Code-switching effects in bilingual word recognition: a masked priming study with event-related potentials

Two experiments tested language switching effects with bilingual participants in a priming paradigm with masked primes (duration of 50 ms in Experiment 1 and 100 ms in Experiment 2). Participants had to monitor target words for animal names, and ERPs were recorded to critical (non-animal) words in L1 and L2 primed by unrelated words from the same or the other language. Both experiments revealed language priming (switching) effects that depended on target language. For target words in L1, most of the language switch effect appeared in the N400 ERP component, with L2 primes generating a more negative going wave than L1 primes. For L2 target words, on the other hand, the effects of a language switch appeared mainly in an earlier ERP component (N250) peaking at approximately 250 ms post-target onset, and showing greater negativity following an L1 prime than an L2 prime. This is the first evidence for fast-acting language-switching effects occurring in the absence of overt task switching.     

An ERP investigation of location invariance in masked repetition priming

In an experiment combining masked repetition priming and the recording of event-related potentials (ERPs) the location of prime stimuli relative to centrally located target words was manipulated. Prime words could appear at the same location as targets or shifted one letter position to the right or to the left. Repetition priming effects (amplitude differences across the repeat vs. unrelated prime conditions) were found in a series of ERP components starting at around 100 msec posttarget onset. The earliest of these, the N/P150 component, was found to be sensitive to prime location. Repetition priming was only apparent with centrally located primes in this component. Repetition priming effects in later components (N250 and N400), on the other hand, were not affected by prime location. The results are interpreted in terms of location-specific letter detectors that map onto a higher level, location-invariant orthographic code for printed words.     

Mindfulness and Emotion Regulation Difficulties in Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Preliminary Evidence for Independent and Overlapping Contributions

Diminished levels of mindfulness (awareness and acceptance/nonjudgment) and difficulties in emotion regulation have both been proposed to play a role in symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD); the current studies investigated these relationships in nonclinical and clinical samples. In the first study, among a sample of 395 individuals at an urban commuter campus, self-reports of both emotion regulation difficulties and aspects of mindfulness accounted for unique variance in GAD symptom severity, above and beyond variance shared with depressive and anxious symptoms, as well as variance shared with one another. In the second study, individuals with GAD (n = 16) reported significantly lower levels of mindfulness and significantly higher levels of difficulties in emotion regulation than individuals in a nonanxious control group (n = 16). Results are discussed in terms of directions for future research and potential implications for treatment development.     

Evaluating Treatments for Functionally Equivalent Problem Behavior Maintained by Adult Compliance with Mands During Interactive Play

A primary goal of behavioral interventions is to reduce dangerous or inappropriate behavior and to generalize treatment effects across various settings. However, there is a lack of research evaluating generalization of treatment effects while individuals with functionally equivalent problem behavior interact with each other. For the current study, the severe problem behavior of two participants with developmental disabilities was targeted for assessment and treatment. Results of a functional analysis indicated that for both participants, problem behaviors occurred when destructive behavior produced reinforcement of participant mands . The use of a multiple schedule that alternated between differential reinforcement of other behaviors and differential reinforcement of alternative behavior (mands) was sufficient to produce a significant reduction in problem behavior for one participant; the addition of differential reinforcement of alternative behaviors via compliance was necessary for the second participant. Extended treatment sessions, which focused on interaction between the two participants, involved one therapist concurrently implementing each participant’s treatment while they were directed to play with one another (a situation that previously evoked problem behavior). Results show that each participant’s treatment produced low to zero rates of problem behavior even during extended interactions.     

Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual

I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.

Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox

We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models. Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements) that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality.     

Gender differences in moral judgment and the evaluation of gender-specified moral agents

Whether, and if so, how exactly gender differences are manifested in moral judgment has recently been at the center of much research on moral decision making. Previous research suggests that women are more deontological than men in personal, but not impersonal, moral dilemmas. However, typical personal and impersonal moral dilemmas differ along two dimensions: Personal dilemmas are more emotionally salient than impersonal ones and involve a violation of Kant’s practical imperative that humans must never be used as a mere means, but only as ends. Thus, it remains unclear whether the reported gender difference is due to emotional salience or to the violation of the practical imperative. To answer this question, we explore gender differences in three moral dilemmas: a typical personal dilemma, a typical impersonal dilemma, and an intermediate dilemma, which is not as emotionally salient as typical personal moral dilemmas, but contains an equally strong violation of Kant’s practical imperative. While we replicate the result that women tend to embrace deontological ethics more than men in personal, but not impersonal, dilemmas, we find no gender differences in the intermediate situation. This suggests that gender differences in these type of dilemmas are driven by emotional salience, and not by the violation of the practical imperative. Additionally, we also explore whether people think that women should behave differently than men in these dilemmas. Across all three dilemmas, we find no statistically significant differences about how people think men and women should behave.     

Emotional Intelligence,Relationship Satisfaction,and the Moderating Effect of ADHD Symptomatology

The present cross-sectional study examined the extent to which ADHD symptomatology moderated the association between emotional intelligence (EI) and relationship satisfaction. A sample of 139 undergraduate students completed self-report measures of ADHD symptomatology, romantic relationship satisfaction, and EI. Hierarchical regression analysis found a significant interaction between emotional intelligence and ADHD symptomatology in their associations with relationship satisfaction while controlling for comorbid depressive symptoms. Simple slopes analyses revealed that EI was positively associated with relationship satisfaction among individuals with higher ADHD symptomatology, but not significantly associated among individuals with lower ADHD symptomatology. These results suggest that EI might play a particularly important role in the relationship quality of individuals with ADHD symptomatology and suggest an important topic for future research.     

Critique of an epistemic account of fallacies

An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (Fallacies,Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would be permitted by traditional accounts. I also question thenecessity of fallacies leading to unwarranted beliefs. Some fallacies are fallacious due to their expected harm to argument practices. This position touches on a theme in the work of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, though I criticize their notion of rules of argument as too broad.