How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

Responses to nervous breakdowns in America over a 40-year period. Mental health policy implications

The 1957 and 1976 Americans View Their Mental Health surveys from the Institute of Social Research were partially replicated in the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) to examine the policy implications of people's responses to feeling an impending nervous breakdown. Questions about problems in modern living were added to the GSS to provide a profile of the public's view of mental health problems. Results were compared for 1957, 1976, and 1996. In 1957, 19% of respondents had experienced an impending nervous breakdown; in 1996, 26% had had this experience. Between 1957 and 1996, participants increased their use of informal social supports, decreased their use of physicians, and increased their use of nonmedical mental health professionals. These findings support policies that strengthen informal support seeking and access to effective psychosocial treatments rather than current mental health reimbursement practices, which emphasize the role of primary care physicians.     

Age and emotional response to the Northridge earthquake: a longitudinal analysis

Cross-sectional studies have found older adults to have lower levels of emotional distress after natural disasters. The maturation hypothesis suggests that older adults are less reactive to stress events, whereas the inoculation hypothesis argues that prior experience with disaster is protective. One hundred and sixty-six adults aged 30 to 102 were interviewed regarding the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Longitudinal data were available on depressed mood before and after the earthquake. The maturation hypothesis was generally not supported. The young-old were least depressed; however, this age difference was present prior to the earthquake. The old-old showed lowest levels of earthquake-specific rumination, but age did not buffer the relationship between damage exposure and rumination. The inoculation hypothesis was supported for depressed mood. Prior earthquake experience was related to lower postearthquake depression scores.     

Neural mechanisms of affective interference in schizotypy

Negatively valenced stimuli foster cognitive impairment in schizotypy and schizophrenia. To identify relevant brain mechanisms, the authors had 16 positive-schizotypy and 16 control participants perform an emotional Stroop task, judging the ink color of negative and neutral words during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of regional brain activity. Schizotypy individuals showed increased right and decreased left activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, indicating a deficit in maintenance of attentional set in the presence of negative emotional distractors. They also showed abnormal activity in ventral limbic areas, including decreased activity in nucleus accumbens and increased activity in hippocampus and amygdala, a circuit involved in the integration of cognitive and affective processes. These results indicate that aspects of emotion-cognition processes and the brain mechanisms that implement them are similar in schizotypy and schizophrenia.     

Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: a critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird And Byrne (2002)

P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne proposed an influential theory of conditionals in which mental models represent logical possibilities and inferences are drawn from the extensions of possibilities that are used to represent conditionals. In this article, the authors argue that the extensional semantics underlying this theory is equivalent to that of the material, truth-functional conditional, at least for what they term "basic" conditionals, concerning arbitrary problem content. On the basis of both logical argument and psychological evidence, the authors propose that this approach is fundamentally mistaken and that conditionals must be viewed within a suppositional theory based on what philosophical logicians call the Ramsey test. The Johnson-Laird and Byrne theory is critically examined with respect to its account of basic conditionals, nonbasic conditionals, and counterfactuals.     

Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe

Highly hypnotizable participants were given a posthypnotic suggestion to feel a flash of disgust whenever they read an arbitrary word. They were then asked to rate moral transgressions described in vignettes that either did or did not include the disgust-inducing word. Two studies show that moral judgments can be made more severe by the presence of a flash of disgust. These findings suggest that moral judgments may be grounded in affectively laden moral intuitions.     

Neuroleptic malignant syndrome: diagnostic and therapeutic dilemmas

Neuroleptic malignant syndrome (NMS) is a life threatening medical state complicating the use of antipsychotic medications and other drugs that affect the dopaminergic system on administration or withdrawal. The condition was recognised nearly half a century ago, shortly after the discovery of antipsychotic medications. However, there are still no systematic studies about NMS. There are no definitive guidelines on its treatment. Although early recognition is emphasised and usually possible, delayed diagnosis is not rare. We here report on a case of NMS complicated by renal failure, and possibly respiratory failure. The report underscores the seriousness of delayed diagnosis and puts forward a comprehensive management recommendation based on our experience and the existing literature.     

The wane of childhood amnesia for autobiographical and public event memories

We modified Bruce, Dolan, and Phillips-Grant's (2000) threshold procedure for determining the wane of childhood amnesia. In two experiments, undergraduates labelled childhood events (e.g., your first permanent tooth came in) as know or recollect memories and estimated their age at the event's occurrence. In both studies the estimated transition from mostly know memories to mostly recollect memories was roughly 4.7 years. This transition estimate was replicated in a sample of adults (ages 24-65 years) with both Bruce et al.'s event-generation task and the Experiment 1a questionnaire. By contrast, in two experiments a transition estimate of roughly 6 years was found for undergraduates' memories of public events (e.g., the Challenger explosion). The wane of childhood amnesia appears to occur around 4.7 years.