Spontaneous use of tools as straws in great apes

Great apes can use multiple tools to extract food embedded in substrates and can invent new ways to exploit those resources. We tested five bonobos, five chimpanzees, and six orangutans in a task in which they had to use (and modify) a tool as a straw to drink the juice located inside a container. Experiment 1 showed that four orangutans and one chimpanzee invented the use of a piece of electric cable to get the juice. Experiment 2 investigated whether subjects could transform a non-functional hose into a functional one by removing blockages that impeded the free flow of juice. Orangutans outperformed chimpanzees and bonobos by differentially removing those blockages that prevented the flow of juice, often doing so before attempting to extract the juice. In Experiment 3, we presented chimpanzees and orangutans with four 3-tool sets (each tool set contained a single straw-like tool) and allowed them to select one tool. Unlike chimpanzees, orangutans succeeded in selecting the straw-like tool above chance levels without having to physically manipulate it. We suggest that orangutans’ superior performance is related to their greater reliance on mouth actions during foraging. Experiment 4 investigated whether orangutans were also capable of selecting the suitable tool not by its appearance, but by the effects that it produced. After witnessing the experimenter blow bubbles or absorb liquid with a functional tool but fail to accomplish the same thing with the non-functional tool, orangutans failed to select the functional tool above chance levels.     

Tool choice on the basis of rigidity in capuchin monkeys

Wild capuchin monkeys select stone tools to crack open nuts on the basis of their weight and friability, two non-visual functional properties. Here, we investigated whether they would select new stick-like tools on the basis of their rigidity. In Experiment 1, subjects faced an out-of-reach reward and a choice of three unfamiliar tools differing in color, diameter, material, and rigidity. In order to retrieve the reward, capuchins needed to select the rigid tool exemplar. Capuchins gathered information regarding tools’ pliability either by (1) manipulating the tools themselves (manipulation condition), (2) observing a human demonstrator repeatedly bending the tools (observation condition), or (3) seeing the tools placed on a platform without any manipulation taking place (visual static condition). Subjects selected the rigid tool above chance levels in both the manipulation and observation conditions, but not in the visual static condition. In Experiment 2, subjects needed to select and use a flexible tool to access a liquid reward (as opposed to the rigid tool, as in previous experiment). Again, capuchins selected above chance levels the appropriate tool (i.e., flexible), thus demonstrating a good appreciation of the relation between the tool properties and the task requirements.     

Is expressive suppression always associated with poorer psychological functioning? A cross-cultural comparison between European Americans and Hong Kong Chinese

The habitual use of expressive suppression as an emotion regulation strategy has been consistently linked to adverse outcomes in a number of domains, including psychological functioning. The present study aimed to uncover whether the suppression-health relationship is dependent on cultural context, given differing cultural norms surrounding the value of suppressing emotional displays. We hypothesized that the negative associations between suppression and psychological functioning seen in European Americans would not be seen among members of East Asian cultures, in which emotional restraint is relatively encouraged over emotional expression. To test this hypothesis, we asked 71 European American students and 100 Chinese students from Hong Kong to report on their use of expressive suppression, life satisfaction, and depressed mood. A moderation analysis revealed that expressive suppression was associated with adverse psychological functioning for European Americans, but not for Chinese participants. These findings highlight the importance of context in understanding the suppression-health relationship.     

Imperative content and the painfulness of pain

Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders of representationalism have tried to analyse every kind of phenomenal character in terms of indicative contents. But there is another possibility: Affective phenomenology, in fact, depends on imperative representational content. This provides a satisfactory solution to the aforementioned difficulties.     

Exaggeration is harder than understatement, but practice makes perfect!

Previous research on the fakeability of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) yielded inconsistent results. The present study simultaneously analyses several relevant factors: faking direction, type of instructions, and practice. Furthermore, it takes baseline individual differences into account. After a baseline assessment in a self-esteem IAT without faking instructions (t0), participants in the faking conditions then (t1) faked high or low scores without being provided with recommended strategies on how to do so (i.e., individual strategies). At t2 and t3, they were asked to fake the IAT after having received information on recommended faking strategies. At t4, faking direction was reversed. Without the recommended strategies, faking high scores was not possible, but faking low scores was. With the recommended strategies, participants needed additional practice to fake high scores. When faking directions were reversed, participants were successful without additional practice, suggesting a transfer in faking skills. In most of the faking attempts, faking success was moderated by individual differences in baseline implicit self-esteem. This suggests that the complex interplay of factors influencing faking success should be taken into account when considering the issue of fakeability of the IAT.     

The modulation of spatial congruency by object-based attention: analysing the "locus" of the modulation

Earlier studies have demonstrated that spatial cueing differentially reduces stimulus-stimulus congruency (e.g., spatial Stroop) interference but not stimulus-response congruency (e.g., Simon; e.g., Lupiá?ez & Funes, 2005). This spatial cueing modulation over spatial Stroop seems to be entirely attributable to object-based attention (e.g., Luo, Lupiá?ez, Funes, & Fu, 2010). In the present study, two experiments were conducted to further explore whether the cueing modulation of spatial Stroop is object based and/or space based and to analyse the "locus" of this modulation. In Experiment 1, we found that the cueing modulation over spatial Stroop is entirely object based, independent of stimulus-response congruency. In Experiment 2, we observed that the modulation of object-based attention over the spatial Stroop only occurred at a short cue-target interval (i.e., stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA), whereas the stimulus-response congruency effect was not modulated either by object-based or by location-based attentional cueing. The overall pattern of results suggests that the spatial cueing modulation over spatial Stroop arises from object-based attention and occurs at the perceptual stage of processing.     

Oculomotor interference during manual response preparation: evidence from the response-cueing paradigm

Preparation provided by visual location cues is known to speed up behavior. However, the role of concurrent saccades in response to visual cues remains unclear. In this study, participants performed a spatial precueing task by pressing one of four response keys with one of four fingers (two of each hand) while eye movements were monitored. Prior to the stimulus, we presented a neutral cue (baseline), a hand cue (corresponding to left vs. right positions), or a finger cue (corresponding to inner vs. outer positions). Participants either remained fixated on a central fixation point or moved their eyes freely. The results demonstrated that saccades during the cueing interval altered the pattern of cueing effects. Finger cueing trials in which saccades were spatially incompatible (vs. compatible) with the subsequently required manual response exhibited slower manual RTs. We propose that interference between saccades and manual responses affects manual motor preparation.     

Instruction and load effects on high-skill and low-skill individuals: A study in the domain of mental arithmetic

What happens when people are asked to respond as quickly or as accurately as possible? This study tested the effects of speed/accuracy instructions and working-memory load on people's strategy efficiency and strategy selection. Adult participants solved simple addition problems (Experiment 1) and simple multiplication problems (Experiment 2) under load and no-load conditions and provided trial-by-trial strategy reports. High-skill participants were more efficient than low-skill participants, but the underlying causes of these skill-related effects differed across experiments. In the addition experiment, high-skill participants responded adaptively to the changing situations by changing their strategy choices, which resulted in smaller effects on their actual performance. Low-skill participants in contrast, did not change their strategy choices as adaptively, which resulted in less efficient performance—and especially so under load conditions. In the multiplication experiment, high-skill and low-skill participants differed in strategy efficiencies rather than in strategy choices. In the discussion, the results are further interpreted and future adaptations for the adaptive strategy choice model (ASCM; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989) are suggested.