Two alternative models of health behaviour and recovery from activity limitations due to acute injury: A prospective study

Cognitions influence recovery from activity limitations. In this study we aimed to independently test, compare and combine the common sense self-regulation model (CS-SRM) and social cognitive theory (SCT) in predicting recovery from activity limitations due to acute injury. Measures were gathered at two time points 5–6 weeks apart. The sample consisted of 146 university students (Mean age: 21.86, SD: 4.83, 62% female) with a heterogeneous range of injuries that limited their participation in physical activity. The dependent variable was recovery from activity limitations (Physical Functioning?–?Short Form-36). The predictor variables were measured using the Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire and SCT items designed according to theoretical recommendations. Time-line (TL) and self-efficacy (SE) were significant predictors of recovery in a multivariate analysis, controlling for reported pain at Time 1. A combined model including the best predictors from both models, TL (β = ?0.25, p < 0.05, R ² change = 0.17, p < 0.01) and SE (β =0.31, p < 0.05, R ² change = 0.05, p < 0.05), accounted for a significant amount of the variance in recovery from activity limitations. A combination of key variables from both models may be particularly useful for understanding the cognitive factors that influence recovery from activity limitations.     

Evaluating the impact of a worksite stress management programme for distressed student nurses: A randomised controlled trial

Abstract

The effectiveness of a stress management intervention designed to reduce affective distress in 79 student nurses who previously reported significant distress, was evaluated by comparing stress management with wait-list control. The intervention had reliable, positive effects on affective outcomes including General Health Questionnaire-30, State and Trait Anxiety Inventory, Beck Depression Inventory, and a measure of domestic satisfaction. The intervention also led to an increase in Direct Coping use.

State Anxiety immediately preceding two important examinations, i.e. at 3 and 18 month follow-up, was lower for students receiving stress management. However, no effect was detected on sickness, absence and examination performance following this intervention. Stress management delivered in groups reduces affective distress and increases adaptive coping use in both clinical and academic settings.     

Binge-Drinking: A Test of the Role of Group Norms in the Theory of Planned Behaviour

A study was undertaken to assess the utility of the theory of planned behaviour in the prediction of students' binge-drinking. Additionally, a perspective was utilised to address the usually weak contribution of subjective norms in predicting behavioural intentions. Respondents were 289 undergraduate students. The study employed a longitudinal design, with the predictors of performing the behaviour under consideration assessed prior to the measure of reported behaviour. Support was found for the application of the theory of planned behaviour to binge-drinking. A reconceptualisation of norms in the theory of planned behaviour, from a social identity theory/self-categorization theory perspective, was also supported; consistent with expectations, the norms of a behaviourally relevant reference group predicted intentions to binge-drink, especially for participants who identified strongly with the reference group. The results are discussed in relation to measures which may help to reduce the incidence of binge-drinking by university students.     

Flexibilidad y demandas de capacidad de la atención

RESUMEN

El artículo presenta una teoría multimodal de la atención. Se supone que la atención es flexible, pudiendo hacer un análisis perceptual de la información de distinta profundidad. La información objetivo es seleccionada al nivel del análisis sensorial por los modos tempranos de la atención pero no lo es por los modos tardíos hasta después del análisis semántico. Mientras el sistema de análisis perceptual cambia de los modos tempranos a los tardíos, se recoge más información de las vías no-objetivo, pero requiere más capacidad para atender a la vía objetivo. El estudio comprueba con cinco experimentos los dos supuestos principales, a saber: que la atención requiere capacidad y que la cantidad de capacidad requerida se incrementa de los modos tempranos a los tardíos. En la discusión general los autores afirman que los datos apoyan estos dos supuestos de la teoría multimodal.     

Ockham and Buridan on the Ampliation of Modal Propositions

This paper explores a currently unnoticed argument used by John Buridan to defend his analysis of modal propositions and to reject the analysis of modal propositions of necessity put forward by William of Ockham. First, I explore this argument and, by considering possible responses of Ockham to Buridan, show some of the ways in which Ockham seems to be keeping closer to Aristotle's remarks about modal propositions in Prior Analytics, 18.     

A Formal Reconstruction of Buridan's Modal Syllogism

In this paper, we provide a historical exposition of John Buridan's theory of divided modal propositions. We then develop a semantic interpretation of Buridan's theory which pays particular attention to Buridan's ampliation of modal terms. We show that these semantics correctly capture his syllogistic reasoning.     

Learning the Relevance of Relevance and the Trouble with Truth: Evaluating Explanatory Relevance across Childhood

ABSTRACT

In four experiments, we investigate how the ability to detect irrelevant explanations develops. In Experiments 1 and 2, 4- to 8-year-olds and adults rated different types of explanations about “what makes cars go” individually, in the absence of a direct contrast. Each explanation was true and relevant (e.g., “Cars have engines that turn gasoline into power”), true and irrelevant (e.g., “Cars have radios that play music”), or a false statement that would be relevant if it were true (e.g., “Cars have rockets that speed them up”). Participants of all ages spontaneously indicated that false explanations were less helpful than relevant explanations. However, there was a developmental shift for irrelevant explanations: 4-year-olds only detected irrelevant explanations that did not involve internal features of cars (e.g., “Cars have parking lots that they park in”). Crucially, this shift between age 4 and 5 cannot be explained by 4-year-olds’ lack of knowledge since 4-year-olds correctly indicated that relevant explanations were more helpful than irrelevant feature explanations when given a direct contrast in Experiment 3. These results are further clarified in Experiment 4, in which we provided a different explanatory goal (“where to find cars”) and found that even young children have a nuanced understanding of explanatory relevance that is sensitive to differing explanatory goals. Together, these four experiments suggest an early-emerging ability to understand relevance, but a shift between age 4 and 5 in the ability to spontaneously use this understanding when evaluating individual explanations in isolation.     

Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Like scientists, children seek ways to explain causal systems in the world. But are children scientists in the strict Bayesian tradition of maximizing posterior probability? Or do they attend to other explanatory considerations, as laypeople and scientists – such as Einstein – do? Four experiments support the latter possibility. In particular, we demonstrate in four experiments that 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children, like adults, have a robust latent scope bias that leads to inferences that do not maximize posterior probability. When faced with two explanations equally consistent with observed data, where one explanation makes an unverified prediction, children consistently preferred the explanation that does not make this prediction (Experiment 1), even if the prior probabilities are identical (Experiment 3). Additional evidence suggests that this latent scope bias may result from the same explanatory strategies used by adults (Experiments 1 and 2), and can be attenuated by strong prior odds (Experiment 4). We argue that children, like adults, rely on ‘explanatory virtues’ in inference – a strategy that often leads to normative responses, but can also lead to systematic error.