A theoretical exploration and model of consumer expectations,post‐purchase affective states and affective behaviour

Through a detailed review of the service quality and (dis)satisfaction literatures, this paper presents a theoretical model exploring the interrelationship between expectations, affective post‐purchase states and affective behaviour. Drawing together a comprehensive hierarchy of expectations culled from the service quality literature, the authors seek to apply levels of expectation to specific post‐purchase affective states and affective behaviour. The authors argue that consumers have two types of expectation that influence post‐purchase affective states: the core or predictive ‘will be’ expectation; and peripheral expectations—that can range from the ideal standard to the minimum tolerable level. By applying the levels‐of‐expectation approach to the expectation‐disconfirmation paradigm, the authors argue that there are four types of post‐purchase affective states: delight, satisfaction (or positive indifference), acceptance (or negative indifference) and dissatisfaction. These four states may lead onto affective action—ie varying degrees of complaining or complimenting behaviour. The paper presents 11 propositions relating to expectations and their interrelationship with post‐purchase affective states and subsequent consumer behaviour, with the aim of stimulating further scholarly enquiry. The managerial implications of the analysis are also considered. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications.     

Emergent Individuals

We explain the thesis that human mental states are ontologically emergent aspects of a fundamentally biological organism. We then explore the consequences of this thesis for the identity of a human person over time. As these consequences are not obviously independent of one's general ontology of objects and their properties, we consider four such accounts: transcendent universals, kind-Aristotelianism, immanent universals, and tropes. We suggest there are reasons for emergentists to favour the latter two accounts. We then argue that within such ontologies, emergentism about properties pushes one to the stronger claim that there are emergent individuals, though not individuals which are dual to person's bodies — substance emergentism, but not substance dualism.