Action mechanisms for social cognition: behavioral and neural correlates of developing Theory of Mind

Many psychological theories posit foundational links between two fundamental constructs: (1) our ability to produce, perceive, and represent action; and (2) our ability to understand the meaning and motivation behind the action (i.e. Theory of Mind; ToM). This position is contentious, however, and long‐standing competing theories of social‐cognitive development debate roles for basic action‐processing in ToM. Developmental research is key to investigating these hypotheses, but whether individual differences in neural and behavioral measures of motor action relate to social‐cognitive development is unknown. We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children's (N = 26) EEG mu‐desynchronization during production of object‐directed action, and explored associations between mu‐desynchronization and children's behavioral motor skills, behavioral action‐representation abilities, and behavioral ToM. For children with high (but not low) mu‐desynchronization, motor skill related to action‐representation abilities, and action‐representation mediated relations between motor skill and ToM. Results demonstrate novel foundational links between action‐processing and ToM, suggesting that basic motor action may be a key mechanism for social‐cognitive development, thus shedding light on the origins and emergence of higher social cognition.     

Religion,moral thought–action fusion,and obsessive–compulsive features in Israeli Muslims and Jews

Previous studies suggest that the link between obsessive–compulsive (OC) symptoms and moral thought–action fusion (TAF) depends on religion; however, no study has compared Muslim and Jewish samples. We examined the relationships between OC symptoms, scrupulosity, religiosity, and moral TAF in Israeli Muslims and Jews. Religiosity was not associated with elevations in OC symptoms, although religiosity correlated with scrupulosity across the entire sample after controlling for depression and anxiety. Moral TAF was related to scrupulosity across the entire sample. The Muslim group had higher levels of OC symptoms, scrupulosity, and depressive symptoms than did the Jewish group, but the groups were equally religious. In addition, Muslims scored higher than did Jews on moral TAF even after controlling for symptoms; however, moral TAF was not related to scrupulosity within the Muslim group. In combination, these results imply that moral TAF depends on cultural and religious factors and does not necessarily indicate pathology.     

The muddle of medicalization: pathologizing or medicalizing?

Medicalization appears to be an issue that is both ubiquitous and unquestionably problematic as it seems to signal at once a social and existential threat. This perception of medicalization, however, is nothing new. Since the first main writings in the 1960s and 1970s, it has consistently been used to describe inappropriate or abusive instances of medical authority. Yet, while this standard approach claims that medicalization is a growing problem, it assumes that there is simply one “medical model” and that the expanding realm of “the medical” can be more or less clearly delineated. Moreover, while intended to establish the reality of this growing threat, this research often requires making arbitrary or unjustified distinctions between different practices. To better clarify the concept of medicalization, I will focus more on capturing the variety of medical practices than on the sociological aspects of medical discourse. In doing so, I will explore the distinction between medicalization and pathologization, a distinction that is often overlooked and that brings with it many conceptual and practical implications. After defining these terms, I will use some examples to show that while pathologizing is closely tied to medicalizing, both can occur independently. I will then further develop this distinction in terms of the different individual and social effects of these practices.     

Integration of parafoveal orthographic information during foveal word reading: beyond the sub-lexical level?

Prior research has shown that processing of a given target word is facilitated by the simultaneous presentation of orthographically related stimuli in the parafovea. Here we investigate the nature of such spatial integration processes by presenting orthographic neighbours of target words in the parafovea, considering that neighbours have been shown to inhibit, rather than facilitate, recognition of target words in foveal masked priming research. In Experiment 1, we used the gaze-contingent boundary paradigm to manipulate the parafoveal information subjects received while they fixated a target word within a sentence. In Experiment 2, we used the Flanking Letters Lexical Decision paradigm to manipulate parafoveal information while subjects read isolated words. Parafoveal words were either a higher-frequency orthographic neighbour of targets words (e.g., blue-blur) or a high-frequency unrelated word (e.g., hand-blur). We found that parafoveal orthographic neighbours facilitated, rather than inhibited, processing of the target. Thus, the present findings provide further evidence that orthographic information is integrated across multiple words and suggest that either the integration process does not enable simultaneous access to those words’ lexical representations, or that lexical representations activated by spatially distinct stimuli do not compete for recognition.     

African philosophy and global epistemic injustice

In this paper, I consider how the discourse on global epistemic justice might be approached differently if some contributions from the African philosophical place are taken seriously. To be specific, I argue that the debate on global justice broadly has not been global. I cite as an example, the exclusion or marginalisation of African philosophy, what it has contributed and what it may yet contribute to the global epistemic edifice. I point out that this exclusion is a case of epistemic injustice. I observe that the absence of a philosophical technique that prevails on philosophers to engage with others from other traditions might be responsible for this epistemic lopsidedness and marginalisation. I go beyond the re-statement of this problem of marginalisation of African philosophy to point out relevant doctrines from the African place. I show how they are united under the methodological and ideological disposition of conversationalism. I argue that this ideology might be a better model for realising the goal of global epistemic justice which is the overcoming of all forms of exclusions and lopsidedness in global epistemic discourses through fair allocation of intellectual spaces.     

Assessing the Factorial Validity of the Attitudes and Belief Scale 2-Abbreviated Version: A Call for the Development a Gold Standard Method of Measuring Rational and Irrational Beliefs

Rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT) does not possess a measure of rational and irrational beliefs that meets internationally recognised standards for acceptable psychometric properties. Without such a measure the theory/practice of REBT cannot be rigorously evaluated, thus undermining its scientific veracity. The current study investigates the validity and reliability of a recently developed measure of rational and irrational beliefs: the Attitudes and Belief Scale 2-Abbreviated Version (ABS-2-AV). University students from three countries completed the ABS-2-AV (N = 397). An alternative models framework using confirmatory factor analysis indicated that a theoretically consistent eight-factor model of the ABS-2-AV provided the best fit of the data. A number of post hoc modifications were required in order to achieve acceptable model fit results, and these modifications revealed important methodological limitations with the ABS-2-AV. Results indicated that the validity of the ABS-2-AV was undermined due to items measuring both the psychological process of interest (rational and irrational beliefs) and the context in which these beliefs processes are presented. This is a serious methodological limitation of the ABS-2 and all questionnaires derived from it, including the ABS-2-AV. This methodological limitation resulted in the ABS-2-AV possessing poor internal reliability. These limitations are discussed in relation to the broader REBT literature and the impact such problems have on research and practice. A call is made for REBT researchers to come together to develop a “gold standard” method of assessing rational and irrational beliefs that meets international standard for psychometric excellence.     

The Ways Paradigm: A Transtheoretical Model for Integrating Spirituality Into Counseling

Research suggests that an emphasis on spirituality and religion in counseling has increased awareness but not translated into changes in practice. The authors contend that part of this challenge is the lack of a broad, heuristic model for integration that seeks to embrace the complex, fluid, and negotiated nature of spirituality and religion. Cheston's ( 2000a ) Ways Paradigm for teaching counseling theory provides such a model, leading to new perspectives on counselor education, research, and practice.     

Dunning–Kruger effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence

The Dunning–Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning–Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest numbers of errors on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than 3. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased, and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic-thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely nonanalytic participants (on the basis of CRT performance) overreported their “need for cognition” (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning–Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic-thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is that they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.