The behavioral activation for depression scale-short form: development and validation

Following a landmark component analysis of cognitive therapy by Jacobson and colleagues (1996), there has been renewed interest in behavioral activation (BA) treatments for depression. The Behavioral Activation for Depression Scale (BADS) was developed to measure when and how clients become activated over the course of BA treatment. Multiple studies have provided initial support for the BADS but have also identified several potential problems. Four studies were conducted in order to develop and provide initial evaluation of a short form of the BADS that addresses these concerns. In Study 1, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted on existing data using the original BADS in order to identify items to retain for the short form. In Study 2, these items were administered to a new sample of college students with elevated depressive symptoms and were analyzed with exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Study 3 examined the predictive validity of the BADS-SF by examining the BADS-SF and depression scores in relation to activity tracking and reward-value ratings over the course of 1 week. Study 4 examined BADS-SF data over the course of BA treatment for two clients using cross-lagged panel correlations. With one client, changes in BADS-SF scores led changes in depression scores by 1 week, whereas with the other client changes in BADS-SF and depression scores occurred concurrently. These studies resulted in a nine-item scale that demonstrated good item characteristics as well as acceptable internal consistency reliability, construct validity, and predictive validity.     

The presence of a best friend buffers the effects of negative experiences

The goal of the current study was to examine how the presence of a best friend might serve as protection against the effect of negative experiences on global self-worth and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis (HPA axis). A total of 103 English-speaking male (n = 55) and female (n = 48) participants from Grade 5 (M = 10.27 years) and Grade 6 (M = 11.30 years) completed booklets about their experiences that occurred 20 min previously and how they felt about themselves at the moment, and they provided saliva multiple times per day over the course of 4 consecutive days. Having a best friend present during an experience significantly buffered the effect of the negativity of the experience on cortisol and global self-worth. When a best friend was not present, there was a significant increase in cortisol and a significant decrease in global self-worth as the negativity of the experience increased. When a best friend was present, there was less change in cortisol and global self-worth due to the negativity of the experience.     

“Broken Together”: Spirituality and Religion as Coping Strategies for Couples Dealing with the Death of a Child: A Literature Review with Clinical Implications

The death of a child is an event that can fall into the category of uncontrollable life events, testing the limits of the ability to control of bereaved parents. The literature reviewed showed that religious/spiritual coping is a unique way of coping and may be particularly important for couples who have lost a child. When assessing the couples’ coping strategies, marital therapists would be wise to look for religious/spiritual mechanisms that can be employed in the therapeutic process. Furthermore, the reviewers propose Emotionally Focused Couple Therapy (Johnson, 2004, The practice of emotionally focused couple therapy: Creating connection, Routledge, New York) as well suited for helping couples grieving the death of their child.     

Focused attention, open monitoring and automatic self-transcending: Categories to organize meditations from Vedic, Buddhist and Chinese traditions

This paper proposes a third meditation-category—automatic self-transcending— to extend the dichotomy of focused attention and open monitoring proposed by Lutz. Automatic self-transcending includes techniques designed to transcend their own activity. This contrasts with focused attention, which keeps attention focused on an object; and open monitoring, which keeps attention involved in the monitoring process. Each category was assigned EEG bands, based on reported brain patterns during mental tasks, and meditations were categorized based on their reported EEG. Focused attention, characterized by beta/gamma activity, included meditations from Tibetan Buddhist, Buddhist, and Chinese traditions. Open monitoring, characterized by theta activity, included meditations from Buddhist, Chinese, and Vedic traditions. Automatic self-transcending, characterized by alpha1 activity, included meditations from Vedic and Chinese traditions. Between categories, the included meditations differed in focus, subject/object relation, and procedures. These findings shed light on the common mistake of averaging meditations together to determine mechanisms or clinical effects.     

Treating Scrupulosity in Religious Individuals Using Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy

Scrupulosity, the obsessional fear of thinking or behaving immorally or against one's religious beliefs, is a form of obsessive-compulsive disorder that has been relatively understudied to date. Treating religious patients with scrupulosity raises a number of unique clinical challenges for many clinicians. For example, how does one distinguish normal beliefs from pathological scrupulosity? How does one adapt exposures to a religious patient whose fears are related to sinning? How far should one go in exposures in such cases? How and when does one include clergy in treatment? We address these issues and report a case example of the successful treatment of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish woman using the treatment principles that we recommend for religious individuals with scrupulosity.     

Hippocampal memory processes are modulated by insulin and high-fat-induced insulin resistance

Insulin regulates glucose uptake and storage in peripheral tissues, and has been shown to act within the hypothalamus to acutely regulate food intake and metabolism. The machinery for transduction of insulin signaling is also present in other brain areas, particularly in the hippocampus, but a physiological role for brain insulin outside the hypothalamus has not been established. Recent studies suggest that insulin may be able to modulate cognitive functions including memory. Here we report that local delivery of insulin to the rat hippocampus enhances spatial memory, in a PI-3-kinase dependent manner, and that intrahippocampal insulin also increases local glycolytic metabolism. Selective blockade of endogenous intrahippocampal insulin signaling impairs memory performance. Further, a rodent model of type 2 diabetes mellitus produced by a high-fat diet impairs basal cognitive function and attenuates both cognitive and metabolic responses to hippocampal insulin administration. Our data demonstrate that insulin is required for optimal hippocampal memory processing. Insulin resistance within the telencephalon may underlie the cognitive deficits commonly reported to accompany type 2 diabetes.     

Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos Revisited

This paper reconsiders some themes and arguments from my earlier paper “Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos.” That work is often considered to be part of a cluster of papers attacking “luck egalitarianism” on the grounds that insisting on luck egalitarianism’s standards of fairness undermines relations of mutual respect among citizens. While this is an accurate reading, the earlier paper did not make its motivations clear, and the current paper attempts to explain the reasons that led me to write the earlier paper, assesses the force of its arguments, and locates it in respect to work of Richard Arneson and Elizabeth Anderson. The paper concludes by bringing out what now appears to be the main message of the earlier paper: that the attempt to implement an “ideal” theory of equality can harm the very people that the theory is designed to help.     

Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms

Here I consider the relative merits of two recent models of explanation, James Woodward’s interventionist‐counterfactual model and the model model. According to the former, explanations are largely constituted by information about the consequences of counterfactual interventions. Problems arise for this approach because countless relevant interventions are possible in most cases and because it overlooks other kinds of equally relevant information. According the model model, explanations are largely constituted by cognitive models of actual mechanisms. On this approach, explanations tend not to represent any of the aforementioned information explicitly but can instead be used to produce it on demand. The model model thus offers the more plausible account of the information of which we are aware when we have an explanation and of the ratiocinative process through which we derive many kinds of information that are relevant to the evaluation of explanations.