Strategies of clinical hypothesis testing

This research examines whether Psychology students, when they test clinical hypotheses, follow either confirmatory or disconfirmatory reasoning strategies. Two hundred and six psychology students, divided in four groups, participated. One group received information about the probability that the hypothesis was correct by means of verbal labels, and another group, by means of numerical expressions. An additional group received the information that getting a precise diagnosis was clinically important. In a last group, diagnostic tests allowed them to increase certainty about the hypothesis. Results show a partial use of confirmatory strategies because, although participants did not seek confirming information, they indeed avoided collecting disconfirming information. When the information increased certainty about the hypothesis, confirmatory strategies became more likely. Neither the increase in the task importance nor the numerical expression of the likelihood that the hypothesis was correct seemed to affect the testing strategy used.     

Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms

Here I consider the relative merits of two recent models of explanation, James Woodward’s interventionist‐counterfactual model and the model model. According to the former, explanations are largely constituted by information about the consequences of counterfactual interventions. Problems arise for this approach because countless relevant interventions are possible in most cases and because it overlooks other kinds of equally relevant information. According the model model, explanations are largely constituted by cognitive models of actual mechanisms. On this approach, explanations tend not to represent any of the aforementioned information explicitly but can instead be used to produce it on demand. The model model thus offers the more plausible account of the information of which we are aware when we have an explanation and of the ratiocinative process through which we derive many kinds of information that are relevant to the evaluation of explanations.     

Psychophysics of perceiving eye-gaze and head direction with peripheral vision: implications for the dynamics of eye-gaze behavior

Two psychophysical experiments are reported, one dealing with the visual perception of the head orientation of another person (the 'looker') and the other dealing with the perception of the looker's direction of eye gaze. The participant viewed the looker with different retinal eccentricities, ranging from foveal to far-peripheral viewing. On average, judgments of head orientation were reliable even out to the extremes of peripheral vision (90 degrees eccentricity), with better performance at the extremes when the participant was able to view the looker changing head orientation from one trial to the next. In sharp contrast, judgments of eye-gaze direction were reliable only out to 4 degrees eccentricity, signifying that the eye-gaze social signal is available to people only when they fixate near the looker's eyes. While not unexpected, this vast difference in availability of information about head direction and eye direction, both of which can serve as indicators of the looker's focus of attention, is important for understanding the dynamics of eye-gaze behavior.     

Ontological Proofs of Existence and Non-Existence

Caramuels’ proof of non-existence of God is compared with Gödel’s proof of existence.     

Forgetting is effortful: Evidence from reaction time probes in an item-method directed forgetting task

Reaction time (RT) was measured in response to visual detection probes embedded within an item-method directed forgetting paradigm. In Experiment 1, study words were presented individually followed by an instruction to remember (R) or forget (F). Probes were presented at stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 1,400, 1,800, or 2,600 msec in relation to the study word or memory instruction. After the study trials, a yes-no recognition task measured retention of R and F words. Experiment 2 added a no-word control condition and no-probe catch trials. In both experiments, post-F probe RTs were longer than post-R probe RTs at early SOAs. Confirming that participants attended to the memory instructions, there was a significant directed forgetting effect, with greater recognition of R than of F words. These findings contradict the view that directed forgetting in the item-method paradigm is due to the passive decay of nonrehearsed F items; instead, they are consistent with the view that intentional forgetting in an item-method paradigm occurs via the operation of an active, potentially inhibitory, cognitive process.     

Processing events: behavioral and neuromagnetic correlates of Aspectual Coercion

Much recent psycho- and neuro-linguistic work has aimed to elucidate the mechanisms by which sentence meanings are composed by investigating the processing of semantic mismatch. One controversial case for theories of semantic composition is expressions such as the clown jumped for ten minutes, in which the aspectual properties of a punctual verb clash with those of a durative modifier. Such sentences have been proposed to involve a coercion operation which shifts the punctual meaning of the verb to an iterative one. However, processing studies addressing this hypothesis have yielded mixed results. In this study, we tested four hypotheses of how aspectual mismatch is resolved with self-paced reading and magnetoencephalography. Using a set of verbs normed for punctuality, we identified an immediate behavioral cost of mismatch. The neural correlates of this processing were found to match effects in midline prefrontal regions previously implicated in the resolution of complement coercion. We also identified earlier effects in right-lateral frontal and temporal sites. We suggest that of the representational hypotheses currently in the literature, these data are most consistent with an account where aspectual mismatch initially involves the composition of an anomalous meaning that is later repaired via coercion.     

Graded effects of number of inserted letters in superset priming

Three masked priming experiments investigated the effects of target word length and number of inserted letters on superset priming, where irrelevant letters are added to targets to form prime stimuli (e.g., tanble-table). Effects of one, two, three, and four-letter insertions were measured relative to an unrelated prime condition, the identity prime condition, and a condition where the order of letters of the superset primes was reversed. Superset primes facilitated performance compared with unrelated primes and reversed primes, and the overall pattern showed a small cost of letter insertion that was independent of target word length and that increased linearly as a function of the number of inserted letters. A meta-analysis incorporating data from the present study and two other studies investigating superset priming, showed an average estimated processing cost of 11 ms per letter insertion. Models of letter position coding are examined in the light of this result.     

On some limits of hypothetical thinking

Faced with extreme demands, hypothetical thinking runs the danger of total failure. Paradoxical propositions such as the Liar (“I am lying”) provide an opportunity to test it to its limits, while the Liar's nonparadoxical counterpart, the Truthteller (“I am telling the truth”), provides a useful comparison. Two experiments are reported, one with abstract materials (“If I am a knave then I live in Emerald City”) and one with belief-laden materials (a judge says: “If I am a knave then I enjoy pop music”). In both experiments, conditionals with Truthteller-type antecedents were “collapsed” to responses of conditional probability closely resembling estimates of control items. Liar-type antecedents, in contrast, dramatically weakened belief in conditionals in which they were embedded. The results are discussed in the framework of the theory of hypothetical thinking.     

When can we say 'if'?

In this study, we focus on the conditions which permit people to assert a conditional statement of the form 'if p then q' with conversational relevance. In a broadly decision-theoretic approach, also drawing on hypothetical thinking theory [Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.], we predicted that conditional tips and promises would appear more useful and persuasive and be more likely to encourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the cost of the action p was lower and (c) the benefit of the consequence q was higher. Similarly, we predicted that conditional warnings and threats would be seen as more useful and persuasive and more likely to discourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the benefit of the action p was lower and (c) the cost of the consequence q was higher. All predictions were strongly confirmed, suggesting that such conditionals may best be asserted when they are of high relevance to the goals of the listener.