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231.
In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According
to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced
by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for
some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we
would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external
political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased
reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. Our conclusion is however not conclusive; the simulation also indicates
what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument from Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds
on the work of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Social Simul 5(3); 2002, J Artif Soc Social Simul 9(3), 2006). 相似文献
232.
Lydia Patton 《Synthese》2012,184(3):235-246
I examine the role of inference from experiment in theory building. What are the options open to the scientific community when faced with an experimental result that appears to be in conflict with accepted theory? I distinguish, in Laudan’s (1977), Nickels’s (1981), and Franklin’s (1993) sense, between the context of pursuit and the context of justification of a scientific theory. Making this distinction allows for a productive middle position between epistemic realism and constructivism. The decision to pursue a new or a revised theory in response to the new evidence may not be fully rationally determined. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish the question of whether there is reason to pursue a theory from the question of whether that theory, once it has been pursued over time, solves a problem of interest to science. I argue that, in this context, there is a solid way to distinguish between the contexts of pursuit and of justification, on the basis of a theory’s evidential support and problem-solving ability. 相似文献
233.
Mark A. Bedau 《Synthese》2012,185(1):73-88
This paper describes and defends the view that minimal chemical life essentially involves the chemical integration of three
chemical functionalities: containment, metabolism, and program (Rasmussen et al. in Protocells: bridging nonliving and living
matter, 2009a). This view is illustrated and explained with the help of CMP and Rasmussen diagrams (Rasmussen et al. In: Rasmussen et al.
(eds.) in Protocells: bridging nonliving and living matter, 71–100, 2009b), both of which represent the key chemical functional dependencies among containment, metabolism, and program. The CMP model
of minimal chemical life gains some support from the broad view of life as open-ended evolution, which I have defended elsewhere
(Bedau in The philosophy of artificial life, 1996; Bedau in Artificial Life, 4:125–140, 1998). Further support comes from the natural way the CMP model resolves the puzzle about whether life is a matter of degree. 相似文献
234.
David Atkinson 《Synthese》2012,184(1):49-61
So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds
of acceptance. In contrast, Shogenji’s new measure of justification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does the trick.
As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate
that this general measure resolves the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of the
general measure for the Conjunction Effect; in particular we give an example in which the effect occurs in a larger domain,
according to Shogenji justification, than Carnap’s measure of confirmation would have led one to expect. 相似文献
235.
David Slutsky 《Synthese》2012,184(3):261-286
Many people argue that history makes a special difference to the subjects of biology and psychology, and that history does
not make this special difference to other parts of the world. This paper will show that historical properties make no more
or less of a difference to biology or psychology than to chemistry, physics, or other sciences. Although historical properties
indeed make a certain kind of difference to biology and psychology, this paper will show that historical properties make the
same kind of difference to geology, sociology, astronomy, and other sciences. Similarly, many people argue that nonhistorical
properties make a special difference to the nonbiological and the nonpsychological world. This paper will show that nonhistorical
properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their causal behavior and that historical
properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their distributions. Although history is special,
it is special in the same way to all parts of the world. 相似文献
236.
John Turri 《Synthese》2012,184(3):247-259
Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the flaw helps us better understand the nature of knowledge and epistemic justification. I propose a crucial improvement to the traditional view, relying on an intuitive and independently plausible metaphysical distinction pertaining to the manifestation of intellectual powers, which supplements the traditional components of justification, truth and belief. 相似文献
237.
Jeanne Peijnenburg 《Synthese》2012,184(1):101-107
Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the
conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation
and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed. 相似文献
238.
John A. Schuster 《Synthese》2012,185(3):467-499
One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed “physico-mathematics”. This signalled
a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy,
non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related
to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more ’physicalised’, more closely intertwined
with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous
epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes’ physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the
mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases
one could literally “see the causes”. Optics took pride of place within Descartes’ physico-mathematics project, because he
believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes’ early physico-mathematical
program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes resources for his later
work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an
achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—causal
knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular
motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system. 相似文献
239.
Sven Dupré 《Synthese》2012,185(3):501-525
This paper argues that Kepler considered his work in optics as part of natural philosophy and that, consequently, he aimed
at change within natural philosophy. Back-to-back with John Schuster’s claim that Descartes’ optics should be considered as
a natural philosophical appropriation of innovative results in the tradition of practical and mixed mathematics the central
claim of my paper is that Kepler’s theory of optical imagery, developed in his Paralipomena ad Vitellionem (1604), was the result of a move similar to Descartes’ by Kepler. My argument consists of three parts. First, Kepler borrowed
a geometrical model and experiment of optical imagery from the mélange of mixed and practical mathematics provided in the
works of the sixteenth-century mathematicians Ettore Ausonio and Giovanni Battista Della Porta. Second, Kepler criticized
the Aristotelian theory of light and he developed his own alternative metaphysics. Third, Kepler used his natural philosophical
assumptions about the nature of light to re-interpret the model of image formation taken from Della Porta’s work. Taken together,
I portray Kepler’s theory of optical imagery as a natural philosophical appropriation of an innovative model of image formation
developed in a sixteenth-century practical and mixed mathematical tradition which was not interested in questioning philosophical
assumptions on the nature of light. 相似文献
240.
Michel Bitbol 《Synthese》2012,185(2):233-255
Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels
of organization is supposed, but only a duality of modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere
ways of revealing intrinsic patterns of organization: They are supposed to be constitutive of them, in Kant’s sense. The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are therefore neither
illusory nor ontologically real: They are objective in the sense of transcendental epistemology. This neo-Kantian approach defuses several paradoxes associated with the concept
of downward causation, and enables one to make good sense of it independently of any prejudice about the existence (or inexistence)
of a hierarchy of levels of being. 相似文献