On Being Rejected: A Meta-Analysis of Experimental Research on Rejection

ABSTRACT— This article presents the first meta-analysis of experimental research on rejection, sampling 88 studies. The results are consistent with a needs account, which states that rejection frustrates basic psychological needs, but not with a numbness account, which states that rejection causes physical and emotional numbness. Rejection moderately lowers mood ( d =−0.50) and self-esteem ( d =−0.70), but does not decrease arousal or flatten affect. Both belonging ( d = 0.69) and control ( d = 1.16) are frustrated by rejection. Aggressive responses to rejection, considered paradoxical by some, appear to be due to attempts to gain control; measures that contrast belonging and control ( d =−1.17) cause antisocial responding, whereas measures that do not allow for control to be restored cause prosocial responding ( d = 1.21). These findings suggest that rejection makes individuals feel bad—ready to act to restore control or belonging—and that they will prioritize restoring control even if it requires being antisocial.     

Liberalism's Religion and Laborde's Integrity

This response to Cecile Laborde's Liberalism's Religion explores her use of integrity in defence of legal accommodation for religious groups, noting some problems and issues raised by her account. It goes on to examine her novel category of Integrity Protecting Commitments, and then her views on reasonable disagreement. Integrity too, I suggest, may be the object of reasonable disagreement. Finally, it considers the two more general accounts of exemptions Laborde offers (into which the notion of integrity is inserted), disproportionate burden and majority bias.     

Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude‐content Distinction

Typical emotions share important features with paradigmatic intentional states and therefore might admit of distinctions made in theory of intentionality. One such distinction is between attitude and content, where we can specify the content of an intentional state separately from its attitude, and therefore, the same content can be taken up by different intentional attitudes. According to some philosophers, emotions do not admit of this distinction, although there has been no sustained argument for this claim. In this article, I argue that the way values figure in emotional experience qualifies the content of emotional experience such that the attitude‐content distinction cannot be applied.