Trial-by-trial effects in the affective priming paradigm

In this paper, we yield evidence for the dependence of affective priming on the congruency of the previous trial. Affective priming refers to the finding that valence categorizations of targets are facilitated when the preceding prime is of the same valence. In two experiments, affective priming was diminished after incongruent trials (i.e., prime and target were of different valence), whereas, significant affective priming was observed after congruent trials (i.e., prime and target were of same valence). We compare this pattern to the known sequential dependencies in Stroop- and Eriksen-type tasks. Furthermore, our results can help to improve the statistical power of studies in which the affective priming task is used as a measure for automatic evaluations of attitude-objects.     

Generalization of conditioned fear-potentiated startle in humans: experimental validation and clinical relevance

Though generalization of conditioned fear has been implicated as a central feature of pathological anxiety, surprisingly little is known about the psychobiology of this learning phenomenon in humans. Whereas animal work has frequently applied methods to examine generalization gradients to study the gradual weakening of the conditioned-fear response as the test stimulus increasingly differs from the conditioned stimulus (CS), to our knowledge no psychobiological studies of such gradients have been conducted in humans over the last 40 years. The current effort validates an updated generalization paradigm incorporating more recent methods for the objective measurement of anxiety (fear-potentiated startle). The paradigm employs 10, quasi-randomly presented, rings of gradually increasing size with extremes serving as CS+ and CS−. The eight rings of intermediary size serve as generalization stimuli (GSs) and create a continuum-of-similarity from CS+ to CS−. Both startle data and online self-report ratings demonstrate continuous decreases in generalization as the presented stimulus becomes less similar to the CS+. The current paradigm represents an updated and efficacious tool with which to study fear generalization—a central, yet understudied conditioning-correlate of pathologic anxiety.     

Do fish count? Spontaneous discrimination of quantity in female mosquitofish

The spontaneous tendency to join the largest social group was used to investigate quantity discrimination in fish. Fish discriminated between shoals that differed by one element when the paired numbers were 1vs2, 2vs3 and 3vs4, but not when 4vs5 or larger. Using large numerosities (>4), the ability to discriminate between two numbers improved as the numerical distance between them increased and a significant discrimination was found only with ratios of 1:2 or smaller (4vs8, 8vs16 and 4vs10). Experiments to control for non-numerical variables evidenced the role played by the total area of stimuli with both large and small numerosities; the total quantity of movement of the fish within a shoal appeared also important but only when large numerosities were involved. Even though the pattern of discrimination exhibited by female mosquitofish is not fully consistent with any of the existing models of quantity representation, our results seem to suggest two distinct mechanisms in fish, one used to compare small numbers of objects and one used when larger numerosities are involved.     

Does self-consciousness increase or decrease priming effects? It depends

Self-consciousness has been shown to both increase and decrease the magnitude of prime-to-behavior effects. In this paper, we decouple the facets of self-consciousness into internal state awareness and self-reflectiveness and show that self-consciousness can be associated with multiple influences on automatic behavior. Specifically, we conducted an experiment demonstrating that increased internal state awareness decreased the magnitude of the prime-to-behavior effect, whereas increased self-reflectiveness amplified the effect. These effects operated independently of self-monitoring and suggest a multiple process approach to understanding prime-to-behavior effects.     

Similarities and differences between traumatic and emotional memories: review and directions for future research

The authors review theory and empirical research on the characteristics of memories for traumatic versus emotional events, with the goal of bringing together the cognitive and clinical perspectives on this issue. They consider the most important approaches to the study of traumatic and emotional memory and summarize the results of recent studies that have compared autobiographical recollections of traumatic and nontraumatic emotional experiences (positive and negative), either in nonclinical or clinical samples. Overall, findings from the current empirical literature are inconsistent. Although some researchers have found that traumatic memories are retrieved differently than are emotional memories, others have demonstrated that the phenomenological characteristics of these memory types are highly similar. The authors discuss methodological issues that could help researchers to interpret the inconsistencies found in the empirical findings. Last, they suggest possible directions for future research that may advance researchers' knowledge of memory, trauma, and emotion.     

Who is watching Big Brother? TV consumption predicted by masked affective priming

In the present study (N=37), we assessed attitudes towards a telecast (Big Brother) with indirect (masked affective priming) and direct (semantic differentials) methods. Additionally, participants recorded their TV viewing behaviour for a period of 7 days. Implicit positivity of the telecast (assessed by the affective priming task), explicit positivity (semantic differentials), and minutes per week spent viewing the TV show were all positively correlated. Viewers of the telecast show a positive priming effect for the label of the telecast (thereby indicating a positive implicit attitude towards the show). Implications for the research and the theoretical debate on implicit attitudes are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate?

On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utilityare not empirically meaningful, and ``hence' impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws onthe parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguisticmeaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisonsof utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empiricallyunderdetermined and, if we also deny any appropriate truth of the matter, indeterminate. However, the underdeterminationcan be broken non-arbitrarily (though not purely empirically) if (i) we assign normative significance to certainstates of affairs or (ii) we posit a fixed connection between certain empirically observable proxies and utility.I conclude that, even if interpersonal comparisons are not empirically meaningful, they are not in principle impossible.