The Functional Analytic Psychotherapy Rating Scale: a Replication and Extension

Few theories of psychotherapy give direction to the therapist on a moment-to-moment level or make predictions about how specific therapist techniques change client behavior in session. Functional analytic psychotherapy (FAP, Kohlenberg and Tsai in Functional analytic psychotherapy: a guide for creating intense and curative therapeutic relationships. Plenum, New York 1991) provides this direction and prediction. Specifically, FAP claims that client problem behaviors will be displayed in the therapeutic relationship and that the therapist can improve client in-session behavior through differential, contingent responding. Further, it is assumed that these improvements in session can be generalized to out of session relationships. The FAP rating scale (FAPRS) was developed for the purpose of coding in-session client and therapist behaviors in an effort to test FAP’s purported mechanism of change. The current study seeks to replicate and extend initial FAPRS findings (Callaghan et al. in J Contemp Psychother 33:321–339, 2003) regarding mechanism of change and to address transportability. FAPRS coding data from a single successful case of an individual diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder and treated with FAP is presented. Results indicate that the FAPRS system is transportable and are generally supportive of the claim that therapist contingent responding leads to client improvement.     

On Sinnott-Armstrong’s Case Against Moral Intuitionism

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) we are emotional in a way that clouds our judgement, (4) the circumstances are conducive to illusion, or (5) the source of our moral beliefs is unreliable or disreputable. I take issue with the elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that centre on (1) to (3) and (5), concluding that his case against moral intuitionism is unpersuasive.     

Madness versus badness: the ethical tension between the recovery movement and forensic psychiatry

The mental health recovery movement promotes patient self-determination and opposes coercive psychiatric treatment. While it has made great strides towards these ends, its rhetoric impairs its political efficacy. We illustrate how psychiatry can share recovery values and yet appear to violate them. In certain criminal proceedings, for example, forensic psychiatrists routinely argue that persons with mental illness who have committed crimes are not full moral agents. Such arguments align with the recovery movement’s aim of providing appropriate treatment and services for people with severe mental illness, but contradict its fundamental principle of self-determination. We suggest that this contradiction should be addressed with some urgency, and we recommend a multidisciplinary collaborative effort involving ethics, law, psychiatry, and social policy to address this and other ethical questions that arise as the United States strives to implement recovery-oriented programs.     

Subtypes of obsessive-compulsive disorder: Implications for specialized cognitive behavior therapy

Although obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a heterogeneous condition, OCD subtypes have received limited attention in trials of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT). Because many patients with OCD do not respond optimally to CBT, it is important for clinicians to consider whether variability in treatment response is related to symptom presentation. Treatment modifications for patients without overt compulsions or with hoarding symptoms show promise. In this article we discuss the available research addressing the treatment of OCD subtypes, review the clinical characteristics and treatment recommendations for prominent OCD subtypes, raise the prospect of using dysfunctional beliefs as a potentially helpful conceptual approach to subtyping OCD and matching treatment to subtypes, and consider future directions in the treatment of OCD subtypes.     

The Perceived Ethnic Discrimination Questionnaire: Development and Preliminary Validation of a Community Version1

This paper describes 2 studies that evaluated a new instrument, the Perceived Ethnic Discrimination Questionnaire‐Community Version (PEDQ‐CV). The PEDQ‐CV can be used across ethnic groups to assess perceived racism or ethnic discrimination. The scales measure several subdimensions of racism, permitting the examination of different forms of this race‐related stressor. The first study evaluated the psychometric properties of the PEDQ‐CV in a large sample of community‐dwelling adults. The second evaluated psychometric properties of a brief version of the PEDQ‐CV, developed for research protocols requiring a shorter administration time. Tests were made of reliability and several forms of construct validity. Both versions of the PEDQ‐CV have good reliability and construct validity. The PEDQ‐CV can facilitate the development of an integrative body of knowledge across different ethnic groups regarding the existence, determinants, and consequences of discrimination.     

Quiddistic Knowledge

Is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis, swallowing the skeptical conclusion. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. Properties have intrinsic natures (quiddities), which we can know. On route I shall also argue that (i) the main necessitarian arguments do not converge on a single view, (ii) properties are transworld entities that cannot be handled by counterpart theory, and (iii) quiddistic skepticism is merely external world skepticism writ small.     

Constraint Respecters, Constraint Challengers, and Crisis Decision Making in Democracies: A Case Study Analysis of Kennedy versus Reagan

Models linking domestic political constraints (audience costs, pressures for the diversionary use of force, democratic norms and institutions) to foreign policy behavior generally assume that leaders simply recognize and submit to constraints in their domestic environments—a strong structural argument. In contrast, research on political leadership and decision making suggests that leaders vary systematically in their orientations toward constraints: "constraint respecters" tend to internalize potential constraints, while "constraint challengers" are more likely to view them as obstacles to be overcome. This article develops an integrative theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates these insights and applies them to the domain of crisis decision making. After identifying leaders' expected orientations toward constraints via at-a-distance methods, the plausibility of hypotheses derived from this framework is examined through case studies that explore the decision-making processes employed by President Kennedy (a "constraint respecter") and President Reagan (a "constraint challenger") during international crises. The results suggest that there is important variation in how leaders perceive and respond to domestic constraints, and that leadership style is one—though not the only—important source of this variation.     

The duality principle: irreducibility of sub-threshold psychophysical computation to neuronal brain activation

A key working hypothesis in neuroscience is ‘materialistic reductionism’, i.e., the assumption whereby all physiological, behavioral or cognitive phenomena is produced by localized neurochemical brain activation (but not vice versa). However, analysis of sub-threshold Weber’s psychophysical stimulation indicates its computational irreducibility to the direct interaction between psychophysical stimulation and any neuron/s. This is because the materialistic-reductionistic working hypothesis assumes that the determination of the existence or non-existence of any psychophysical stimulation [s] may only be determined through its direct interaction [di1] with a given neuron/s [N] that together forms the ‘neural registry’ computational level [NR/di1]. But, this implies that in cases of (initial) sub-threshold (sensory-specific) psychophysical stimulation which is increased above the sensory-specific threshold but below Weber’s psychophysical ‘dv’—the psychophysical computational processing [PCP] produces an apparently ‘computationally indeterminate’ output. This is because materialistic reductionism asserts the contingency of PCP upon the existence of a direct interaction between ‘s’ and ‘N’ within the NR/di1 level, but in the special case of Weber’s sub-threshold psychophysical stimulation the same PCP/di1 also asserts the non-existence of ‘s’ (as demanded by Weber’s psychophysical law). However, given robust empirical evidence indicating the capability of PCP to determine whether (or not) ‘s’ exists, we must conclude that PCP may not be carried out from within NR’s direct interaction between a particular psychophysical stimulation and any set of neuron/s in the brain. Hence, the Duality Principle asserts the conceptual irreducibility of sub-threshold psychophysical stimulation to any direct NR/di1: s-N interaction, thereby challenging the current materialistic-reductionistic assumption.