Tracks and affordances: The sources of a physical ontology

How is meaning assigned to those terms in a theory which are remote from direct observational instantiation? Models and analogies play a role, but close examination of theories in high energy physics shows that the design of experimental apparatus also influences the interpretation of such terms. Certain apparatus favours certain kinds of effects, and this affects the way mathematical theories are interpreted. In particular track producing apparatus becomes involved with theories in which photonic terms are picked out in the theory. A further conceptual constraint is thus introduced. It is argued that this situation favours the interpretation of dispositional properties as affordances rather than as simple dispositions.     

The role accorded to the public by philosophers of science 1

The role accorded to the public by scientists and philosophers of science has undergone an essential historical change in the last three centuries. Public participation in (witnessing of) scientific experiments was considered an important requirement for 17th century experimenters (e.g. for Boyle or Pascal). The cognitive role played by lay persons was later substantially downgraded; witnessing went out of fashion, while science became more and more esoteric and a matter for experts only. Part of this process was that all scientific disciplines became intensively compartmentalized and in consequence a rather puzzling or even paradoxical situation appeared: that the scientists themselves were and are being reduced epistemically to the status of lay persons, outside of their proper field of expertise (as was pointed out by J. Hardwig). The paper deals with some cognitive aspects of this historical process.     

The Belief in Good Luck Scale

The construction and properties of the Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) Scale are described. Three studies provide evidence that reliable individual differences exist with respect to beliefs about luck. Some individuals maintain an irrational view of luck as a somewhat stable force that tends to influence events in their own favor, while others seem to hold the more rational belief that luck is random and unreliable. Further, these beliefs showed a considerable amount of stability over time. The BIGL was significantly related to locus of control (primarily to a chance subscale), but other evidence suggested these constructs were distinct. Belief in good luck was not related to general optimism, academic pessimism, self-esteem, desire for control, or achievement motivation. There was also evidence that belief in good luck was distinct from feeling fortunate or generally satisfied with one's life. Ethnic group differences were observed for the BIGL scale, showing that Asian-Americans were more likely to endorse superstitious beliefs about luck than non-Asians. Finally, the BIGL scale was shown to predict positive expectations for the outcome of everyday situations that are typically associated with luck. This is generally in agreement with previous findings suggesting that people who believe in personal good luck react to lucky events by becoming more positive about the likelihood of future success (Darke & Freedman, 1997). In general, it is suggested that irrational beliefs about luck can serve as a source of positive expectations for the outcome of future events.     

Assessing Hypersensitive Narcissism: A Reexamination of Murray''s Narcism Scale

A new measure of hypersensitive narcissism was derived by correlating the items of H. A. Murray's (1938) Narcism Scale with an MMPI-based composite measure of covert narcissism. In three samples of college students (totalN= 403), 10 items formed a reliable measure: the Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale (HSNS). The new HSNS and the MMPI-based composite showed similar patterns of correlations with the Big Five Inventory, and both measures correlated near zero with the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, which assesses overt narcissism. Results support P. Wink's (1991) distinction between covert and overt narcissistic tendencies in the normal range of individual differences and suggest that it would be beneficial for personality researchers to measure both types of narcissism in future studies.     

Perceiving geographical slant

People judged the inclination of hills viewed either out-of-doors or in a computer-simulated virtual environment. Angle judgments were obtained by having people (1) provide verbal estimates, (2) adjust a representation of the hill’s cross-section, and (3) adjust a tilt board with their unseen hand. Geographical slant was greatly overestimated according to the first two measures, but not the third. Apparent slant judgments conformed to ratio scales, thereby enhancing sensitivity to the small inclines that must actually be traversed in everyday experience. It is proposed that the perceived exaggeration of geographical slant preserves the relationship between distal inclination and people’s behavioral potential. Hills are harder to traverse as people become tired; hence, apparent slant increased with fatigue. Visually guided actions must be accommodated to the actual distal properties of the environment; consequently, the tilt board adjustments did not reflect apparent slant overestimations, nor were they influenced by fatigue. Consistent with the fact that steep hills are more difficult to descend than to ascend, these hills appeared steeper when viewed from the top.     

Children's capacity to agree to psychological research: knowledge of risks and benefits and voluntariness

A series of studies investigated the capacity of children between the ages of 7 and 12 to give free and informed consent to participation in psychological research. Children were reasonably accurate in describing the purpose of studies, but many did not understand the possible benefits or especially the possible risks of participating. In several studies children's consent was not affected by the knowledge that their parents had given their permission or by the parents saying that they would not be upset if the children refused. In contrast, other studies found that children were much more likely to stop their participation if the experimenter said explicitly that she would not be upset if they stopped. We suggest that experimenters should pay more attention to describing the possible risks and benefits of participation in research, and that they should also make it clearer to children that they are free to stop once they have begun.