Dunning–Kruger effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence

The Dunning–Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning–Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest numbers of errors on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than 3. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased, and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic-thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely nonanalytic participants (on the basis of CRT performance) overreported their “need for cognition” (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning–Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic-thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is that they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.     

Walking through a virtual environment improves perceived size within and beyond the walked space

Distances tend to be underperceived in virtual environments (VEs) by up to 50%, whereas distances tend to be perceived accurately in the real world. Previous work has shown that allowing participants to interact with the VE while receiving continual visual feedback can reduce this underperception. Judgments of virtual object size have been used to measure whether this improvement is due to the rescaling of perceived space, but there is disagreement within the literature as to whether judgments of object size benefit from interaction with feedback. This study contributes to that discussion by employing a more natural measure of object size. We also examined whether any improvement in virtual distance perception was limited to the space used for interaction (1–5 m) or extended beyond (7–11 m). The results indicated that object size judgments do benefit from interaction with the VE, and that this benefit extends to distances beyond the explored space.     

Tag, you're it: Tagging as an alternative to yes/no recognition in item method directed forgetting

The current study contrasted a standard yes/no recognition task with a tagging recognition task in the context of an item-method directed forgetting paradigm. During the study phase, a series of words was presented one at a time, each followed by an instruction to remember (R) or forget (F). The retention of R and F study words was tested using either a typical yes/no recognition task or a tagging recognition task in which participants labeled each word as “R”, “F” or “New”. The directed forgetting effect observed in each task was equivalent in magnitude. However, the tagging recognition task afforded an additional analysis of the errors of misattribution that was not possible with the more typical yes/no recognition task. Interestingly, when falsely recognizing a Foil word, participants were more likely to assign an “F” tag than an “R” tag. These errors of misattribution are consistent with existing accounts of directed forgetting that suggest R words are better encoded than F words. We argue for the utility of the tagging procedure, given it does not alter the directed forgetting effect normally seen with yes/no recognition but provides additional information about errors of misattribution.     

The effects of familiarity on thought--action fusion

The present study examined whether beliefs about the importance of thoughts (i.e., thought–action fusion; TAF) are related to the target subject of the negative thought. One hundred and seven undergraduate students were randomly assigned to imagine either a beloved relative or a stranger being diagnosed with cancer and provided in vivo ratings of anxiety, likelihood, moral wrongness, urge to neutralize, and how upsetting the event would be if it occurred. Results indicated that thinking of a relative being diagnosed with cancer provoked more distress, urges to neutralize, and higher estimates of likelihood, as well greater use of mental neutralizing behaviors, compared to thinking of a stranger. Contrary to our prediction, the groups did not differ in their ratings of the moral wrongness. These findings broadly support the assertion that the more personally significant a negative intrusive thought, the more it will provoke distress and urges to neutralize. Results are discussed in terms of the cognitive model of obsessions and clinical implications are addressed.     

Can semi-supervised learning explain incorrect beliefs about categories?

Three experiments with 88 college-aged participants explored how unlabeled experiences—learning episodes in which people encounter objects without information about their category membership—influence beliefs about category structure. Participants performed a simple one-dimensional categorization task in a brief supervised learning phase, then made a large number of unsupervised categorization decisions about new items. In all three experiments, the unsupervised experience altered participants’ implicit and explicit mental category boundaries, their explicit beliefs about the most representative members of each category, and even their memory for the items encountered during the supervised learning phase. These changes were influenced by both the range and frequency distribution of the unlabeled stimuli: mental category boundaries shifted toward the middle of the range and toward the trough of the bimodal distribution of unlabeled items, whereas beliefs about the most representative category members shifted toward the modes of the unlabeled distribution. One consequence of this shift in representations is a false-consensus effect (Experiment 3) where participants, despite receiving very disparate training experiences, show strong agreement in judgments about representativeness and boundary location following unsupervised category judgments.     

Challenge and error: critical events and attention-related errors

Attention lapses resulting from reactivity to task challenges and their consequences constitute a pervasive factor affecting everyday performance errors and accidents. A bidirectional model of attention lapses (error ↔ attention-lapse: Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009) argues that errors beget errors by generating attention lapses; resource-depleting cognitions interfering with attention to subsequent task challenges. Attention lapses lead to errors, and errors themselves are a potent consequence often leading to further attention lapses potentially initiating a spiral into more serious errors. We investigated this challenge-induced error ↔ attention-lapse model using the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), a GO–NOGO task requiring continuous attention and response to a number series and withholding of responses to a rare NOGO digit. We found response speed and increased commission errors following task challenges to be a function of temporal distance from, and prior performance on, previous NOGO trials. We conclude by comparing and contrasting the present theory and findings to those based on choice paradigms and argue that the present findings have implications for the generality of conflict monitoring and control models.     

Mapping the moral domain

The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: (a) Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; (b) convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and (c) we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality.     

Changes in children’s perception-action tuning over short time scales: Bicycling across traffic-filled intersections in a virtual environment

This investigation examined short-term changes in child and adult cyclists’ gap decisions and movement timing in response to general and specific road-crossing experiences. Children (10- and 12-year-olds) and adults rode a bicycle through a virtual environment with 12 intersections. Participants faced continuous cross traffic and waited for gaps they judged were adequate for crossing. In the control condition, participants encountered randomly ordered gaps ranging from 1.5 to 5.0 s at all intersections. In the high-density condition, participants encountered high-density intersections sandwiched between sets of control intersections. These high-density intersections were designed to push participants toward taking tighter gaps. Participants in both conditions were more likely to accept 3.5-, 4.0-, 4.5-, and 5.0-s gaps at the last set of intersections than at the first set of intersections, whereas participants in the high-density condition were also more likely to accept very tight 3.0-s gaps at the last intersections than at the first intersections. Moreover, individuals in the high-density condition who waited less and took shorter gaps at the middle intersections were also more likely to take very tight 3.0-s gaps at the last intersections. The 10-year-olds in both conditions had more time to spare when they cleared the path of the oncoming car at the last intersections, whereas the 12-year-olds and adults showed no change in time to spare across intersections. The discussion focuses on linking short-term change in perceptual-motor functioning to longer term perceptual-motor development.     

Threatened to distraction: Mind-wandering as a consequence of stereotype threat

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that the threat of a negative stereotype increases the frequency of mind-wandering (i.e., task-unrelated thought), thereby leading to performance impairments. Study 1 demonstrated that participants anticipating a stereotype-laden test mind-wandered more during the Sustained Attention to Response Task. Study 2 assessed mind-wandering directly using thought sampling procedures during a demanding math test. Results revealed that individuals experiencing stereotype threat experienced more off-task thoughts, which accounted for their poorer test performance compared to a control condition. These studies highlight the important role that social forces can have on mind-wandering. More specifically, these results serve as evidence for task-unrelated thought as a novel mechanism for stereotype threat-induced performance impairments.