Empathy and the aesthetic: Why does art still move us?

In this article I will argue for the affective-motivation (background affective attitude or orientation) hypothesis that incubates the aesthetic experience and sets the deep frame of our engagement with art. For this, I look at these microgenetic—early passages of (a) affective perception as mapped into the early emergence of tertiary qualities that underlie a sensorimotor synchronization—a coupling of action, emotion and perception via mirroring that result in dynamic embodied anticipatory control and a feeling of proximity/connectedness and (b) developmental passages that are characterized by spatiotemporal coordination and proximity of the self-other/interactive object and thus structure intentionality, shape experience, in an engaging world of action potentialities forming a background affective attitude. As I will argue these qualitative emergent layers provide the minimal for the aesthetic and the ‘feeling into’ empathy, or their phenomenological counterparts enable engaged, embodied perception and imagination underlying expressive symbolic communication in interpersonal settings but also for the possibility of art. These layers have an ‘echoing’ effect (pre-attentive) when we let ourselves to be ‘moved’ from within by art. The underlying mechanism could be found in the mirroring interface of the upcoming bottom-up and feeding forward anticipatory/predictive (top-down) function of the ‘embodied action’ representations that are affective, imitative and grounded in the body-affective matrix—carrying experiential affordances and keeping the intersubjective ties between spectator and beheld/object. Given the asymmetry on action tendency between them that affords the ‘subordination of the goal-directed action’ into to the means of the action’s unfolding, aesthetic experiences can go deeply back reconstructing the first level of emerging consciousness where both the aesthetic and ethic became actualities. This could be by itself deeply rewarding, amplifying the experience to the ‘edge’. This is a ‘hot’ cognition self-restructuring related to morality when facing the sufferings—so there might be something special bout art and negative emotions in relation to empathy.     

Attenuated audiovisual integration in middle-aged adults in a discrimination task

Numerous studies have focused on the diversity of audiovisual integration between younger and older adults. However, consecutive trends in audiovisual integration throughout life are still unclear. In the present study, to clarify audiovisual integration characteristics in middle-aged adults, we instructed younger and middle-aged adults to conduct an auditory/visual stimuli discrimination experiment. Randomized streams of unimodal auditory (A), unimodal visual (V) or audiovisual stimuli were presented on the left or right hemispace of the central fixation point, and subjects were instructed to respond to the target stimuli rapidly and accurately. Our results demonstrated that the responses of middle-aged adults to all unimodal and bimodal stimuli were significantly slower than those of younger adults (p < 0.05). Audiovisual integration was markedly delayed (onset time 360 ms) and weaker (peak 3.97%) in middle-aged adults than in younger adults (onset time 260 ms, peak 11.86%). The results suggested that audiovisual integration was attenuated in middle-aged adults and further confirmed age-related decline in information processing.     

Seeing what is not seen

This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.     

Storytelling agents: why narrative rather than mental time travel is fundamental

I propose that we can explain the contribution of mental time travel to agency through understanding it as a specific instance of our more general capacity for narrative understanding. Narrative understanding involves the experience of a pre-reflective and embodied sense of self, which co-emerges with our emotional involvement with a sequence of events (Velleman 2003). Narrative understanding of a sequence of events also requires a ‘recombinable system’, that is, the ability to combine parts to make myriad sequences. Mental time travel shares these two characteristics: it involves an embodied sense of self and the ability to create novel scenarios. What is unique about mental time travel is that it is a story explicitly about our selves, and it involves metarepresentation. Agency is enabled by narrative understanding when we are able to put our current situation into a larger narrative context, whereby some possible actions, but not others, make sense. However, new features of agency are enabled when we understand stories that are explicitly about our selves: we gain the ability to plan and act on plans.     

Sensorimotor theory,cognitive access and the ‘absolute’ explanatory gap

Sensorimotor Theory (SMT) is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following three claims. First, that appeals to cognitive access fail to answer the absolute gap question. Second, that SMT can be read in a way that rejects the gap question. Third, that if proponents of SMT are prepared to read SMT in a way that rejects the absolute gap question, then they can also reject the claim that cognitive access is needed to explain experience.     

Normative accuracy and response time data for the computerized Benton Facial Recognition Test (BFRT-<Emphasis Type="Italic">c</Emphasis>)

We report normative data from a large (N = 307) sample of young adult participants tested with a computerized version of the long form of the classical Benton Facial Recognition Test (BFRT; Benton & Van Allen, 1968). The BFRT-c requires participants to match a target face photograph to either one or three of six face photographs presented simultaneously. We found that the percent accuracy on the BFRT-c (81%–83%) was below ceiling yet well above chance level, with little interindividual variance in this typical population sample, two important aspects of a sensitive clinical test. Although the split-half reliability on response accuracy was relatively low, due to the large variability in difficulty across items, the correct response times measured in this version—completed in 3 min, on average—provide a reliable and critical complementary measure of performance at individual unfamiliar-face matching. In line with previous observations from other measures, females outperformed male participants at the BFRT-c, especially for female faces. In general, performance was also lower following lighting changes than following head rotations, in line with previous studies that have emphasized participants’ limited ability to match pictures of unfamiliar faces with important variations in illumination. Overall, this normative data set supports the validity of the BFRT-c as a key component of a battery of tests to identify clinical impairments in individual face recognition, such as observed in acquired prosopagnosia. However, this analysis strongly recommends that researchers consider the full test results: Beyond global indexes of performance based on accuracy rates only, they should consider the time taken to match individual faces as well as the variability in performance across items.     

Predicting group-level outcome variables: An empirical comparison of analysis strategies

This study provides a review of two methods for analyzing multilevel data with group-level outcome variables and compares them in a simulation study. The analytical methods included an unadjusted ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of group means and a two-step adjustment of the group means suggested by Croon and van Veldhoven (2007). The Type I error control, power, bias, standard errors, and RMSE in parameter estimates were compared across design conditions that included manipulations of number of predictor variables, level of correlation between predictors, level of intraclass correlation, predictor reliability, effect size, and sample size. The results suggested that an OLS analysis of the group means, with White’s heteroscedasticity adjustment, provided more power for tests of group-level predictors, but less power for tests of individual-level predictors. Furthermore, this simple analysis avoided the extreme bias in parameter estimates and inadmissible solutions that were encountered with other strategies. These results were interpreted in terms of recommended analytical methods for applied researchers.     

How visual spatial attention alters perception

Visual attention is essential for visual perception. Spatial attention allows us to grant priority in processing and selectively process information at a given location. In this paper, I explain how two kinds of spatial attention: covert (allocated to the target location, without accompanying eye movements) and presaccadic (allocated to the location of the upcoming saccade’s target) affect performance and alter appearance. First, I highlight some behavioral and neuroimaging research on covert attention, which alters performance and appearance in many basic visual tasks. Second, I review studies showing that presaccadic attention improves performance and alters appearance at the saccade target location. Further, these modulations change the processing of feature information automatically, even when it is detrimental to the task at hand. We propose that saccade preparation may support transsaccadic integration. Systematically investigating the common and differential characteristics of covert attention and presaccadic attention will continue to further our understanding of the pervasive selective processing of information, which enables us to make sense of our complex visual world.