The Belief in Good Luck Scale

The construction and properties of the Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) Scale are described. Three studies provide evidence that reliable individual differences exist with respect to beliefs about luck. Some individuals maintain an irrational view of luck as a somewhat stable force that tends to influence events in their own favor, while others seem to hold the more rational belief that luck is random and unreliable. Further, these beliefs showed a considerable amount of stability over time. The BIGL was significantly related to locus of control (primarily to a chance subscale), but other evidence suggested these constructs were distinct. Belief in good luck was not related to general optimism, academic pessimism, self-esteem, desire for control, or achievement motivation. There was also evidence that belief in good luck was distinct from feeling fortunate or generally satisfied with one's life. Ethnic group differences were observed for the BIGL scale, showing that Asian-Americans were more likely to endorse superstitious beliefs about luck than non-Asians. Finally, the BIGL scale was shown to predict positive expectations for the outcome of everyday situations that are typically associated with luck. This is generally in agreement with previous findings suggesting that people who believe in personal good luck react to lucky events by becoming more positive about the likelihood of future success (Darke & Freedman, 1997). In general, it is suggested that irrational beliefs about luck can serve as a source of positive expectations for the outcome of future events.     

Configural biases and reversible figures: evidence of multilevel grouping effects

Four experiments sought to identify the processes underlying 2 classes of grouping effects that are readily produced with a hierarchical figure type known as ambiguous triangles. Previous work has shown that aligning small equilateral triangles in particular configurations can both facilitate and interfere with observers' ability to report the pointing direction of the individual triangles. We determined that selectively adapting the observer to low-frequency gratings of the same orientation as the aligned triangles markedly altered the interfering and facilitative effects of the global configuration only when an accuracy measure of performance was used. When a response latency measure was used, no effect of the same adaptation condition was found. Results are discussed in terms of multiple levels of grouping effects in the visual system and the differential sensitivity of these levels to basic neural adaptation.     

The role of ethnic identity and self-construal in coping among African American and Caucasian American seventh graders: an exploratory analysis of within-group variance

Much coping research has been conducted comparing members of different ethnic groups using discrete racial classifications. However, the past two decades have seen the construct of ethnicity evolve into a complex variable that must be assessed in a more comprehensive way. This study explored how ethnicity, a discrete variable, and the continuous variables of a person's ethnic identity and self-construal contribute to the use of particular coping strategies across various situations. One hundred twelve seventh graders (67 African Americans and 45 Caucasian Americans) from three suburban middle schools completed questionnaires assessing ethnic identity, self-construal, and coping strategies for medical, test, and social criticism stressors. Results supported the hypothesis that ethnicity as a discrete variable is not associated with coping, but that ethnic identity and self-construal are. It was also found that high scores on the ethnic identity and self-construal scales were indicative of more positive psychological adjustment. Implications for future research and methodological considerations are discussed.     

Atypical depression: enhanced right hemispheric dominance for perceiving emotional chimeric faces

Two studies compared hemispatial bias for perceiving chimeric faces in patients having either atypical or typical depression and healthy controls. A total of 245 patients having major depressive disorder (MDD) or dysthymia (164 with atypical features) and 115 controls were tested on the Chimeric Faces Test. Atypical depression differed from typical depression and controls in showing abnormally large right hemisphere bias. This was present in patients having either MDD or dysthymia and was not related to anxiety, physical anhedonia, or vegetative symptoms. In contrast, patients having MDD with melancholia showed essentially no right hemisphere bias. This is further evidence that atypical depression is a biologically distinct subtype and underscores the importance of this diagnostic distinction for neurophysiologic studies.     

Effects of lexicality and distinctiveness on repetition blindness

The repetition blindness (RB) paradigm developed by K. M. Arnell and P. Jolicoeur (1997) was used to examine effects of lexicality (word vs. nonword target pairs) and target distinctiveness on RB. Distinctiveness was manipulated by having both targets (Experiments 1 and 2) or only the first target (Experiment 3) brighter than nontarget items. All 3 experiments demonstrated strong RB for word targets but no RB for nonword targets. This confirms that RB depends on pre-existing memory representations. In fact, there was repetition facilitation for nonwords in Experiments 2 and 3. These experiments also demonstrated that RB is reduced when targets are distinctive. This finding is better understood interms of RB as a failure of memory rather than as a failure of perception.     

The accuracy of abstracts in psychology journals

This article provides an empirically supported reminder of the importance of accuracy in scientific communication. The authors identify common types of inaccuracies in research abstracts and offer suggestions to improve abstract-article agreement. Abstracts accompanying 13% of a random sample of 400 research articles published in 8 American Psychological Association journals during 1997 and 1998 contained data or claims inconsistent with or missing from the body of the article. Error rates ranged from 8% to 18%, although between-journal differences were not significant. Many errors (63%) were unlikely to cause substantive misinterpretations. Unfortunately, 37% of errors found could be seriously misleading with respect to the data or claims presented in the associated article. Although deficient abstracts may be less common in psychology journals than in major medical journals (R. M. Pitkin, M. A. Branagan, & L. F. Burmeister, 1999), there is still cause for concern and need for improvement.     

Background beliefs in Bayesian inference

We report five experiments in which the role of background beliefs in social judgments of posterior probability was investigated. From a Bayesian perspective, people should combine prior probabilities (or base rates) and diagnostic evidence with equal weighting, although previous research shows that base rates are often underweighted. These experiments were designed so that either piece of information was supplied either by personal beliefs or by presented statistics, and regression analyses were performed on individual participants to assess the relative influence of information. We found that both prior probabilities and diagnostic information significantly influenced judgments, whether supplied by beliefs or by statistical information, but that belief-based information tended to dominate the judgments made.     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.