Self-implication and heart rate variability during simulated exposure to flight-related stimuli

In the present study, the relationship between self-implication during simulated exposure to feared stimuli and Heart Rate Variability (HRV) was explored within the framework of the dynamical systems model of emotion regulation proposed by Thayer and Lane (Thayer, J.F., and Lane, R.D. (2000). A model of neurovisceral integration in emotion regulation and dysregulation. Journal of Affective Disorders, 61, 201–216.). An analogue sample of flight phobics (n=15) and a matched non-phobic control group (n=15) were presented with flight-related pictures, flight-related sounds or flight-related pictures and sounds. Significant differences on self-implication during exposure to flight-related sounds were found between low and high HRV fearful flyers, the former being more self-implied. However, the expected HRV decreases in the phobic participants exposed to feared stimuli were not found. These results emphasize the need to distinguish between high and low HRV fearful flyers in order to make a better use of the simulated exposure treatments.     

Self-deception and self-knowledge

The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self-deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of self-knowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so-called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception.     

Influence of Mass Media on Body Image and Eating Disordered Attitudes and Behaviors in Females: A Review of Effects and Processes

This article reviews research on the effects of television and magazines on body image and on disordered eating attitudes and behaviors in females. Evidence from different types of studies in the fields of eating disorders, media psychology, health psychology, and mass communication indicates that mass media are an extremely important source of information and reinforcement in relation to the nature of the thin beauty ideal, its importance, and how to attain it. Although considerable research remains to be done, evidence is accumulating that repeated exposure to media and to both direct and indirect (via media's effects on peers, parents, coaches, physicians, etc.) pressures from media to be thin constitute risk factors for body dissatisfaction, concerns over weight and disordered eating behaviors in adolescent girls and young women. To guide further research, as well as the prevention and treatment of disordered eating, we present a figural summary of media effects that integrates moderating and mediating factors such as internalization of the thin beauty ideal, social comparison, and activation of the thinness schema. We argue that risk factor research, prevention, and treatment will benefit from systematic research designed to clarify how the impact of various mass media is shaped by source and receiver/perceiver factors.     

A Pilot Study of Fragile X Syndrome Screening in Pregnant Women and Women Planning Pregnancy: Implementation,Acceptance, Awareness,and Geographic Factors

We report herein results of a study performed in the Balearic Islands which had the following goals: 1) Determine the proportion of pregnant or non-pregnant women planning pregnancy, who would choose to undergo a screening test for Fragile X Syndrome (FXS), if it is accompanied by the appropriate information; 2) Assess satisfaction and any increase in stress among women who participate in screening; 3) Collect epidemiological information about the incidence of the disease in our population; and 4) Collect demographic and health history data and assess participants’ awareness of the disease. Screening was performed on 3,731 pregnant and non-pregnant women of childbearing age and the results indicate: a very high voluntary rate of participation; a high level of self-reported satisfaction and low levels of stress because of the test; a very high incidence of premutation (1/106) in our population; and a low level of awareness about the existence of FXS (25 %). Additional findings indicate no significant correlation between self-reported health history and premutation detection, and the high premutation incidence does not seem to be specific to the indigenous Balearic population. Based on these results, we discuss the pros and cons of an implementation of preconception and pregnant women screening for FXS within a public health screening program.     

Personality neglect. The unforeseen impact of personal dispositions on emotional life

The present research provides the first evidence that people neglect their own personalities when they envision their future emotional lives. In Study 1, students ignored the impact of their dispositional happiness in predicting how they would feel 2 weeks after receiving grades. Yet dispositional happiness played an important role in shaping actual emotional experiences. Similarly, exhibiting personality neglect, participants in Study 2 overlooked their trait levels of neuroticism and optimism when forecasting their reaction to Barack Obama's election, though these personality dimensions were related to their actual emotional reactions. Because they overlooked the influence of their own dispositions, individuals incorrectly predicted their future feelings. Ironically, as a result of this personality neglect, more optimistic individuals were less likely to see their emotional future in an overly rosy light, whereas more neurotic individuals were more likely to overestimate the pleasure that the future would bring.     

PRIVILEGED ACCESS REVISITED

Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.     

The Ethical Subject and Willing Subject in the Tractatus: an Alternative to the Transcendental Reading

Philosophia - The Transcendental Reading of the Tractatus argues that Wittgenstein endorses, under the notion of ‘metaphysical subject’, the existence of a willing subject as a...     

Correction to: The Ethical Subject and Willing Subject in the Tractatus: an Alternative to the Transcendental Reading

Philosophia - The original version of the article missed to include an acknowledgments. The missing information is provided below.     

Memory,past and self

The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next, I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence.     

Privileged Access Naturalized

I offer an account of subjects' privileged access to their own minds. The main tenet of my account is that one may have the very same grounds for both a given belief that p and a higher-order belief about this belief, a feature which separates the believer's epistemic situation from that of observers. My account appeals only to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. It constitutes a naturalizing account in that it does not posit any mysterious faculty of introspection or 'inner perception' mechanism.