Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy

Evidence-based medicine (EBM) makes use of explicit procedures for grading evidence for causal claims. Normally, these procedures categorise evidence of correlation produced by statistical trials as better evidence for a causal claim than evidence of mechanisms produced by other methods. We argue, in contrast, that evidence of mechanisms needs to be viewed as complementary to, rather than inferior to, evidence of correlation. In this paper we first set out the case for treating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation in explicit protocols for evaluating evidence. Next we provide case studies which exemplify the ways in which evidence of mechanisms complements evidence of correlation in practice. Finally, we put forward some general considerations as to how the two sorts of evidence can be more closely integrated by EBM.     

Discovering the Sequential Structure of Thought

Multi‐voxel pattern recognition techniques combined with Hidden Markov models can be used to discover the mental states that people go through in performing a task. The combined method identifies both the mental states and how their durations vary with experimental conditions. We apply this method to a task where participants solve novel mathematical problems. We identify four states in the solution of these problems: Encoding, Planning, Solving, and Respond. The method allows us to interpret what participants are doing on individual problem‐solving trials. The duration of the planning state varies on a trial‐to‐trial basis with novelty of the problem. The duration of solution stage similarly varies with the amount of computation needed to produce a solution once a plan is devised. The response stage similarly varies with the complexity of the answer produced. In addition, we identified a number of effects that ran counter to a prior model of the task. Thus, we were able to decompose the overall problem‐solving time into estimates of its components and in way that serves to guide theory.     

Changing the Paradigm for Engineering Ethics

Modern philosophy recognizes two major ethical theories: deontology, which encourages adherence to rules and fulfillment of duties or obligations; and consequentialism, which evaluates morally significant actions strictly on the basis of their actual or anticipated outcomes. Both involve the systematic application of universal abstract principles, reflecting the culturally dominant paradigm of technical rationality. Professional societies promulgate codes of ethics with which engineers are expected to comply (deontology), while courts and the public generally assign liability to engineers primarily in accordance with the results of their work, whether intended or unintended (consequentialism). A third option, prominent in ancient philosophy, has reemerged recently: virtue ethics, which recognizes that sensitivity to context and practical judgment are indispensable in particular concrete situations, and therefore rightly focuses on the person who acts, rather than the action itself. Beneficial character traits—i.e., virtues—are identified within a specific social practice in light of the internal goods that are unique to it. This paper proposes a comprehensive framework for implementing virtue ethics within engineering.     

The Salience of Moral Character

In this essay I review an underappreciated strand of thought according to which the best Kantian moral theory has less in common with paradigmatically deontological theories and more in common with virtue theories than is standardly maintained. I then argue this program should be continued further, to provide not only a virtue‐based account of moral judgment but also a virtue‐based account of moral worth. I make a case that this fusion of Kantian theory with virtue theory provides the best account of moral rules, and I close by suggesting that it generates a promising new understanding of moral rights.     

Affiliation‐seeking among the powerless: Lacking power increases social affiliative motivation

Although it is well known that many people possess fundamental desires for both social affiliation and power, research has only begun to investigate the interplay between these two core social motives. The current research tested the hypothesis that an individual's level of power would influence that person's level of social affiliative motivation. We predicted that, compared with participants in a control condition, (1) individuals who possess power would exhibit less social affiliative motivation; and (2) individuals who lack power would display greater social affiliative motivation. Although we found little evidence to support the former prediction, we observed consistent evidence across two experiments that supported the latter. In Experiment 1, priming participants with low power (versus control) led them to display greater interest in joining a campus service aimed at fostering new friendships among students. In Experiment 2, placing participants in a position of low power (versus control) led them to seek greater proximity to a partner. Together, these results suggest that lacking power motivates people to seek social affiliation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation

Unusability pessimism has recently emerged as an appealing new option for pessimists about aesthetic testimony—those who deny the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony. Unusability pessimists argue that we should reject the traditional pessimistic stance that knowledge of aesthetic matters is unavailable via testimony in favour of the view that while such knowledge is available to us, it is unusable. This unusability stems from the fact that accepting such testimony would violate an important non‐epistemic norm of belief formation. In this article I present an objection to unusability pessimism and argue that Robert Hopkins, the view's most prominent defender, fails to motivate adequately the claim that there are such non‐epistemic belief norms. The cases which putatively legitimize usability norms can be explained by appeal to more familiar norm types: epistemic norms of belief formation, and non‐epistemic norms which govern action other than belief formation. The intent of this article is not primarily negative, however, and I will also argue that understanding why the unusability position fails helps us to identify a promising new direction for the pessimist's opponents who wish to defend the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony.     

Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground

A logic of grounding where what is grounded can be a collection of truths is a “many-many” logic of ground. The idea that grounding might be irreducibly many-many has recently been suggested by Dasgupta (2014). In this paper I present a range of novel philosophical and logical reasons for being interested in many-many logics of ground. I then show how Fine’s State-Space semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground (plg) can be extended to the many-many case, giving rise to the Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground (plmmg). In the second, more technical, part of the paper, I do two things. First, I present an alternative formalization of plg; this allows us to simplify Fine’s completeness proof for plg. Second, I formalize plmmg using an infinitary sequent calculus and prove that this formalization is sound and complete.     

Applying the Chaos Theory of Careers as a Framework for College Career Centers

The chaos theory of careers (CTC; Pryor & Bright, 2011 ) has emerged as a career development theory to describe the reality of career development and account for the changing nature of work in the 21st century. Integrating CTC into a coherent framework accessible to practitioners is an ongoing process. In recent years, CTC has gained traction within some college career centers. Although techniques and interventions have been discussed to address some of the primary issues, no overarching framework has been conceptualized. This article proposes a model to conceptualize CTC in an accessible framework for college career centers, students, and beyond.     

Evidence Evaluation and Evidence Integration in Legal Decision‐Making: Order of Evidence Presentation as a Moderator of Context Effects

Legal decision‐making studies often demonstrate context effects: People's initial beliefs about a suspect's guilt influence their evaluation of subsequent evidence. We examine three potential moderators of these context effects: Order of evidence presentation, ability to ruminate, and valence of the initial belief (innocence or guilt). College students (n = 382) were presented with DNA evidence (incriminating or exonerating) and an ambiguous alibi in one of two orders (or just the alibi), and then evaluated how strongly the alibi incriminated the suspect and the suspect's likelihood of guilt. Results indicated that alibi evaluation exhibited context effects when (i) initial beliefs were of guilt (but not of innocence) and when (ii) evaluating subsequent evidence (but not when retroactively evaluating prior evidence). Rumination failed to moderate any effects. The integration of evidence exhibited recency effects: DNA had a greater impact on participants' beliefs in the suspect's guilt when presented last rather than first. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.