Spatial updating relies on an egocentric representation of space: Effects of the number of objects

Models of spatial updating attempt to explain how representations of spatial relationships between the actor and objects in the environment change as the actor moves. In allocentric models, object locations are encoded in an external reference frame, and only the actor’s position and orientation in that reference frame need to be updated. Thus, spatial updating should be independent of the number of objects in the environment (set size). In egocentric updating models, object locations are encoded relative to the actor, so the location of each object relative to the actor must be updated as the actor moves. Thus, spatial updating efficiency should depend on set size. We examined which model better accounts for human spatial updating by having people reconstruct the locations of varying numbers of virtual objects either from the original study position or from a changed viewing position. In consistency with the egocentric updating model, object localization following a viewpoint change was affected by the number of objects in the environment.     

Whose Fault? The Origins and Evitability of the Analytic–Continental Rift

This is a broad survey of the chronology of the rift between continental and analytic philosophy, starting in 1899. Whereas at that time there was no discernible divide, as the twentieth century progresses we can see a gradual parting of the ways in which philosophy was done, culminating in a period of maximum separation in 1945-68, followed by some convergence. There is one substantial historical thesis proposed, and facts are adduced from the chronology to back it up: that the divide was never absolute, never purely geographical, and above all that it was not inevitable, but was largely the product of accidental historical circumstances, of which the most crucial was the flourishing of totalitarianism in Europe and the disruption caused by two world wars.     

Age Differences in Coping Resources and Satisfaction With Life Among Middle-Aged,Young-Old,and Oldest-Old Adults

The authors examined age differences in perceived coping resources and satisfaction with life across 3 older-adult age groups (45-64, 65-74, and 75 years and older). The 98 participants represented healthy, socially active, community-residing adults. Group comparisons were made on 12 individual coping scales, and an overall coping resource effectiveness score was computed. No significant differences were found for 11 of the coping resources or for overall coping resource effectiveness. Similar consistencies in life satisfaction were found across the 3 age groups. The findings indicate that (a) for healthy adults, the oldest old cope at least as effectively as their younger counterparts, despite their likelihood of encountering increased levels of stress; and (b) psychologically, old age may be viewed as a time of resilience and fortitude.     

Links between neuroticism,emotional distress,and disengaging attention: Evidence from a single-target RSVP task

Anxiety and depression are often associated with attention control deficits, but few studies have explored whether neuroticism can account for these links. In the present study, undergraduate students (n=146) completed self-report measures of neuroticism, worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression and also completed a visual attention task in which they were asked to identify a red target letter embedded within a rapid sequence of items. Neuroticism was associated with detection of the target when it was preceded by a distracter with which it shared a feature in common (a green letter). Specifically, these distracters produced longer attentional blinks in individuals with elevated levels of neuroticism. In contrast, target detection was not significantly associated with worry, anxious arousal, or anhedonic depression. We discuss the implications of this link between neuroticism and attention for cognitive models of emotional distress and disorders.     

Worry spreads: Interpersonal transfer of problem-related anxiety

This paper distinguishes processes potentially contributing to interpersonal anxiety transfer, including object-directed social appraisal, empathic worry, and anxiety contagion, and reviews evidence for their operation. We argue that these anxiety-transfer processes may be exploited strategically when attempting to regulate relationship partners’ emotion. More generally, anxiety may serve as either a warning signal to other people about threat (alerting function) or an appeal for emotional support or practical help (comfort-seeking function). Tensions between these two interpersonal functions may account for mutually incongruent interpersonal responses to expressed anxiety, including mistargeted interpersonal regulation attempts. Because worry waxes and wanes over time as a function of other people's ongoing reactions, interpersonal interventions may help to alleviate some of its maladaptive consequences.     

Children's use of addition to solve two‐digit subtraction problems

Subtraction problems of the type M ? S = ? can be solved with various mental calculation strategies. We investigated fourth‐ to sixth‐graders' use of the subtraction by addition strategy, first by fitting regression models to the reaction times of 32 two‐digit subtractions. These models represented three different strategy use patterns: the use of direct subtraction, subtraction by addition, and switching between the two strategies based on the magnitude of the subtrahend. Additionally, we compared performance on problems presented in two presentation formats, i.e., a subtraction format (81 ? 37 = .) and an addition format (37 + . = 81). Both methods converged to the conclusion that children of all three grades switched between direct subtraction and subtraction by addition based on the combination of two features of the subtrahend: If the subtrahend was smaller than the difference, direct subtraction was the dominant strategy; if the subtrahend was larger than the difference, subtraction by addition was mainly used. However, this performance pattern was only observed when the numerical distance between subtrahend and difference was large. These findings indicate that theoretical models of children's strategy choices in subtraction should include the nature of the subtrahend as an important factor in strategy selection.     

Distracted by Details: Narrative Influence Following Conflicting Stories

Work on narrative influence has demonstrated that stories can have a strong effect on people's thoughts and attitudes. However, existing research has not addressed how people respond to multiple stories endorsing different conclusions. The current studies examined how reading two conflicting narratives influences people's decisions about a subsequent situation, with particular emphasis on how resemblances between the narratives and the situation moderate the effects. Across two studies, participants read two testimonials that described the successful use of different treatments for a medical disorder. Participants subsequently made treatment recommendations for a patient who resembled one of the testimonials in treatment-relevant ways. The key manipulation was whether the patient also resembled the other testimonial in treatment-irrelevant ways. Both studies found that these distracting, irrelevant similarities led to less appropriate treatment recommendations. The effect on decision confidence, however, was less clear, with some suggestion of both an increase (Study 1) and a decrease (Study 2) in confidence.     

Alternative-based thresholding with application to presurgical fMRI

Functional magnetic reasonance imaging (fMRI) plays an important role in pre-surgical planning for patients with resectable brain lesions such as tumors. With appropriately designed tasks, the results of fMRI studies can guide resection, thereby preserving vital brain tissue. The mass univariate approach to fMRI data analysis consists of performing a statistical test in each voxel, which is used to classify voxels as either active or inactive—that is, related, or not, to the task of interest. In cognitive neuroscience, the focus is on controlling the rate of false positives while accounting for the severe multiple testing problem of searching the brain for activations. However, stringent control of false positives is accompanied by a risk of false negatives, which can be detrimental, particularly in clinical settings where false negatives may lead to surgical resection of vital brain tissue. Consequently, for clinical applications, we argue for a testing procedure with a stronger focus on preventing false negatives. We present a thresholding procedure that incorporates information on false positives and false negatives. We combine two measures of significance for each voxel: a classical p-value, which reflects evidence against the null hypothesis of no activation, and an alternative p-value, which reflects evidence against activation of a prespecified size. This results in a layered statistical map for the brain. One layer marks voxels exhibiting strong evidence against the traditional null hypothesis, while a second layer marks voxels where activation cannot be confidently excluded. The third layer marks voxels where the presence of activation can be rejected.