Comparability of Self‐Reported Conscientiousness Across 21 Countries

In cross‐national studies, mean levels of self‐reported phenomena are often not congruent with more objective criteria. One prominent explanation for such findings is that people make self‐report judgements in relation to culture‐specific standards (often called the reference group effect), thereby undermining the cross‐cultural comparability of the judgements. We employed a simple method called anchoring vignettes in order to test whether people from 21 different countries have varying standards for Conscientiousness, a Big Five personality trait that has repeatedly shown unexpected nation‐level relationships with external criteria. Participants rated their own Conscientiousness and that of 30 hypothetical persons portrayed in short vignettes. The latter type of ratings was expected to reveal individual differences in standards of Conscientiousness. The vignettes were rated relatively similarly in all countries, suggesting no substantial culture‐related differences in standards for Conscientiousness. Controlling for the small differences in standards did not substantially change the rankings of countries on mean self‐ratings or the predictive validities of these rankings for objective criteria. These findings are not consistent with mean self‐rated Conscientiousness scores being influenced by culture‐specific standards. The technique of anchoring vignettes can be used in various types of studies to assess the potentially confounding effects of reference levels. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stereotypes,Ingroup Emotions and the Inner Predictive Machinery of Testimony

The reductionist/anti-reductionist debate about testimonial justification (and knowledge) can be taken to collapse into a controversy about two kinds of underlying monitoring mechanism. The nature and structure of this mechanism remains an enigma in the debate. We suggest that the underlying monitoring mechanism amounts to emotion-based stereotyping. Our main argument in favor of the stereotype hypothesis about testimonial monitoring is that the underlying psychological mechanism responsible for testimonial monitoring has several conditions to satisfy. Each of these conditions is satisfied by our “hot” stereotypical capacities. Intergroup emotions play a key role here. Intergroup emotions inform the agent about which candidate stereotype is better suited to the current situation. Emotions serve as evidence that makes a certain stereotype and its particular profile of features more or less expected.

     

Group agential epistemic injustice: Epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of group epistemic agency1

Expanding Miranda Fricker's (2007) concept of epistemic injustice, recent accounts of agential epistemic injustice (Lackey, 2020; Medina, 2021; Pohlhaus, 2020) have focused on cases in which the epistemic agency of individuals or groups is unfairly blocked, constrained, or subverted. In this article I argue that agential epistemic injustice is perpetrated against marginalized groups not only when their group epistemic agency is excluded, but also when it is included but receives defective uptake that neutralizes their capacity to resist epistemic oppression. I identify two harms that such injustice inflicts on marginalized groups: epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of resistant epistemic group agency. My analysis shows how the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur through unfair epistemic exclusions in group dynamics, but also through forms of inclusion in group dynamics that distort or coopt the epistemic agency of the group. Following Emmalon Davis (2018) and her analysis of epistemic appropriation, I argue that the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur when the resistant epistemic resources of a marginalized group are appropriated in a way that disempowers them and critically defangs their resistant epistemic agency. I use Taylor Rogers’ (2021) analysis of the epistemic appropriation of “#MeToo” and “intersectionality” to show how epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging work in unjust epistemic group dynamics. The article offers a diagnosis of the failures of epistemic responsibility involved in agential epistemic injustice, and some suggestions for resisting those failures and working toward more responsible and just epistemic group dynamics.     

Sexual distractors boost younger and older adults' visual search RSVP performance

Do sexual words have high attentional priority? How does the ability to ignore sexual distractors evolve with age? To answer these questions, two experiments using Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) were conducted. Experiment 1 showed that both younger and older participants were better at identifying a target (the name of a colour) when it was preceded by 336 ms by a sexual word rather than by a musical word. Strikingly, the sexual‐word advantage was more pronounced for older adults than for younger adults. Experiment 2 showed that introducing a variable delay between the distractor and the target eliminated the sexual‐word advantage. This finding suggests that the sexual‐word advantage found in Experiment 1 was due to learning to utilize the sexual word as a temporal cue with a fixed duration between the distractor and the target. Contrary to previous research [Arnell et al., 2007, Emotion, 7, 465), neither experiment showed that sexual words produce an attentional blink.     

Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism

This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification.     

Using the Implicit Association Test to Assess Risk Propensity Self‐concept: Analysis of its Predictive Validity on a Risk‐taking Behaviour in a Natural Setting

The present work analyses the predictive validity of measures provided by several available self‐report and indirect measurement instruments to assess risk propensity (RP) and proposes a measurement instrument using the Implicit Association Test: the IAT of Risk Propensity Self‐Concept (IAT‐RPSC), an adaptation of the prior IAT‐RP of Dislich et al. Study 1 analysed the relationship between IAT‐RPSC scores and several RP self‐report measures. Participants' risk‐taking behaviour in a natural setting was also assessed, analyzing the predictive validity of the IAT‐RPSC scores on risk‐taking behaviour compared with the self‐report measures. Study 2 analysed the predictive validity of the IAT‐RPSC scores in comparison with other indirect measures. Results of these studies showed that the IAT‐RPSC scores exhibited good reliability and were positively correlated to several self‐report and indirect measures, providing evidence for convergent validity. Most importantly, the IAT‐RPSC scores predicted risk‐taking behaviour in a natural setting with real consequences above and beyond all other self‐report and indirect measures analysed. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Meaning as perceived and experienced by an African student group

This qualitative study explored what a Batswana group of African students (N?=?73) find most meaningful in their life and why those sources of meaning are important to them. Findings showed that, in line with previous Western studies, the most important source of meaning is relationships, and in particular family which provides support, but is also intrinsically valuable. Relatedness in this African group is also different from Western conceptualisations and previous empirical findings in the sense that horizontal (interpersonal) and vertical (spiritual) relationships are deeply intertwined. Education as a domain of life is also an important source of meaning to this cohort of students. The reported perceived meanings and experienced reasons bring forth a picture that resonates with values and expectations from the specific cultural and life phase contexts in which these African students are embedded. The meaning of these meanings for the enhancement of well-being in students merits exploration.