Individual differences in the mixture ratio of rotation and nonrotation trials during rotated mirror/normal letter discriminations

Mental rotation is thought to underlie the increase in response times (RTs) for deciding whether rotated letters are normal or mirrored versions. However, mental rotation predicts a linear increase in RTs, whereas the mirror/normal letter discrimination task typically produces a curved function. Recently, Kung and Hamm suggested that this curved function results from a mixture of trials in which mental rotation is employed and trials in which it is not. The mixture ratio may vary between individuals, with some individuals relying more on mental rotation than others. There is no factor in the Kung and Hamm model that reflects such individual differences. In the present study, we suggest that a possible exponent parameter could be added to the Kung and Hamm model to capture individual differences in the mixture ratio. This exponent parameter appears to capture an individual characteristic since the value obtained correlates between the mirror/normal letter task and a left/right object facing task. The development of a quantity that represents the mixture ratio will aid further testing of processes involved in the visual imagery system.     

Some Metaethical Desiderata and the Conceptual Resources of Theism

In this paper, I argue that theists are extremely well-situated with respect to developing metaethical accounts that qualify as ‘robust’ versions of moral realism. In the first part of the essay, a number of metaethical desiderata are identified. In the second part, theistic strategies for accommodating those desiderata are explained and defended. The upshot is that, contrary to the received philosophical wisdom, there are good theoretical reasons for theistic philosophers to seek to develop metaethical accounts that ground moral facts in facts about God.     

Birds of a feather sit together: physical similarity predicts seating choice

Across four studies, people sat (or reported they would sit) closer to physically similar others. Study 1 revealed significant aggregation in seating patterns on two easily observed characteristics: glasses wearing and sex. Study 2 replicated this finding with a wider variety of physical traits: race, sex, glasses wearing, hair length, and hair color. The overall tendency for people to sit beside physically similar others remained significant when controlling for sex and race, suggesting people aggregate on physical dimensions other than broad social categories. Study 3 conceptually replicated these results in a laboratory setting. The more physically similar participants were to a confederate, the closer they sat before an anticipated interaction when controlling for sex, race, and attractiveness similarity. In Study 4, overall physical similarity and glasses wearing similarity predicted self-reported seating distance. These effects were mediated by perceived attitudinal similarity. Liking and inferred acceptance also received support as mediators for glasses wearing similarity.     

Whole-Hearted Motivation and Relevant Alternatives: A Problem for the Contrastivist Account of Moral Reasons

Recently, Walter Sinott-Armstrong and Justin Snedegar have argued for a general contrastivist theory of reasons. According to the contrastivist account of reasons, all reasons claims should be understood as a relation with an additional place for a contrast class. For example, rather than X being a reason for A to P simpliciter, the contrastivist claims that X is a reason for A to P out of {P,Q,R…}. The main goal of this paper is to argue that the contrastivist account of reasons will be ill-fitted for accommodating certain features of moral reasons. In brief, the reason why the contrastivist analysis fails is that it cannot adequately allow for cases of morally correct whole-hearted action—cases where consideration of any alternate course of action would be misguided. But, if all consideration of alternate courses of action is misguided, then it is hard to see how one can set the relevant contrast class that is essential to the contrastivist view—any contrast class will seem out of place. In addition, I address some of the arguments that have been given in favor of the contrastivist account of reasons and argue that there are at least two ways that the non-contrastivist can respond to these arguments.     

Probability Discounting in College Students’ Willingness to Isolate During COVID-19: Implications for Behavior Analysis and Public Health

The Psychological Record - The present study was a preliminary analysis of college students’ willingness to self-isolate and socially isolate during the COVID-19 pandemic analyzed through a...     

A Black and White History of Psychiatry in the United States

Journal of Medical Humanities - Histories of psychiatry in the United States can shed light on current areas of need in mental health research and treatment. Often, however, these histories fail to...     

Snitching versus reporting: A qualitative analysis of barriers and facilitators to addressing safety concerns among high school students

Social Psychology of Education - Creating effective school-wide safety mechanisms depends on understanding students' previous experiences of reporting, however, students may also be...     

Actual and non-actual motion: why experientialist semantics needs phenomenology (and vice versa)

Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as “The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada.” Through a phenomenological reanalysis of proposals of Talmy, Langacker, and Matlock, we show that non-actual motion is both experientially and linguistically non-unitary. At least three different features of human consciousness—enactive perception, visual scanning, and imagination—constitute experiential motivations for non-actual motion sentences, and each of these could be related to phenomenological analyses of human intentionality. The second problem is addressed by proposing that the experiential motivations of non-actual motion sentences can be viewed as sedimented through “passive” processes of acquisition and social transmission and that this implies an interactive loop between experience and language, yielding losses in terms of original experience, but gains in terms of communal signification. Something that is underestimated by phenomenology is that what is sedimented are not only intentional objects such as states of affairs, but aspects of how they are given, i.e., the original, temporal, bodily experiences themselves. Since cognitive semantics has emphasized such aspects of meaning, we suggest that phenomenology can itself benefit from experientialist semantics, especially when it turns its focus from prepredicative to predicative, linguistic intentionality.     

Terms of the debate on the format and structure of visual memory

Our ability to actively maintain information in visual memory is strikingly limited. There is considerable debate about why this is so. As with many questions in psychology, the debate is framed dichotomously: Is visual working memory limited because it is supported by only a small handful of discrete “slots” into which visual representations are placed, or is it because there is an insufficient supply of a “resource” that is flexibly shared among visual representations? Here, we argue that this dichotomous framing obscures a set of at least eight underlying questions. Separately considering each question reveals a rich hypothesis space that will be useful for building a comprehensive model of visual working memory. The questions regard (1) an upper limit on the number of represented items, (2) the quantization of the memory commodity, (3) the relationship between how many items are stored and how well they are stored, (4) whether the number of stored items completely determines the fidelity of a representation (vs. fidelity being stochastic or variable), (5) the flexibility with which the memory commodity can be assigned or reassigned to items, (6) the format of the memory representation, (7) how working memories are formed, and (8) how memory representations are used to make responses in behavioral tasks. We reframe the debate in terms of these eight underlying questions, placing slot and resource models as poles in a more expansive theoretical space.     

Using spatial frequency adaptation to study word recognition

The study of spatial frequency is being used increasingly often to investigate processes underlying visual word recognition. However, research in this area has adopted techniques that require the physical deformation of word targets used in experiments (e.g., filtered images of words, words embedded in visual noise), and this approach may limit the inferences that can be made about the role of spatial frequencies in normal word recognition. Spatial frequency adaptation is described in this article as an additional technique for studying the role of spatial frequency information in word recognition. The advantage of this technique is that it alters participants' sensitivity to particular spatial frequencies and so allows the study of spatial frequency involvement in word recognition using normal images of word stimuli. The application of the adaptation technique to studies of word recognition is explained in detail and its potential is then demonstrated by an example word recognition experiment in which spatial frequency adaptation was used.