Fitting in a group: Theoretical development and validation of the Multidimensional Perceived Person–Group Fit scale

Despite the wide use of groups in organizations, research on individuals’ experiences of fit in their work groups has lagged due to lack of conceptual clarity of person–group (PG) fit and inconsistent measurement. To rectify these issues, we present an integrative definition of PG fit, which incorporates social- and task-related elements of group work, as well as supplementary and complementary conceptualizations of fit. Using this definition, we develop the Multidimensional Perceived Person-Group Fit (MPPGF) scale and validate it through five phases, across six samples. In Phase 1, we identified dimensions and generated items using a mix of deductive and inductive approaches. In Phase 2, we validated items yielding seven dimensions (value congruence, shared interests, perceived demographic similarity, needs-supplies match, goal similarity, common workstyle, and complementary attributes). In Phase 3, we examined how the dimensions combine to form an aggregate (formative) PG fit construct. The MPPGF scale showed convergent and discriminant validity with relevant constructs in Phase 4. In Phase 5, the MPPGF exhibited criterion-related and incremental validity with attitudes and performance beyond existing PG fit scales. Finally, we report dimension-specific results, demonstrating that MPPGF could be used to study questions regarding overall PG fit perceptions, as well as more narrow dimension-specific questions.     

“I Want to Know More!”: Children Are Sensitive to Explanation Quality When Exploring New Information

When someone encounters an explanation perceived as weak, this may lead to a feeling of deprivation or tension that can be resolved by engaging in additional learning. This study examined to what extent children respond to weak explanations by seeking additional learning opportunities. Seven‐ to ten‐year‐olds (N = 81) explored questions and explanations (circular or mechanistic) about 12 animals using a novel Android tablet application. After rating the quality of an initial explanation, children could request and receive additional information or return to the main menu to choose a new animal to explore. Consistent with past research, there were both developmental and IQ‐related differences in how children evaluated explanation quality. But across development, children were more likely to request additional information in response to circular explanations than mechanistic explanations. Importantly, children were also more likely to request additional information in direct response to explanations that they themselves had assigned low ratings, regardless of explanation type. In addition, there was significant variability in both children's explanation evaluation and their exploration, suggesting important directions for future research. The findings support the deprivation theory of curiosity and offer implications for education.     

Critical Notice: Paul Russell's The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism,Naturalism, and Irreligion (OUP 2008)

In The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (2008), Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Hume's series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life,’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’” (2008, 290). Understanding Hume in this way, according to Russell, sheds light on the “ultimate riddle” of the Treatise: “is it possible to reconcile Hume's (extreme) skeptical principles and conclusions with his aim to advance the ‘science of man’” (2008, 3)? Or does Hume's skepticism undermine his “secular, scientific account of the foundations of moral life in human nature” (290)? Russell's controversial thesis is that “the irreligious nature of Hume's fundamental intentions in the Treatise” is essential to solving the riddle (11). Russell makes a compelling case for Hume's irreligion as well as his atheism. Contrary to this interpretation I argue that Hume is an irreligious theist and not an atheist.