Specifying executive representations and processes in number generation tasks

The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems framework, ICS (Barnard, 1985) proposes that central executive phenomena can be accounted for by two autonomous subsystems, which process different forms of meaning: propositional and schematic (implicational) meanings. The apparent supervisory role of the executive arises from limitations on the exchange of information between these and other cognitive subsystems. This general proposal is elaborated in four experiments in which a total of 1,293 participants are asked to spontaneously generate a large verbal number to varying task constraints, with the intention of specifying the representations of number and task that underlie responses. Responses change systematically according to participants' use of explicit propositional information provided by the instructions, and inferred implicational information about what the experimenter is requesting. There was a high error rate (between 6% and 24%), participants producing responses that did not fall within the large range indicated by the instructions. The studies support the distinction between propositional and implicational processing in executive function, and provide a framework for understanding normal executive representations and processes.     

Rethinking temporal contiguity and the judgement of causality: effects of prior knowledge, experience, and reinforcement procedure.

Time plays a pivotal role in causal inference. Nonetheless most contemporary theories of causal induction do not address the implications of temporal contiguity and delay, with the exception of associative learning theory. Shanks, Pearson, and Dickinson (1989) and several replications (Reed, 1992, 1999) have demonstrated that people fail to identify causal relations if cause and effect are separated by more than two seconds. In line with an associationist perspective, these findings have been interpreted to indicate that temporal lags universally impair causal induction. This interpretation clashes with the richness of everyday causal cognition where people apparently can reason about causal relations involving considerable delays. We look at the implications of cause-effect delays from a computational perspective and predict that delays should generally hinder reasoning performance, but that this hindrance should be alleviated if reasoners have knowledge of the delay. Two experiments demonstrated that (1) the impact of delay on causal judgement depends on participants' expectations about the timeframe of the causal relation, and (2) the free-operant procedures used in previous studies are ill-suited to study the direct influences of delay on causal induction, because they confound delay with weaker evidence for the relation in question. Implications for contemporary causal learning theories are discussed.     

Some uses of the Psychoanalyst in the NHS

SUMMARY

This paper addresses various training issues of psychotherapy training in mental hospitals. It discusses some particular attitudes about the use of the Psychoanalyst as a Psychotherapist as well as the Institutions' (i.e. psychiatric establishments) desire often for a superficial teaching in Psychotherapy. It describes a training for NHS staff in psychodynamics and in particular in use of the counter-transference from Balint's model of general practitioner training groups.

Training groups most usually seen in GP seminars, with their central use of counter-transference by the analyst, can be extended to train medical students, nurses, social workers, etc. It is a form of training that uses the analytic stance rather than something of lesser alloy, and allows the Psychoanalyst to be himself rather than function at the level of a Psychotherapist alone.