Working with prisoners in a transitional space

In this paper I talk about the potential benefits for offenders of working within the transitional space provided by a discussion group. Through ‘play’ these men have an opportunity to interact and learn to be potent without resorting to omnipotent defences of violence to get their own way. In considering the discussion group within the context of the prison as a whole, I focus on the relationship between staff and prisoners and how this relationship can be managed in such a way as to create more opportunities for thinking, leading to an enhanced focus on rehabilitation.     

Saboteur and superego: The judgement of the ego in brief dynamic therapy

Drawing principally upon the work of Woodmansey the author describes the development of the punitive or humiliating superego as arising from the internalisation of an external conflict, which the child experiences with adult carers, and from whom the child fears retaliatory punishment or scornful reproach. The superego serves the function of extricating the child from the external conflict. Woodmansey’s view of the natural instincts and the development of a moral sense are compared to those of Winnicott, Fairbairn and Guntrip. The notion of a pristine unitary ego and the development of an internal saboteur arising from the frustration of needs for relatedness are outlined and linked conceptually to the development of the punitive superego. The role and judgement of the ego and its emancipation from the superego in accordance with Britton’s formulation are highlighted and related to clinical practice and the alternating transference. These clinical themes are discussed in relation to eliciting affects and narrative construction and deconstruction in brief dynamic work and illustrated by a case example.     

Slouching Toward Policy: Lazy Bioethics and the Perils of Science Fiction

Too much contemporary bioethical discourse is weak on science, lazily citing and adopting science fiction scenarios rather than science facts in the framing of analyses and policies. We challenge bioethicists to take more seriously the role of providing informed insight into and oversight over contemporary science and its implications and applications. Bioethicists must work harder to understand the fast-changing truths and limits of basic science, and they must incorporate only appropriate and authentic science into their discourse, just as they did in the past when addressing the quandaries of clinical medicine. The field of bioethics is not so old and entrenched that its future is assured. Bioethicists must make themselves useful to society in order to deserve and retain the public's trust. They can best do this by ensuring that decision making and public policy are grounded in facts, not fictions and fantasies.     

More than just perception–action recalibration: Walking through a virtual environment causes rescaling of perceived space

Egocentric distances in virtual environments are commonly underperceived by up to 50 % of the intended distance. However, a brief period of interaction in which participants walk through the virtual environment while receiving visual feedback can dramatically improve distance judgments. Two experiments were designed to explore whether the increase in postinteraction distance judgments is due to perception–action recalibration or the rescaling of perceived space. Perception–action recalibration as a result of walking interaction should only affect action-specific distance judgments, whereas rescaling of perceived space should affect all distance judgments based on the rescaled percept. Participants made blind-walking distance judgments and verbal size judgments in response to objects in a virtual environment before and after interacting with the environment through either walking (Experiment 1) or reaching (Experiment 2). Size judgments were used to infer perceived distance under the assumption of size–distance invariance, and these served as an implicit measure of perceived distance. Preinteraction walking and size-based distance judgments indicated an underperception of egocentric distance, whereas postinteraction walking and size-based distance judgments both increased as a result of the walking interaction, indicating that walking through the virtual environment with continuous visual feedback caused rescaling of the perceived space. However, interaction with the virtual environment through reaching had no effect on either type of distance judgment, indicating that physical translation through the virtual environment may be necessary for a rescaling of perceived space. Furthermore, the size-based distance and walking distance judgments were highly correlated, even across changes in perceived distance, providing support for the size–distance invariance hypothesis.     

