Is the attribution of cultural differences to minorities an expression of racial prejudice?

The social psychological literature considers two main perspectives on the study of perceived cultural differences between majorities and minorities: one proposes that perception of cultural differences is an antecedent of prejudice and another states that the attribution of cultural differences to minorities is already a hidden expression of racial prejudice. This paper offers further support to this latter perspective. One hundred and ninety-four participants answered a questionnaire measuring (1) general racist belief; (2) cultural differences attributed to Black people (hetero-ethnicization); (3) the asymmetric attribution of secondary and primary emotions to the in-group and to Black people (infra-humanization); (4) the asymmetric attribution of natural and cultural traits to in-group members and to Black people (ontologization); and (5) negative evaluation of this social category. The general racist belief scale was not anchored in a specific group and measured the belief in the inferiority of certain social groups or peoples based on biological or cultural factors. Relationships between the scales were analysed through a set of Structural Equation Models. According to the predictions, results showed that the attribution of cultural differences is a dimension of prejudice. Results also showed that attribution of cultural differences, negative evaluation of Black people, ontologization, and infra-humanization were different dimensions of a common latent factor that can be identified as racial prejudice; and that prejudice was predicted by general racist belief. Results are discussed in the light of the study of the impact of perceived cultural differences on intergroup relations and in the light of the "new racism" approaches.     

Role of the Disease in the Psychological Impact of Pre-Symptomatic Testing for SCA2 and FAP ATTRV30M: Experience with the Disease, Kinship and Gender of the Transmitting Parent

To identify possible factors affecting the psychological impact of pre-symptomatic testing for spinocerebellar ataxia type 2 (SCA2) and familial amyloid polyneuropathy (FAP ATTRV30M), we studied (1) the effect of previous experience with the disease in the family, (2) kinship with the closest affected relative and (3) gender of affected parent, when adapting to test results; as well as (4) differences in the course of psychological wellbeing in 63 subjects ( 28 at-risk for FAP ATTRV30M, and 35 at risk for SCA2), who pursued predictive testing for these diseases, in Cuba and in Portugal. Our research shows that individuals with little or no experience with the disease in their family exhibited more anxiety; at-risk subjects for SCA2 or FAP ATTRV30M who had a first degree relative with the disease showed lower levels of anxiety and depression during pre-symptomatic testing. Also those with an affected mother had lower levels of depression, either immediately, or one year after receipt of test results. Adaptation to pre-symptomatic testing results differed for subjects at-risk for the two different conditions. Unlike the FAP ATTRV30M families, carriers for SCA2 reported pathological levels of depression immediately after-testing (3 weeks), although those levels had returned to normal levels at 6 months. Subjects at-risk for FAP ATTRV30M tended to have less anxiety than those tested for SCA2, at the one-year follow-up. Overall, depression levels improved over time, while anxiety remained more constant. A longer awareness of the disease in the family, closer kinship, and a transmitting mother all lessened the impact of pre-symptomatic testing, as expressed by the post-test levels of anxiety and depression.     

The role of interference produced by conflicting associations in contextual control

In 2 experiments, participants completed a computer task in which they judged the probability of outcomes occurring (e.g., flowers growing, a bug infestation) given cues (e.g., treatment of soil with a fictitious garden product). In each 2-phase experiment, cue X was associated with 1 outcome in Phase 1 and with a 2nd outcome in Phase 2. When the outcome in Phase 1 (e.g., X led to a bug infestation) was replaced in Phase 2 (e.g., X led to flowers growing), contextual control was observed (Experiments 1 and 2). Information learned in each phase was less likely to be retrieved when the cue was tested in a context different from the 1 where training occurred. When the 2nd outcome did not conflict with information acquired in the 1st phase (e.g., X led to flowers and bugs), no contextual control was observed (Experiment 2). Acquiring a 2nd association to X resulted in contextual control only when it conflicted with an association learned earlier. The authors discuss the role of interference produced when conflicting information is acquired in establishing contextual control.     

A Study on Late Closure in Spanish: Principle-grounded vs. Frequency-based Accounts of Attachment Preferences

A much-debated issue in current research on sentence parsing concerns the resolution of attachment ambiguities. Parsing theories differ on the procedures used to guide on-line attachment decisions: principle-grounded theories (e.g. garden-path/ construal) propose universal principles that minimize processing load; frequency-based accounts (such as linguistic tuning) claim that attachment decisions are shaped by readers' previous experience with their particular language; lexically based models, in turn, assert that attachment choices are determined by the properties of individual lexical items in the sentence. This paper reports six studies on late closure in the resolution of attachment ambiguities in Spanish: a questionnaire study on attachment preferences and three self-paced reading experiments where ambiguous PPs could be attached as arguments of two VP-hosts in NP-VP1-NPVP2-PP structures. The results show a clear preference towards low attachment (late closure), thus supporting principle-grounded theories. In addition, two corpus studies were carried out to obtain records of relative frequencies of the attachment choices involved in the experiments. A coarse-grained measure revealed that, in accordance with linguistic tuning, low-attachment structures are more common in Spanish NP-VP1-NP-VP2-PP sentences. However, a fine-grained count showed that low-attachment preferences cannot be explained by arguing that the specific verbs positioned lower on the tree (VP2) are more likely to take an extra argument than those located at a higher position (VP1), as lexical models would assume.     

The formation of structurally relevant units in artificial grammar learning

A total of 78 adult participants were asked to read a sample of strings generated by a finite state grammar and, immediately after reading each string, to mark the natural segmentation positions with a slash bar. They repeated the same task after a phase of familiarization with the material, which consisted, depending on the group involved, of learning items by rote, performing a shortterm matching task, or searching for the rules of the grammar. Participants formed the same number of cognitive units before and after the training phase, thus indicating that they did not tend to form increasingly large units. However, the number of different units reliably decreased, whatever the task that participants had performed during familiarization. This result indicates that segmentation was increasingly consistent with the structure of the grammar. A theoretical account of this phenomenon, based on ubiquitous principles of associative memory and learning, is proposed. This account is supported by the ability of a computer model implementing those principles, PARSER, to reproduce the observed pattern of results. The implications of this study for developmental theories aimed at accounting for how children become able to parse sensory input into physically and linguistically relevant units are discussed.     

Implicit learning shapes new conscious percepts and representations

We present here the lineaments of a new account of implicit learning, an account that does not rely on the notion of “implicit knowledge.” In this account, improved performance depends on the action of unconscious mechanisms that structure the phenomenal, conscious experience of the world. This integrative view makes groundless the search for dissociations between conscious and unconscious influences that has been at the core of the research on implicit learning and memory. We contrast this view, on the one hand, to Dienes and Berry’s (1997) proposal, which defines implicit learning by analogy with subliminal perception, and, on the other, to Neal and Hesketh’s (1997) episodic account, in which subjective experience is a starting point for inquiry, rather than the phenomenon requiring explanation.