Evaluation of a Booster Intervention Three Years After Acute Treatment for Early-Onset Disruptive Behavior Disorders

This study examines the impact of a brief booster treatment administered 3 years after the delivery of an acute treatment in a group (n?=?118) of clinically referred boys and girls (ages 6 to 11) originally diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) or Conduct Disorder (CD). At the conclusion of the acute treatment and three-year follow-up period (i.e., study month 42), the sample was re-randomized into Booster treatment or Enhanced Usual Care and then assessed at four later timepoints (i.e., post-booster, and 6-, 12- and 24-month booster follow-up). Booster treatment was directed towards addressing individualized problems and some unique developmental issues of adolescence based on the same original protocol content and treatment setting, whereas the Enhanced Usual Care condition involved providing clinical recommendations based on the assessment and an outside referral for services. HLM analyses identified no significant group differences and few time effects across child, parent, and teacher reports on a broad range of child functioning and impairment outcomes. Analyses examining the role of putative moderators or predictors (e.g., severity of externalizing behavior, dose of treatment) were likewise non-significant. We discuss the nature and implications of these novel findings regarding the role and timing of booster treatment to address the continuity of DBD over time.     

Satan,Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg

We examine a distinctive kind of problem for decision theory, involving what we call discontinuity at infinity. Roughly, it arises when an infinite sequence of choices, each apparently sanctioned by plausible principles, converges to a ‘limit choice’ whose utility is much lower than the limit approached by the utilities of the choices in the sequence. We give examples of this phenomenon, focusing on Arntzenius et al.’s Satan’s apple, and give a general characterization of it. In these examples, repeated dominance reasoning (a paradigm of rationality) apparently gives rise to a situation closely analogous to having intransitive preferences (a paradigm of irrationality). Indeed, the agents in these examples are vulnerable to a money pump set-up despite having preferences that exhibit no obvious defect of rationality. We explore several putative solutions to such problems, particularly those that appeal to binding and to deliberative dynamics. We consider the prospects for these solutions, concluding that if they fail, the examples show that money pump arguments are invalid.     

Children Use Temporal Cues to Learn Causal Directionality

The ability to learn the direction of causal relations is critical for understanding and acting in the world. We investigated how children learn causal directionality in situations in which the states of variables are temporally dependent (i.e., autocorrelated). In Experiment 1, children learned about causal direction by comparing the states of one variable before versus after an intervention on another variable. In Experiment 2, children reliably inferred causal directionality merely from observing how two variables change over time; they interpreted Y changing without a change in X as evidence that Y does not influence X. Both of these strategies make sense if one believes the variables to be temporally dependent. We discuss the implications of these results for interpreting previous findings. More broadly, given that many real‐world environments are characterized by temporal dependency, these results suggest strategies that children may use to learn the causal structure of their environments.     

ERNEST BECKER'S PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION FORTY YEARS ON: A VIEW FROM SOCIAL COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

This article distinguishes between three projects in Ernest Becker's (1924–1974) later work: his psychology of “religion,” his psychology of religion, and his psychology of Religion (with a capital R). The first is an analysis of culture and civilization as immortality projects, means by which to deny death. The second, which overlaps with the first, is a characterization of religion‐as‐practiced (e.g., by adherents of the world religions) as a particularly effective immortality project vis‐à‐vis death anxiety. The third is less social scientific and more theological; Becker argues for a view of God that is in the tradition of Søren Kierkegaard and Paul Tillich (and, arguably, Pseudo‐Dionysius, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas). Focusing on the second of these projects—as much has already been written on the first, and little can be said about the third—this article evaluates Becker's claims about religion‐as‐practiced in light of recent developments in social cognitive psychology.     

Frontotemporal neural systems supporting semantic processing in Alzheimer’s disease

We hypothesized that semantic memory for object concepts involves both representations of visual feature knowledge in modality-specific association cortex and heteromodal regions that are important for integrating and organizing this semantic knowledge so that it can be used in a flexible, contextually appropriate manner. We examined this hypothesis in an fMRI study of mild Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Participants were presented with pairs of printed words and asked whether the words matched on a given visual–perceptual feature (e.g., guitar, violin: SHAPE). The stimuli probed natural kinds and manufactured objects, and the judgments involved shape or color. We found activation of bilateral ventral temporal cortex and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during semantic judgments, with AD patients showing less activation of these regions than healthy seniors. Moreover, AD patients showed less ventral temporal activation than did healthy seniors for manufactured objects, but not for natural kinds. We also used diffusion-weighted MRI of white matter to examine fractional anisotropy (FA). Patients with AD showed significantly reduced FA in the superior longitudinal fasciculus and inferior frontal-occipital fasciculus, which carry projections linking temporal and frontal regions of this semantic network. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that semantic memory is supported in part by a large-scale neural network involving modality-specific association cortex, heteromodal association cortex, and projections between these regions. The semantic deficit in AD thus arises from gray matter disease that affects the representation of feature knowledge and processing its content, as well as white matter disease that interrupts the integrated functioning of this large-scale network.     

How undistorted spatial memories can produce distorted responses

Reproducing the location of an object from the contents of spatial working memory requires the translation of a noisy representation into an action at a single location—for instance, a mouse click or a mark with a writing utensil. In many studies, these kinds of actions result in biased responses that suggest distortions in spatial working memory. We sought to investigate the possibility of one mechanism by which distortions could arise, involving an interaction between undistorted memories and nonuniformities in attention. Specifically, the resolution of attention is finer below than above fixation, which led us to predict that bias could arise if participants tend to respond in locations below as opposed to above fixation. In Experiment 1 we found such a bias to respond below the true position of an object. Experiment 2 demonstrated with eye-tracking that fixations during response were unbiased and centered on the remembered object’s true position. Experiment 3 further evidenced a dependency on attention relative to fixation, by shifting the effect horizontally when participants were required to tilt their heads. Together, these results highlight the complex pathway involved in translating probabilistic memories into discrete actions, and they present a new attentional mechanism by which undistorted spatial memories can lead to distorted reproduction responses.     

Characterizing belief bias in syllogistic reasoning: A hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis of ROC data

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.’s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former’s methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N =?993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT’s generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed.     

On Biotechnology,Theology, and the Human Sciences

There may be very good Christian theological reasons to oppose human biotechnological enhancement. It is, however, difficult to discern what they are. Much of the specifically Christian response to transhumanist biotechnological enhancement has revolved around the metaphysics of human persons; this is hardly surprising, given that similar themes appear in other bioethical themes, such as over in vitro fertilization, abortion, and euthanasia. The main aim of this paper is to clarify the theological requirements for such responses, particularly those that are mistakenly delegated to scientists. In particular, the paper will focus on the need for a Christian theological account of human nature that does not unduly rely on biological accounts of the same.