Hume's Utilitarian Theory of Right Action

A theory of right action is implicit in Hume's delineation of the virtues. It gives qualified priority to 'rules of justice' as Hume's remarks on 'that species of utility which attends this virtue' require. It is a useful actual-rule, not an ideal possible-rule, purely utilitarian theory that discounts rules of justice in 'extraordinary cases', has a problem when rules conflict, and invites the question 'Why not hark directly to the supreme law of utility in every case?'. It does not reflect contractarian considerations of mutuality of interests evident in Hume's texts, which while sometimes relevant to what is reasonable, are in his view never also relevant to what is moral.     

Pascalian wagers

A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to Robinsonian hyperreals. Another appendix presents for comparison Newcomb's Problem and a problem in some ways like it suggested, I think, by ideas of John Calvin.     

Age differences in visual and kinesthetic short-term memory

30 elderly subjects were matched with 30 young subjects and tested on a kinesthetic short-term memory task which required the replication of criterion moves after a variable retention interval under conditions of either rest, differing interpolated movement tasks, or mental activity. A visual control condition was used. Differing interference and temporal decrements were observed. Both old and young subjects differed significantly between sighted and blindfold conditions; however, there was no difference between the performance of the old and the young in the blindfold (kinesthetic) condition. These findings were discussed with respect to practical implications for the retraining of old subjects on certain motor tasks.     

Mental rotation and the frame of reference in blind and sighted individuals

Mental rotation in the congenitally blind was investigated with a haptic letter-judgment task. Blind subjects and blindfolded, sighted subjects were presented a letter in some orientation between 0° to 300° from upright and timed while they judged whether it was a normal or mirror-image letter. Both groups showed an increasing response time with the stimulus’s departure from upright; this result was interpreted as reflecting the process of mental rotation. The results for the blind subjects suggest that mental rotation can operate on a spatial representation that does not have any specifically visual components. Further research showed that for the sighted subjects in the haptic task, the orientation of a letter is coded with respect to the position of the hand. Sighted subjects may code the orientation of the letter and then translate this code into a visual representation, or they may use a spatial representation that is not specifically visual.     

Non-dominance,third person and non-action Newcomb problems,and metatickles

It is plausible that Newcomb problems in which causal maximizers and evidential maximizers would do different things would not be possible for ideal maximizers who are attentive to metatickles. An objection to Eells's first argument for this makes welcome a second. Against it I argue that even ideal evidential and causal maximizers would do different things in some non-dominance Newcomb problems; and that they would hope for different things in some third-person and non-action problems, which is relevant if a good theory of rational choices of acts should fit smoothly into a good theory of rational desires for facts.This paper elaborates on Section V of Sobel. forthcoming.     

Social preference in rats

Rats were given repeated choices between social and nonsocial outcomes, and between familiar and unfamiliar social outcomes. Lever presses on either of 2 levers in the middle chamber of a 3-chamber apparatus opened a door adjacent to the lever, permitting 45-s access to social interaction with the rat in the chosen side chamber. In Experiment 1, rats preferred (a) social over nonsocial options, choosing their cagemate rat over an empty chamber, and (b) an unfamiliar over a familiar rat, choosing a non-cagemate over their cagemate. These findings were replicated in Experiment 2 with 2 different non-cagemate rats. Rats preferred both non-cagemate rats to a similar degree when pitted against their cagemate, but were indifferent when the 2 non-cagemates were pitted against each other. Similar preference for social over nonsocial and non-cagemate over cagemate was seen in Experiment 3, with new non-cagemate rats introduced after every third session. Response rates (for both cagemate and non-cagemate rats) were elevated under conditions of nonsocial (isolated) housing compared to conditions of social (paired) housing, demonstrating a social deprivation effect. Together, the experiments contribute to an experimental analysis of social preference within a social reinforcement framework, drawing on methods with proven efficacy in the analysis of reinforcement more generally.