Perceptions of women and men as entrepreneurs: evidence for differential effects of attributional augmenting

It was hypothesized that perceptions of women who become entrepreneurs are enhanced by attributional augmenting because they adopt this role despite major obstacles to doing so. In contrast, attributional augmenting was expected to operate to a lesser degree for men who become entrepreneurs because they presumably face weaker obstacles. Three studies offered support for these hypotheses; all of these investigations used between-subjects designs in which women and men shown in standard-format photos were described to different groups of raters as being either entrepreneurs or managers. As predicted, raters assigned significantly higher scores to women, but not to men, when they were described as entrepreneurs.     

Group polarization and choice‐dilemmas: how important is self‐categorization?

Self‐categorization proponents (e.g., Turner, 1991 ) assume that group polarization occurs because discussants wish to differentiate themselves from outgroup positions and implicitly think of such groups even when they are not specifically mentioned. Ingroup/outgroup salience is thought to heighten such effects. To examine this view, we had participants discuss Choice Dilemma items either with or without explicit knowledge of outgroup positions. Contrary to a self‐categorization account, this manipulation of outgroup salience did not affect the degree of group polarization. In addition, rating measures revealed little spontaneous consideration of outgroup positions on the part of participants, nor was consideration of outgroup positions related to degree of polarization. Group members did show evidence of ingroup identification, but this identification was unrelated to participants' post‐discussion conformity to the group consensus. Taken as a whole, these results suggest distinct limits to the self‐categorization interpretation of group polarization involving Choice Dilemmas. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

It’s one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them

In this paper we offer a response to one argument in favour of Priority Monism, what Jonathan Schaffer calls the nomic argument for monism. We proceed in three stages. We begin by introducing Jonathan Schaffer’s Priority Monism and the nomic argument for that view. We then consider a response to the nomic argument that we presented in an earlier paper (Baron and Tallant in Philos Phenomenol Res 93:583–606, 2016). We show that this argument suffers from a flaw. We then go on to offer a different response to the nomic argument. The core idea is that the current laws of physics are not integrated in the manner that Schaffer requires to get the nomic argument for monism off the ground.

     

Causation in a timeless world

This paper offers a new way to evaluate counterfactual conditionals on the supposition that actually, there is no time. We then parlay this method of evaluation into a way of evaluating causal claims. Our primary aim is to preserve, at a minimum, the assertibility of certain counterfactual and causal claims once time has been excised from reality. This is an important first step in a more general reconstruction project that has two important components. First, recovering our ordinary language claims involving notions such as persistence, change and agency and, second, recovering enough observational evidence so that any timeless metaphysics is not empirically self-refuting. However, the project of investigating causation in a timeless setting has a greater relevance than its application to timeless physical theory alone. For, as we show, it can be used to model the assertibility conditions of causal claims more generally.     

Foundations of infants' social group evaluations

Previous research has suggested that infants exhibit a preference for familiar over unfamiliar social groups (e.g., preferring individuals from their own language group over individuals from a foreign language group). However, because past studies often employ forced‐choice procedures, it is not clear whether infants' intergroup preferences are driven by positivity toward members of familiar groups, negativity toward members of unfamiliar groups, or both. Across six experiments, we implemented a habituation procedure to independently measure infants' positive and negative evaluations of speakers of familiar and unfamiliar languages. We report that by 1 year of age, infants positively evaluate individuals who speak a familiar language, but do not negatively evaluate individuals who speak an unfamiliar language (Experiments 1 and 2). Several experiments rule out lower‐level explanations (Experiments 3–6). Together these data suggest that children's early social group preferences may be shaped by positive evaluations of familiar group(s), rather than negative evaluations of unfamiliar groups.     

Hate Crime Legislation Reconsidered

In “Is Penalty Enhancement a Sound Idea?” Claudia Card calls into question hate crime legislation, querying whether hatred makes a crime worse, whether hatred of the sort pertinent to hate crimes is worse than a more personal hatred, and whether the message sent by hate crime legislation is the intended message. This essay questions her assumption that penalty enhancement for hate crimes is warranted only if the crimes are worse than otherwise similar crimes that do not count as hate crimes. Instead, it may be the case that it is the proper business of the state to take a particular interest in such crimes, in part because they enact not just any hatred but civic hatred. And if hate crimes are understood as enacting civic hatred, hate crime legislation can indeed serve to counter a message that very much needs to be countered.     

The explanatory dispensability of idealizations

Enhanced indispensability arguments seek to establish realism about mathematics based on the explanatory role that mathematics plays in science. Idealizations pose a problem for such arguments. Idealizations, in a similar way to mathematics, boost the explanatory credentials of our best scientific theories. And yet, idealizations are not the sorts of things that are supposed to attract a realist attitude. I argue that the explanatory symmetry between idealizations and mathematics can potentially be broken as follows: although idealizations contribute to the explanatory power of our best theories, they do not carry the explanatory load. It is at least open however that mathematics is load-carrying. To give this idea substance, I offer an analysis of what it is to carry the explanatory load in terms of difference-making and counterfactuals.