Conciliatory strategies and relative power

In an investigation of variations of a conciliatory strategy, 96 subjects, half female and half male, played a modified Prisoner's Dilemma in which their relative power, in terms of control over the other's outcomes, was less than, equal to, or greater than that of a simulated other. After 10 trials on which (s)he was 50% competitive, the other either did or did not send a handwritten note of general intent to be cooperative. In the second block of 10 trials, the other either was 100% cooperative or began with cooperation and stayed with it as long as the subject did not exploit. When the subject did exploit, the other made the competitive choice on the following trial as a form of retaliation, but followed this retaliation by a return to cooperation on the next trial so that there were never two consecutive competitive choices. During this second block, the simulated other always signaled in advance, with an explicit message, which choice (s)he was about to make. In a third block, the other was 100% cooperative in all conditions and sent no messages. As hypothesized, subjects whose power was equal to or less than that of the other were more cooperative in response to conciliation than were subjects whose power was greater than that of the other. Subjects who received the general note of intent were more cooperative than those who did not, but only in the equal and low power conditions. The subjects in the equal power condition who experienced retaliation were more cooperative than those who did not, but those in the unequal conditions tended to react negatively to retaliation. The results were discussed in terms of Osgood's (Peace Research Reviews, 1979, 8(2), 77–92) GRIT strategy and outcome control in interaction.     

Examining Hindu Ethics: The Three Yogas in Bhāgavata Purāṇa Commentaries

The object of this article is pre-colonial Hindu ways of distinguishing “the path of devotion” (bhakti-yoga) from “the path of knowledge” (jñāna-yoga) and “the path of work” (karma-yoga). It highlights how a developing religious group in early modern India explained and justified its path—its ethics, its ritual, its theology—while in conversation with the larger Brahminical tradition out of which it was emerging. I argue that early authors in the Chaitanya Vaishnava tradition such as Sanātana (c.1475–1554), Rūpa (c.1480–1554), Jīva (c.1510–1606), and Viśvanātha (fl. c.1650–1712) used the authority of the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa to elevate devotion to an ethical imperative by including and excluding the behaviors and the motives of the older and well-established paths like knowledge, works, and Patañjali’s yoga. Their ethics is connected to an ontology of god’s being in which the path of devotion is uniquely effective in revealing god’s being and uniquely salvific the among paths. I argue this discourse on the three paths is a type of Hindu ethics, but it is unclear how it might be reconstructed in rational terms to deal with contemporary issues and that its primary innovation for the time was the uncoupling of ethics from the caste system.     

Advancing Creativity Theory and Research: A Socio-cultural Manifesto

This manifesto, discussed by 20 scholars, representing diverse lines of creativity research, marks a conceptual shift within the field. Socio-cultural approaches have made substantial contributions to the concept of creativity over recent decades and today can provide a set of propositions to guide our understanding of past research and to generate new directions of inquiry and practice. These propositions are urgently needed in response to the transition from the Information Society to the Post-Information Society. Through the propositions outlined here, we aim to build common ground and invite the community of creativity researchers and practitioners to reflect up, study, and cultivate creativity as a socio-cultural phenomenon.     

Samuel Scheffler on Valuing and Considering Valuable

Philosophia - Consider the utterances ‘our friendship is valuable’ and ‘I value our friendship’. On the face of it, these aren’t semantic equivalents: the former...     

Guilt and Shame,Justice and Mercy

This essay argues that the criminal justice system in the United States is flawed because it focuses principally on punishment of illegal actions without considering offenders as persons in their entirety. It considers the role that constructive shame and mercy can play in addressing this flaw. The essay concludes by applying this argument to the case of shaming penalties within criminal justice.     

Clients' beliefs about psychological problems

An investigation of clients beliefs about the causes and treatments of their own psychological problems, using a new instrument, the Opinions about Psychological Problems (OPP). We found that, although the beliefs about the various models were positively correlated, clients made clear overall discriminations between them. For causation, they tended to agree with the four psychological models (Behavioural, Cognitive, Humanistic and Psychodynamic) and the Naïve model, and tended to disagree with the Socio-economic and Organic models. For treatment, they endorsed Behavioural, Cognitive and Humanistic most highly, and again disagreed overall with Socio-economic and Organic. Individual difference variables showed that clients reporting a higher level of psychological symptoms tended to endorse all causation beliefs more highly, and also were more likely to agree with Behavioural, Cognitive, Humanistic and Psychodynamic treatments. The structure of clients' beliefs differed from that found in previous studies. There was a single factor which loaded on the four psychological models, with which the Organic, Socio-economic and Naive subscales were less strongly, but still positively, correlated     

Critique of an epistemic account of fallacies

An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (Fallacies,Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would be permitted by traditional accounts. I also question thenecessity of fallacies leading to unwarranted beliefs. Some fallacies are fallacious due to their expected harm to argument practices. This position touches on a theme in the work of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, though I criticize their notion of rules of argument as too broad.     

Repression and effective coping styles

This study investigated the relationship between repressive coping style as defined by Weinberger (1990)—low reported anxiety and high reported defensiveness—and several individual difference measures related to general coping styles. Twenty‐nine studies looking at cognitive, behavioural, and individual difference factors associated with repressive coping were tabulated and reviewed. In the current study 116 women and 32 men were administered a questionnaire including measures of personality, ways of coping, self‐monitoring, interpersonal influence, and locus of control to further explore the repressor coping style. Two measures, as opposed to the usual one, were used to categorize repressors: the use of anxiety and social desirability measures of Weinberger, Schwartz and Davidson (1979) and the Gudjonsson (1981) method using Neuroticism and Lie scales from the EPQ(R). Analysis of variance showed that repressors reported using more positive/healthy and less negative/unhealthy coping styles. The results did not change substantially when more extreme scoring groups were used. Factor analysis of the scales revealed six clear factors relating to ways of coping; again, repressors scored highly on the factor denoting positive coping. It was also found that the Lie and Neuroticism scales of the revised EPQ personality questionnaire of Eysenck, Eysenck and Barrett (1985) could be used as a substitute for anxiety and defensiveness to predict repression with considerable success. However results from both one‐ and two‐way analysis of variance indicated that the two different ways of classifying repressors was not totally inter‐changeable as the overlap in results occurred only with highly significant effects. The results are discussed in the light of previous investigations into repression which suggested that repressors report an overly optimistic way of coping in order to avoid negative affect. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.