The Public and Private Use of Consensus-Raising Excuses

ABSTRACT Two experiments tested the proposition that people use consensus-raising excuses more in private than in public when the audience has information that could refute subjects' claims about others In Experiment 1, subjects received success or failure feedback and made public or private attributions to ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck In Experiment 2, subjects received positive or negative feedback and evaluated themselves and others on the trait Task difficulty attributions and evaluations of others are consensus-raising measures Consistent with our hypothesis, subjects receiving negative feedback in Experiment 1 claimed that the task was more difficult, and in Experiment 2 evaluated the other more negatively in private than in public.     

Coping, locus of control, social support, and combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder: a prospective study

We examined the relations between coping, locus of control, and social support and combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The sample consisted of 262 Israeli soldiers who suffered a combat stress reaction episode during the 1982 Lebanon war and were followed 2 and 3 years after their participation in combat. Cross-sectional analyses revealed significant relations between locus of control, coping, and social support and PTSD at the two points of assessment. Changes in PTSD from Time 1 to Time 2 were also associated with changes in coping. We discuss theoretical and methodological implications of the findings.     

The epistemic efficacy of stupidity

I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, as contemporary theories construe it, is not a particularly valuable cognitive achievement, and that we would do well to reopen epistemology to the study of cognitive excellences of all sorts.I am grateful to Warren Goldfarb for sharing his knowledge of wines with me, and to Kenneth Winkler for sharing his knowledge of birds.     

From appraisal to emotion: Differences among unpleasant feelings

Recent research has indicated strong relations between people's appraisals of their circumstances and their emotional states. The present study examined these relations across a range of unpleasant situations in which subjects experienced complex emotional blends. Subjects recalled unpleasant experiences from their pasts that were associated with particular appraisals and described their appraisals and emotions during these experiences. Situations defined by particular appraisals along the human agency or situational control dimensions were reliably associated with different levels of anger, sadness, and guilt, as predicted. However, predicted differences in emotion were not observed for situations selected for appraisals along the certainty or attention dimensions. Most subjects reported experiencing blends of two or more emotions, and correlation/regression analyses indicated that even in the context of these blends, patterns of appraisal similar to those observed previously (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987) characterized the experience of the individual emotions. The regressions further indicated that appraisals along some dimensions were more important to the experience of particular emotions than were appraisals along other dimensions. Thesecentral appraisals are compared with the adaptive functions their associated emotions are believed to serve, and the implications of these findings are discussed.This research was supported in part by a Stanford University graduate fellowship and in part by a National Institute of Mental Health training grant to Craig Smith. Part of the writing was done while Phoebe Ellsworth was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by the James McKeen Cattell Fund.     

Intentional and incidental visual memory as a function of cognitive level and color of the stimulus

Performance of two groups of youngsters, educable mentally retarded (CA 15-5; MA 11-4; IQ 74.3) and those of average ability (CA 10-5; MA 11-3; IQ 109.1) was compared for intentional and incidental visual memory as a function of cognitive level and color of the stimulus. Nonretarded subjects performed significantly better than the retarded ones of equal MA. Both groups performed better with a color than black-white card, and both groups did better on the tasks involving intentional rather than incidental memory.     

Does spreading activation summate?

Summary Network models of semantic memory assume implicitly or explicitly that the degree of activation of a node is a monotonic function of the total amount of excitation reaching that node from all sources. For example, the activation level of the node representing apple should be greater if it is receiving excitation due to the activation of the nodes for fruit and pear than if only one of these neighboring nodes is activated. This notion was tested by presenting semantic primes 80 ms or 320 ms before a letter string (e.g., apple or ipple) requiring a lexical decision. The prime stimuli consisted of a pair of simultaneous items that were identical in the single prime condition (e.g., fruit/fruit or pear/pear) or different in the double prime condition (e.g., fruit/pear or pear/fruit), and were either related (target = apple) or unrelated (target = copper) to the target, or neutral. As predicted by the summation of semantic activation assumption of network models there was a larger priming effect (in the 320 ms SOA condition) following the simultaneous activation of two related nodes than following the activation of only one node.This research was supported by grants to the first author from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.     

Ambiguity and rationality

Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a prediction. We show how this definition can explain why ambiguity affects decisions in the ways it does. We argue that there are a variety of rational reasons ambiguity affects probability judgments and choices in the ways it does. However, we argue that the ambiguity effect does not cast doubt on the claim that utility theory is a standard of rational choice. Rather, we suggest that the effect of ambiguity on decisions highlights the fact that utility theory, like any normative model of decision making only prescribes the optimal decision, given what one knows.     

Marx,technocracy, and the corporatist ethos

Communism, in Marx' mind, did not mean simple liberation, but the economics of liberation. The realm of necessity (technē) was to become the primary field for emancipation (praxis), the latter taking form in new institutions, responsive to real socio-economic needs. In this sense, the problem of technocracy and the corporatist ethos in Marx are part of a broader discursive structure, which links the experiences of workers through the industrial revolution with the philosophies ofpraxis as they reach from Hegel through Marković.     

Mass media treatment of violence in sports and its effects

There appears to be a strong relationship between mass media portrayals of violence and real-life violence itself. This article reviews the available literature on the effects of media treatment of sports violence; analyzes the theoretical explanations for this treatment; and makes proposals on how the problems of both sports violence and its media coverage may be remedied, with a particular focus on amateur hockey in Canada.