Learned patterns of action-effect anticipation contribute to the spatial displacement of continuously moving stimuli

When participants control the horizontal movements of a stimulus and indicate its vanishing point after it unexpectedly vanishes, the perceived vanishing point is displaced beyond the actual vanishing point, and the size of the displacement is directly related to the action-effect anticipation one has to generate to successfully control the stimulus. The present experiments examined whether learning a pattern of action-effect anticipation would later impact one's perception of moving stimuli. While 1 participant (the controller) controlled a dot's movements across a computer screen, another (the observer), who could neither see nor hear the controller, watched the dot's movements on a separate monitor. When the dot unexpectedly vanished, the observer indicated the vanishing point. After 40 trials, participants switched roles. While serving as observers, all participants generated forward displacements, but those who did so after acquiring control experience produced larger displacement. Subsequent experiments indicated the larger displacement was due to action-effect anticipation the participants learned while either controlling the dot or observing another do so.     

From sucker to saint: moralization in response to self-threat

ABSTRACT— When people's rationality and agency are implicitly called into question by the more expedient behavior of others, they sometimes respond by feeling morally superior; this is referred to as the sucker-to-saint effect. In Experiment 1, participants who completed a tedious task and then saw a confederate quit the same task elevated their own morality over that of the confederate, whereas participants who simply completed the task or simply saw the confederate quit did not. In Experiment 2, this effect was eliminated by having participants contemplate a valued personal quality before encountering the rebellious confederate, a result suggesting a role for self-threat in producing moralization. These studies demonstrate that moral judgments can be more deeply embedded in judges' immediate social contexts—and driven more by motivations to maintain self-image—than is typically appreciated in contemporary moral-psychology research. Rather than uphold abstract principles of justice, moral judgment may sometimes just help people feel a little less foolish.     

Techniques for the production of point-light and fully illuminated video displays from identical recordings

Illumination of only a few key points on a moving human body or face is enough to convey a compelling perception of human motion. A full understanding of the perception ofbiological motion from point-light displays requires accurate comparison with the perception of motion in normal, fully illuminated versions of the same images. Traditionally, these two types of stimuli (point-light and fully illuminated) have been filmed separately, allowing the introduction of uncontrolled variation across recordings. This is undesirable for accurate comparison of perceptual performance across the two types of display. This article describes simple techniques, using proprietary software, that allow production of point-light and fully illuminated video displays from identical recordings. These techniques are potentially useful for many studies of motion perception, by permitting precise comparison of perceptual performances across point-light displays and their fully illuminated counterparts with accuracy and comparative ease.     

David O'Connor,God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism. Lanham,MD 1997

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Rational skepticism: A scientific review of Witts' (2018) criticisms of the PEAK relational training system

Witts' (2018) review of the peer-reviewed research on the PEAK-Direct Training Module (Dixon, 2014) yielded a divergent conclusion from that of previous reviews (Reed & Luiselli, 2016; Dixon, Belisle, McKeel et al., 2017). Witts advocates for skepticism of this research due to methodological shortcomings, hyperclaiming of results, and inappropriate statistical testing procedures. We identified 30 criticisms in Witts' review, respond to each, and argue that all but 2 (7%) contain untrue assumptions (7, 23%), are not novel (5, 17%), are logically invalid (7, 23%), or are more appropriately framed as criticisms of applied behavior analytic research more generally (9, 30%). The two criticisms that support Witts' purpose in writing his review are minor and not fatal. We discuss all of Witts' criticisms both specifically and broadly to illustrate that most of his suggestions about applied behavior analytic research may actually serve to hinder progress in a discipline moving toward larger-scale research.     

Willingness to fake: Examining the impact of competitive climate and hiring situations

Applicants may be willing to fake in job interviews with the aim of creating a positive impression. In two vignette‐based experiments, we examined if a competitive—versus noncompetitive—climate (Study 1) and hiring situation (Study 2) increased participants' willingness to fake. We also examined if Honesty–Humility and Competitive Worldviews moderated the relation between willingness to fake and how competitive participants believed they must be in order to secure the job. Results demonstrated that a competitive climate and hiring situation increased willingness to fake. Honesty–Humility and Competitive Worldviews were related to willingness to fake, but these relations did not change substantially at different levels of perceived need for competitiveness. Overall, results lend some theoretical support to propositions about applicant faking.