Effects of lexicality and distinctiveness on repetition blindness

The repetition blindness (RB) paradigm developed by K. M. Arnell and P. Jolicoeur (1997) was used to examine effects of lexicality (word vs. nonword target pairs) and target distinctiveness on RB. Distinctiveness was manipulated by having both targets (Experiments 1 and 2) or only the first target (Experiment 3) brighter than nontarget items. All 3 experiments demonstrated strong RB for word targets but no RB for nonword targets. This confirms that RB depends on pre-existing memory representations. In fact, there was repetition facilitation for nonwords in Experiments 2 and 3. These experiments also demonstrated that RB is reduced when targets are distinctive. This finding is better understood interms of RB as a failure of memory rather than as a failure of perception.     

Constraints have different concurrent effects and aftereffects on variability

Three experiments showed that constraints imposed early in learning have different effects on variability when they are in effect and after they are removed. Task constraints, which determine how something can be done, limited the number of possible responses in a computer game. Variability constraints, which specify how differently something must be done, required that each response differ from some number of prior responses. Less restrictive constraints (Experiments 1 and 2) produced higher variability during the constraints. More restrictive constraints (Experiments 2 and 3) led to higher variability after the constraints were relaxed. The authors discuss how these differences reflect strategies acquired during the constraints (default rules) and modified in closely related ways (exception rules) afterward.     

The accuracy of abstracts in psychology journals

This article provides an empirically supported reminder of the importance of accuracy in scientific communication. The authors identify common types of inaccuracies in research abstracts and offer suggestions to improve abstract-article agreement. Abstracts accompanying 13% of a random sample of 400 research articles published in 8 American Psychological Association journals during 1997 and 1998 contained data or claims inconsistent with or missing from the body of the article. Error rates ranged from 8% to 18%, although between-journal differences were not significant. Many errors (63%) were unlikely to cause substantive misinterpretations. Unfortunately, 37% of errors found could be seriously misleading with respect to the data or claims presented in the associated article. Although deficient abstracts may be less common in psychology journals than in major medical journals (R. M. Pitkin, M. A. Branagan, & L. F. Burmeister, 1999), there is still cause for concern and need for improvement.     

Recent exposure affects artifact naming

Deciding how to label an object depends both on beliefs about the culturally appropriate name and on memory. A label should be consistent with a language community's norms, but those norms can be used only if they can be retrieved. Two experiments are reported in which we tested the hypothesis that immediate prior exposure to familiar objects and their names affects how an ambiguous target object is named. Exposure to a typical instance of one name category was pitted against exposure to one or two instances from a contrasting category. When the contrast set consisted of a neighbor of the target, naming was usually consistent with the contrast category. This effect was reduced when a typical instance of the contrast category was also exposed. In Experiment 2, the exposure set was varied to include conditions in which either the neighbor or a prototypical instance was paired with an instance dissimilar to the target. The results suggest that all recently exposed objects affect name choice in proportion to their similarity to the target.     

Background beliefs in Bayesian inference

We report five experiments in which the role of background beliefs in social judgments of posterior probability was investigated. From a Bayesian perspective, people should combine prior probabilities (or base rates) and diagnostic evidence with equal weighting, although previous research shows that base rates are often underweighted. These experiments were designed so that either piece of information was supplied either by personal beliefs or by presented statistics, and regression analyses were performed on individual participants to assess the relative influence of information. We found that both prior probabilities and diagnostic information significantly influenced judgments, whether supplied by beliefs or by statistical information, but that belief-based information tended to dominate the judgments made.     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: a critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird And Byrne (2002)

P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne proposed an influential theory of conditionals in which mental models represent logical possibilities and inferences are drawn from the extensions of possibilities that are used to represent conditionals. In this article, the authors argue that the extensional semantics underlying this theory is equivalent to that of the material, truth-functional conditional, at least for what they term "basic" conditionals, concerning arbitrary problem content. On the basis of both logical argument and psychological evidence, the authors propose that this approach is fundamentally mistaken and that conditionals must be viewed within a suppositional theory based on what philosophical logicians call the Ramsey test. The Johnson-Laird and Byrne theory is critically examined with respect to its account of basic conditionals, nonbasic conditionals, and counterfactuals.