "in the hospital". Only by 6 years, did children give mostly correct answers.     

Perspective taking and cognitive flexibility in the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task

In a study with 79 3-year-olds, we confirm earlier findings that separating the sorting dimensions improve children's performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task. We also demonstrate that the central reason for this facilitation is that the two sorting dimensions are not integral features of a single object. Spatial separation of the sorting dimensions has no additional significant influence. This finding highlights the important role of objects with respect to children's attentional flexibility. Implications for current theories on the DCCS task and for the development of perspective taking and cognitive flexibility are discussed.