Rousseau on Sex-Roles,Education and Happiness

Over the last decade, philosophers of education have begun taking a renewed interest in Rousseau’s educational thought. This is a welcome development as his ideas are rich with educational insights. His philosophy is not without its flaws, however. One significant flaw is his educational project for females, which is sexist in the highest degree. Rousseau argues that females should be taught to “please men…and make [men’s] lives agreeable and sweet.” The question becomes how could Rousseau make such strident claims, especially in light of his far more insightful ideas concerning the education of males. This paper attempts to make sense of Rousseau’s ideas on the education of females. While I maintain that Rousseau’s project for Sophie ought to be rejected, I argue that we should try to understand how this otherwise insightful thinker could make such surprising claims. Is it a bizarre inconsistency in his philosophical reasoning or an expression of his unabashed misogyny, as so many have claimed? I argue that it is neither. Rather, it is a product of his conception of human happiness and his belief in the irreducible role human sexual relations has in achieving and prolonging that happiness. For Rousseau, sex, love and happiness are inextricably connected, and he believes that men and women will be happiest when they inhabit certain sex roles—not because sex roles are valuable in themselves, but because only through them can either men or women hope to be happy.     

On having very long arms: how the availability of technological means affects moral cognition

Modern technological means allow for meaningful interaction across arbitrary distances, while human morality evolved in environments in which individuals needed to be spatially close in order to interact. We investigate how people integrate knowledge about modern technology with their ancestral moral dispositions to help relieve nearby suffering. Our first study establishes that spatial proximity between an agent's means of helping and the victims increases people's judgement of helping obligations, even if the agent is constantly far personally. We then report and meta-analyse 20 experiments elucidating the cognitive mechanisms behind this effect, which include inferences of increased efficaciousness and personal involvement. Implications of our findings for the scientific understanding of ancestral moral dispositions in modern environments are discussed, as well as suggestions for how these insights might be exploited to increase charitable giving. Our meta-analysis provides a practical example for how aggregating across all available data, including failed replication attempts, allows conclusions that could not be supported in single experiments.     

From state neuroticism to momentary task performance: A person × situation approach

The goal of this article was to investigate the mechanisms through which personality relates to task performance. We argue that perceptions of work pressure and task complexity trigger momentary levels of neuroticism (i.e., state neuroticism) and that these momentary levels of neuroticism predict momentary task performance. Moreover, we hypothesized that the relationship between momentary job demands and state neuroticism is moderated by trait neuroticism. To test this model, we conducted an event reconstruction study and a day reconstruction study. The results revealed that trait neuroticism indeed moderated the momentary job demands–state neuroticism relationship, and in three out of four cases state neuroticism was found to mediate the relationship between momentary job demands and momentary task performance. From a practical point-of-view our results suggest that employees’ task performance can be improved by enhancing the way in which individuals perceive job demands. This strategy would be particularly helpful for individuals for whom the momentary job demands–state neuroticism relationship is the strongest (i.e., employees high in trait neuroticism).     

Explaining unexplainable food choices

In recent years, psychologists have started to investigate the downstream consequences of nonconsciously activated behaviour (acting in an ‘explanatory vacuum’). Results have shown that when such behaviour is norm‐violating, people experience a need to confabulate reasons for this behaviour. The present paper aims to add more convincing evidence for this assumption. Study 1 addresses this question by replicating Study 2 of Adriaanse, Weijers, De Ridder, De Witt Huberts, and Evers ( 2014 ) while adding a condition in which people are post hoc provided with an explanation for their behaviour. Study 2 addresses this question by explicitly demanding an explanation for a nonconsciously steered choice. Both studies were conducted in the context of eating behaviour. Results of both studies were indicative of confabulation as a downstream consequence of nonconsciously steered eating behaviour (Study 1) or food choice (Study 2). Future research should address the potential of confabulated reasons spilling over to next occasions.     

Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard,Meaning and Normativity

In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard’s preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving ‘oughts’. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis – a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.     

Uppsala 1968 – The Swedish Context

The 4th Assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1968 was an event of global significance, drawing participants from around the world under the theme “Behold, I make all things new.” At the same time, it was an event taking place in Sweden – a country that by the 1960s had become a model of “responsible society,” with strong economic growth, an all‐encompassing welfare state, and an ambitious policy for international development that was channelling material aid to Southern Africa. For the Church of Sweden, the assembly marked a continuity with the 1925 World Conference on Life and Work convened in Stockholm by Swedish Archbishop Nathan Söderblom. In turn, the Swedish churches themselves were influenced by the Uppsala assembly, especially in the renewal of liturgy and worship. This article explores the Swedish dimension of the Uppsala assembly through examining the legacy of the Stockholm conference of 1925, the societal and political context in Sweden of the 1960s, the participation of youth, and the impact of the assembly on Swedish church life.     

Many entities, no identity

The aim of this paper is to argue that some objections raised by Jantzen (Synthese, 2010) against the separation of the concepts of ‘counting’ and ‘identity’ are misled. We present a definition of counting in the context of quasi-set theory requiring neither the labeling nor the identity and individuality of the counted entities. We argue that, contrary to what Jantzen poses, there are no problems with the technical development of this kind of definition. As a result of being able to keep counting and identity apart for those entities, we briefly suggest that one venerable tradition concerning the nature of quantum particles may be consistently held. According to that tradition, known as the Received View on particles non-individuality, quantum particles may be seen as entities having both features: (i) identity and individuality do not apply to them, (ii) they may be gathered in collections comprising a plurality of them.     

A continuous false belief task reveals egocentric biases in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders

This study reports on a new false belief measure in a sample of 124 children and adolescents with or without high functioning autism (HFASD). In the classic paradigm, a participant predicts in which of two discrete locations a deceived protagonist will look for an object. In the current Sandbox task, the object is buried and reburied in a sandbox, thus creating a continuum between locations. Compared to typically developing individuals (n=62), those with HFASD (n=62) showed a larger egocentric bias on the Sandbox task. They failed to take the protagonist's false belief into account, despite their adequate ability to infer advanced mental states. This indicates that sensitive measures can reveal subtle first order Theory of Mind impairments in HFASD individuals.