Deus or Darwin: Randomness and belief in theories about the origin of life

A simple reminder of the fact that we do not always control life's outcomes reduced people's belief in Darwin's Theory of Evolution. This control-threat resulted in a relative preference for theories of life that thwart randomness, either by stressing the role of a controlling God (Intelligent Design) or by presenting the Theory of Evolution in terms of predictable and orderly processes. Moreover, increased preference for Intelligent Design over evolutionary theory disappeared when the latter was framed in terms of an orderly process with inevitable outcomes. Thus, psychological threat enhances belief in God, but only in the absence of other options that help to create order in the world.     

Ambivalence, discomfort, and motivated information processing

In two studies we examined the nature and consequence of ambivalent attitudes. In the first study, we assessed whether holding ambivalent attitudes was aversive, and tested whether this aversion was resolved through biased information processing. To do this we manipulated participants’ attributions of the discomfort associated with an ambivalent message through a pill manipulation (tense vs. relaxed). Participants who attributed their discomfort to their ambivalence reported more negative emotions and generated more one-sided thoughts than participants who attributed their discomfort to the pill. In the second study, we examined the conditions necessary for ambivalence reduction. Results suggest that people spontaneously engage in biased information processing in order to resolve their ambivalence.     

Primary control and the consistency of interpersonal behaviour across different situations

Recent findings from person–situation studies suggest that primary control is a major factor underlying cross-situational consistency of individual behaviour. To provide evidence, we studied behaviour reflecting primary control in two modes: self-reports and observations of overt behaviour. Study I examined self-reports of 147 Ss in 15 interpersonal situations. In study II, 25 Ss were observed during role playing in five situations. The analysis focused on the degree to which Ss maintain consistent patterns of behaviour across different situations. Both studies revealed considerable degrees of consistency, thus confirming our conjecture. In the discussion attention is paid to the dispositional nature of primary control and the connections with secondary control. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience

Prospect theory predicts that people tend to prefer the sure option when choosing between two alternative courses of action framed in terms of gains and prefer the risky option when choosing between two alternatives framed as losses. Related research investigated the impact of emphasizing the probability of the positive outcome of a risky option versus emphasizing the probability of the negative outcome on preference. Most of these studies on the effects of "outcome salience" related their findings to prospect theory′s framing effect. It will be argued that most of these studies inaccurately applied prospect theory to explain the obtained effects and that these might be better understood in terms of salience. In four experiments we test the predictions that (1) choosing between two options in a gain problem will lead to decreased risk preference as compared to loss problems and (2) emphasizing the probability of positive outcomes of a risky option leads to increased preference for this option compared to emphasizing the probability of negative outcomes. Results confirm the impact of both prospect framing and outcome salience and indicate that these effects should be understood in terms of distinct, independent processes.     

Deliberation versus intuition: Global versus local processing in judgment and choice

Decisions and judgments made after deliberation can differ from expert opinion and be more regretted over time than intuitive judgments and decisions. We investigated a possible underlying process of this phenomenon, namely global versus local processing style. We argue that deliberation induces a local processing style. This processing style narrows conceptual attention and can have detrimental effects on judgment and decision-making. Study 1 showed that intuitive judgments of quality of modern paintings were more accurate than were more deliberate, reasoned judgments. Study 2 showed that local versus global processing style is associated with accuracy of quality judgments of paintings, and Study 3 replicated this finding with an experimental manipulation of processing style. Finally, Study 4 showed that the effect of intuitive versus deliberative decision mode on quality judgments of poems is mediated by processing style.     

Risk perception and behavior: Pessimism,realism, and optimism about aids-related health behavior

Abstract

This study investigates the perceived risk of becoming infected with HIV for heterosexuals with multiple sexual partners, examines cognitive and motivational antecedents of biases in risk perception, and relates these biases to behavior. We obtained a moderate degree of optimism in a longitudinal study based on a sample of 535 visitors of a STD clinic. Further analyses—after classifying subjects as “pessimists”, “realists”, or “optimists”—revealed that pessimists were extremely pessimistic and optimists remarkably optimistic. Optimism increased with perceived control and decreased with prior experience, supporting a cognitive explanation of optimism. The data also provided some support for a motivational explanation: optimists who scored higher on a defensive coping style were more optimistic about their risks. Contrary to other findings, we found a positive relation between optimism and intentions to reduce risks. Furthermore, results revealed that optimists showed lower levels of subsequent behavioral risk. It was concluded that optimists were not unrealistically optimistic about their personal vulnerability. but rather that pessimists were unrealistically pessimistic. Previous behavior was found to be the best predictor of subsequent behavior. Although measures of perceived risk were also related to subsequent behavior, their predictive power was rather modest.