Imprisoned by the past: Unhappy moods lead to a retrospective bias to mind wandering

Evidence suggests that mind wandering is a frequent accompaniment to an unhappy mood. Building on such work, two laboratory experiments used mood induction to assess whether the greater frequency of mind wandering in a low mood is also accompanied by a shift towards a focus on events from the past. Experiment 1 induced moods via video and induction of an unhappy mood was associated with a greater tendency for past-related mind wandering as measured by a post-task questionnaire. In Experiment 2, negative and positive moods were induced in a group of participants using the Velten mood-induction procedure and the temporal focus of mind wandering was measured using experience sampling probes. Analyses indicated that induction of an unhappy mood led to an increase in past-related mind wandering and the magnitude of this change increased with scores on a measure of depressive symptoms. Together these experiments suggest that when the mind wanders in an unhappy mood it is drawn to events from its past.     

Effects of traumatic stress and perceived stress on everyday cognitive functioning

Stressful or traumatic events have been shown to impair cognitive functioning on laboratory-based tasks due to stress-related intrusive thoughts and avoidance. However, research on the effects of stress on everyday cognitive functioning has been lacking. A sample of 909 undergraduates completed measures of perceived stress, PTSD symptoms, and everyday cognitive failures. The results revealed that both perceived stress and PTSD symptoms uniquely predicted cognitive failures, even after controlling for a number of potentially confounding variables. Additionally, there was a significant interaction. Participants with low scores on both measures of stress reported the fewest occurrences of everyday cognitive failures. In contrast, participants with elevated scores on either measure of stress reported higher levels of cognitive failures. These results suggest that there are unique negative effects of perceived stress and PTSD symptoms on everyday cognitive functioning and sharpen our understanding of the relationship between stress and cognition.     

UNTANGLING FALSE ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ATHEISM AND HEALTH

Abstract In the past decade, the cognitive science of religion has worked to find an evolutionary explanation for supernatural belief. The explanations are convincing, but have created the stereotype that atheism is unnatural. In a similar way studies linking religious belief and health have vilified atheism as unhealthy. But belief is too complex, health is too nuanced, and the data are too varied to draw such a generalization. Catherine Caldwell‐Harris has developed a psychological profile to understand nonbelief as an expected outcome of individual difference and therefore natural. In a similar manner I argue that we should study the relationship between belief and health through the lens of individual differences. This approach is especially promising given recent research which indicates personality fully accounts for the relationship with well‐being previously attributed to belief. This approach has the added benefit of neutralizing the conversation by understanding atheism as the healthy expression of a natural personality.     

Event-method directed forgetting: Forgetting a video segment is more effortful than remembering it

Videos were presented depicting events such as baking cookies or cleaning a fish tank. Periodically, the video paused and an instruction to Remember (R) or Forget (F) the preceding video segment was presented; the video then resumed. Participants later responded more accurately to cued-recall questions (E1) and to true/false statements (E2–5) regarding R segments than F segments. This difference was larger for specific information (the woman added 3 cups of flour) than for general information (the woman added flour). Participants were also slower to detect visual probes presented following F instructions compared to those presented following R instructions. These findings suggest that intentional forgetting is an effortful process that can be performed even on segments of otherwise continuous events and that the result is a relatively impoverished representation of the unwanted information in memory.     

Berkeley's Missing Argument: The Sceptical Attack on Intentionality

Berkeley argues that our ideas cannot represent external objects, because only an idea can resemble an idea. But he does not offer any argument for the claim that an idea can represent only what it resembles - a premise essential to his argument. I argue that this gap can be both historically explained and filled by examining the debates between Cartesians and sceptics in the late seventeenth century. Descartes held that representation involves two relations between an idea and its object – resemblance and causation – and that these relations are very closely linked to each other. I look at variations upon this claim in later Cartesians, especially Desgabets and Régis. I also examine the critics who attacked this claim, especially Huet, Foucher, and Du Hamel, who developed arguments similar to Berkeley's but concluded that (Cartesian) representation is simply impossible. I also argue that Malebranche, although an adherent of the Cartesian theory of intentionality, used a modified version of this argument to argue for his claim that ideas do not exist in the mind at all. These thinkers, and especially Malebranche, provide the context in which we should understand Berkeley.