Narrative and Metaphysical Ambition: On Being “in Christ”

This article addresses some of the confusion regarding the role of metaphysical claims in narrative theology. Proponents and critics of narrative theology alike wonder at the ambiguous place of metaphysical speech about God as an objective reality. This essay enters the conversation through the side door of soteriology. Rather than focusing on the relationship between narrative and metaphysics or narrative and analogy or narrative and first‐order theological claims, I examine what sort of metaphysical statements are required to make the Christian claim that human beings are “in Christ” intelligible as a soteriological reality. I argue that the Christian grammar itself assumes a Christology with a certain kind of metaphysical ambition without which Christianity lapses into incoherence. To make this case, I show that David Kelsey's “narrative identity” Christology in Eccentric Existence lacks the metaphysical statements necessary to uphold his conviction that human beings are “in Christ.” A comparison with T. F. Torrance and the Book of Hebrews reveals that when narrative circumvents metaphysical statements about the incarnate Son, soteriological claims lack coherence and the biblical narrative itself is distorted by a false metaphysic. Thus, metaphysical claims internal to the narrative of Jesus are necessary to tell the story of God faithfully. In this way, narrative is the expression of a theological metaphysics.     

Eyeblinking during autokinetic movement observed by a subject living in the up-down inverted visual world

Eyeblinking during autokinetic movement observed by one subject living in the up-down inverted visual world, was investigated. The subject wore frame-spectacles (without prisms) for the first two days and then wore up-down inverting spectacles (with prisms) for the next four days, followed by the resumption of the former frame-spectacles for one day. Eyeblinks during autokinetic movement were measured by using vertical EOG. Analysis showed (1) the occurrence of eyeblinking during autokinetic movement was not influenced by living in the up-down inverted visual world; (2) the frequency of eyeblinking during autokinetic movement significantly decreased with successive days of observation.     

Effects of up-down visual inversion on motor skills

The movement of a hand or fingers and locomotion of the body by a subject wearing prisms which inverted his visual world were investigated. A subject wore frame-spectacles (without prisms) for the first two days and then wore up-down inverting spectacles (with prisms) for the next four days, followed by wearing the former frame-spectacles again for one day. Measurements were made of skill on star-drawing, pegboard tests, and on zigzag-walking and walking up and down stairs. There were no differences on the five measures during acquisition for the four tasks, which suggests smooth progress of prism-adaptation by this man.     

Effects of living in the up-down inverted visual world on apparent movement

The purpose of this study was to examine whether a change of perceptual framework may affect the occurrence of apparent movement. Apparent movement was observed by one subject living over four days in the prismatically inverted visual world, because this situation was considered as the operation in which the subject was forced to change the perceptual framework to adapt himself to the novel environment. Apparent movement with two points was measured in vertical and horizontal configurations before wearing and after removing the prism as well as while wearing it. Analysis showed significant effects of prism-wearing on the occurrence of apparent movement in both vertical and horizontal configurations. Although further elaboration is required, an hypothesis was suggested from the viewpoint of the loss of visual position constancy.