Strategic development in exact calculation: group and individual differences in four achievement subtypes

This longitudinal study sought to identify developmental changes in strategy use between 5 and 7 years of age when solving exact calculation problems. Four mathematics and reading achievement subtypes were examined at four time points. Five strategies were considered: finger counting, verbal counting, delayed retrieval, automatic retrieval, and derived fact retrieval. Results provided unique insights into children's strategic development in exact calculation at this early stage. Group analysis revealed relationships between mathematical and/or reading difficulties and strategy choice, shift, and adaptiveness. Use of derived fact retrieval by 7 years of age distinguished children with mathematical difficulties from other achievement subtypes. Analysis of individual differences revealed marked heterogeneity within all subtypes, suggesting (inter alia) no marked qualitative distinction between our two mathematical difficulty subtypes.     

Individual differences in the mixture ratio of rotation and nonrotation trials during rotated mirror/normal letter discriminations

Mental rotation is thought to underlie the increase in response times (RTs) for deciding whether rotated letters are normal or mirrored versions. However, mental rotation predicts a linear increase in RTs, whereas the mirror/normal letter discrimination task typically produces a curved function. Recently, Kung and Hamm suggested that this curved function results from a mixture of trials in which mental rotation is employed and trials in which it is not. The mixture ratio may vary between individuals, with some individuals relying more on mental rotation than others. There is no factor in the Kung and Hamm model that reflects such individual differences. In the present study, we suggest that a possible exponent parameter could be added to the Kung and Hamm model to capture individual differences in the mixture ratio. This exponent parameter appears to capture an individual characteristic since the value obtained correlates between the mirror/normal letter task and a left/right object facing task. The development of a quantity that represents the mixture ratio will aid further testing of processes involved in the visual imagery system.     

Some Metaethical Desiderata and the Conceptual Resources of Theism

In this paper, I argue that theists are extremely well-situated with respect to developing metaethical accounts that qualify as ‘robust’ versions of moral realism. In the first part of the essay, a number of metaethical desiderata are identified. In the second part, theistic strategies for accommodating those desiderata are explained and defended. The upshot is that, contrary to the received philosophical wisdom, there are good theoretical reasons for theistic philosophers to seek to develop metaethical accounts that ground moral facts in facts about God.     

What You Feel Influences What You See: The Role of Affective Feelings in Resolving Binocular Rivalry

It seems obvious that what you see influences what you feel, but what if the opposite were also true? What if how you feel can shape your visual experience? In this experiment, we demonstrate that the affective state of a perceiver influences the contents of visual awareness. Participants received positive, negative, and neutral affect inductions and then completed a series of binocular rivalry trials in which a face (smiling, scowling, or neutral) was presented to one eye and a house to the other. The percepts “competed” for dominance in visual consciousness. We found, as predicted, that all faces (smiling, scowling, and neutral) were dominant for longer when perceivers experienced unpleasant affect compared to when they were in a neutral state (a social vigilance effect), although scowling faces increased their dominance when perceivers felt unpleasant (a relative negative congruence effect). Relatively speaking, smiling faces increased their dominance more when perceivers were experiencing pleasant affect (a positive congruence effect). These findings illustrate that the affective state of a perceiver serves as a context that influences the contents of consciousness.     

Birds of a feather sit together: physical similarity predicts seating choice

Across four studies, people sat (or reported they would sit) closer to physically similar others. Study 1 revealed significant aggregation in seating patterns on two easily observed characteristics: glasses wearing and sex. Study 2 replicated this finding with a wider variety of physical traits: race, sex, glasses wearing, hair length, and hair color. The overall tendency for people to sit beside physically similar others remained significant when controlling for sex and race, suggesting people aggregate on physical dimensions other than broad social categories. Study 3 conceptually replicated these results in a laboratory setting. The more physically similar participants were to a confederate, the closer they sat before an anticipated interaction when controlling for sex, race, and attractiveness similarity. In Study 4, overall physical similarity and glasses wearing similarity predicted self-reported seating distance. These effects were mediated by perceived attitudinal similarity. Liking and inferred acceptance also received support as mediators for glasses wearing similarity.     

Whole-Hearted Motivation and Relevant Alternatives: A Problem for the Contrastivist Account of Moral Reasons

Recently, Walter Sinott-Armstrong and Justin Snedegar have argued for a general contrastivist theory of reasons. According to the contrastivist account of reasons, all reasons claims should be understood as a relation with an additional place for a contrast class. For example, rather than X being a reason for A to P simpliciter, the contrastivist claims that X is a reason for A to P out of {P,Q,R…}. The main goal of this paper is to argue that the contrastivist account of reasons will be ill-fitted for accommodating certain features of moral reasons. In brief, the reason why the contrastivist analysis fails is that it cannot adequately allow for cases of morally correct whole-hearted action—cases where consideration of any alternate course of action would be misguided. But, if all consideration of alternate courses of action is misguided, then it is hard to see how one can set the relevant contrast class that is essential to the contrastivist view—any contrast class will seem out of place. In addition, I address some of the arguments that have been given in favor of the contrastivist account of reasons and argue that there are at least two ways that the non-contrastivist can respond to these arguments.     

Probability Discounting in College Students’ Willingness to Isolate During COVID-19: Implications for Behavior Analysis and Public Health

The Psychological Record - The present study was a preliminary analysis of college students’ willingness to self-isolate and socially isolate during the COVID-19 pandemic analyzed through a...     

A Black and White History of Psychiatry in the United States

Journal of Medical Humanities - Histories of psychiatry in the United States can shed light on current areas of need in mental health research and treatment. Often, however, these histories fail to...     

Snitching versus reporting: A qualitative analysis of barriers and facilitators to addressing safety concerns among high school students

Social Psychology of Education - Creating effective school-wide safety mechanisms depends on understanding students' previous experiences of reporting, however, students may also be...     

Functional analysis and mechanistic explanation

Piccinini and Craver (Synthese 183:283–311, 2011) argue for the surprising view that psychological explanation, properly understood, is a species of mechanistic explanation. This contrasts with the ‘received view’ (due, primarily, to Cummins and Fodor) which maintains a sharp distinction between psychological explanation and mechanistic explanation. The former is typically construed as functional analysis, the analysis of some psychological capacity into an organized series of subcapacities without specifying any of the structural features that underlie the explanandum capacity. The latter idea, of course, sees explanation as a matter of describing structures that maintain (or produce) the explanandum capacity. In this paper, I defend the received view by criticizing Piccinini and Craver’s argument for the claim that psychological explanation is not distinct from mechanistic explanation, and by showing how psychological explanations can possess explanatory force even when nothing is known about the underlying neurological details. I conclude with a few brief criticisms about the enterprise of mechanistic explanation in general.