Phases of Organ Integration and Conflict in a Transplant Recipient: A Longitudinal Study Using a Diary

In this paper the results from a research project on self-perception and psychological processing following transplantation of solid organs are presented. A diary at the individual case level was introduced to generate a longitudinal analysis. In the following paper we describe an evaluation of the entries of a single patient following a living donor kidney transplant. Conflicts in the relationship between the transplant recipient and the donor, who is also his wife, are clearly evident, and these are interpreted as incorporation conflicts in light of current psychoanalytic theory.     

Sorting between dimensions: conditions of cognitive flexibility in preschoolers

The Dimensional Change Card Sorting task frequently is used to measure extradimensional shifting abilities in preschool children. In two studies, we investigated what makes this extradimensional shifting task difficult. In Study 1 with 61 2- to 4-year-olds, we showed that extradimensional shifts from one dimension to another are more difficult than reversal shifts within a dimension (even with irrelevant variation on a second dimension). Study 2 with 77 3- and 4-year-olds further confirmed this finding using a computerized paradigm and showed that sorting instructions are critical for 3-year-olds' difficulties with extradimensional shifts. This finding is taken to suggest that 3-year-olds have particular problems with spontaneously classifying one object in two different ways.     

Langzeitwirkungen psychoanalytischer und verhaltenstherapeutischer Langzeitpsychotherapien

The prospective study compares 31 patients in long-term behavior therapy with 31 patients in psychoanalytically oriented long-term therapy. A naturalistic design was applied within the German health system. All patients underwent a diagnostic interview (SCID) by an external interviewer. Only patients who fulfilled the DSM III-R criteria for a depression or an anxiety disorder were included in the study. Although the diagnoses of the patients undergoing long-term behaviour therapy and long-term psychoanalytical psychotherapy were comparable, we found that they differed in various ways. The differences arose in a number of characteristics, such as education, access to psychotherapy (recommended by professionals versus patients introducing themselves), usage of psychotropic medication, and the strain of symptoms. The average duration of long-term behavior therapy was 2.4 years and 64 sessions. The average duration of psychoanalytically oriented long-term therapy was 3.6 years and 209 sessions. Symptoms (SCL-90-R) and interpersonal problems (IIP) were examined at the beginning, after 1 year, 2.5 years, 3.5 years and after 7 years. Both groups showed significant degrees of improvement within the first 3.5 years and remained stabilized in the following 3.5 years regarding the symptomatic aspects. Focussing on the interpersonal problems, group PA showed further improvement after the 3.5-year period. The BT group however, showed no further improvement after 3.5 years but stabilized. The evaluated phase-model of psychotherapeutic change for short-term therapy was confirmed more clearly for long-term therapies of psychoanalytical orientation than for long-term therapies of behavioral orientation.     

Probability and Evolution. Why the Probability Argument of Creationists is Wrong

Summary  Evolution is a time process. It proceeds in steps of definite length. The probability of each step is relatively high, so self organization of complex systems will be possible in finite time. Prerequisite for such a process is a selection rule, which certainly exists in evolution. Therefore, it would be wrong to calculate the probability of the formation of a complex system solely on the basis of the number of its components and as a momentary event.     

Simulation à la Goldman: pretend and collapse

Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006). We argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument. Fig. 1 Structure of argument

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Episodic memory development: theory of mind is part of re‐experiencing experienced events

Two experiments with 3½‐ to 6½‐year‐old children showed that theory‐of‐mind development is associated with the growth of episodic memory. Episodic memory was assessed by manipulating informational conditions such that they permit or prevent the formation of episodic memories in terms of re‐experiencing the recalled event. Only experienced events, e.g. seeing how one puts a picture of a frog into a box, can be remembered by re‐experience. Events known through indirect information cannot be re‐experienced, e.g. putting pictures into the box when blindfolded and being later shown on video what was on these cards. Children were also tested on a battery of theory‐of‐mind tasks assessing their understanding of the origins of knowledge. There was a significant interaction in both experiments showing that recall of directly experienced items improved in relation to indirectly presented items the higher children's theory‐of‐mind scores. The discussion suggests that episodic memory development is specifically linked to the growing ability to introspect an ongoing experience and interpret it as representing an actual past event. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Der biopsychosoziale Krankheitsbegriff in der Praxis

Many of the recent approaches in diagnostics and therapy, e. g. the behavioral medicine, consider themselves as “holistic” or “multidimensional”. By closer consideration, however, it turns out, that while more or less referring back to the system-theoretically founded “bio-psycho-social model” (Engel, Weiner et al.) its implications are not taken seriously in practice. Presenting a concrete work project (“simultaneous diagnostics”) we will show, how to implement this (theoretically potent) bio-psycho-social conception of disease in clinical practice. It can be clearly seen, that it cannot replace the conventional reductional approach of medicine which focusses on the examination of single processes and structures under simplified conditions. On the contrary, such reductionism remains indispensable, because to be able to grasp any higher (more complex) structure one has to know its elements. Comprehensive explanation of phenomena, however, is not possible in a reductionist way. Therefore, the bio-psycho-social disease model in its operationalization is not a new way of medicine, rather an expanded approach to diagnostical and therapeutic issues.     

Use of current explanations in multicausal abductive reasoning

In multicausal abductive tasks a person must explain some findings by assembling a composite hypothesis that consists of one or more elementary hypotheses. If there are n elementary hypotheses, there can be up to 2ⁿ composite hypotheses. To constrain the search for hypotheses to explain a new observation, people sometimes use their current explanation—the previous evidence and their present composite hypothesis of that evidence; however, it is unclear when and how the current explanation is used. In addition, although a person's current explanation can narrow the search for a hypothesis, it can also blind the problem solver to alternative, possibly better, explanations. This paper describes a model of multicausal abductive reasoning that makes two predictions regarding the use of the current explanation. The first prediction is that the current explanation is not used to explain new evidence if there is a simple (i.e., nondisjunctive, concrete) hypothesis to account for that evidence. The second prediction is that the current explanation is used when attempting to discriminate among several alternative hypotheses for new evidence. These hypotheses were tested in three experiments. The results are consistent with the second prediction: the current explanation is used when discriminating among alternative hypotheses. However, the first prediction—that the current explanation is not used when a simple hypothesis can account for new data—received only limited support. Participants used the current explanation to constrain their interpretation of new data in 46.5% of all trials. This suggests that context-independent strategies compete with context-dependent ones—an interpretation that is consistent with recent work on strategy selection during problem solving.